Data Science in Human Health: Opportunities and Challenges

Introduction to Data Science

Despite the recent hype and discussion regarding data science, there is much confusion about what data science actually is. Some embrace the term and field of data science, for example, Davenport and Patil (2012) labelled it “the sexiest job of the 21st century”. Others are more critical of the term, for example, Bloor (2013) claimed that there is “nothing at all new” about data science and it is “utterly misleading”. Regardless of this debate, whenever data science is referred to in this report, it means something more or less similar to the definition stated by Stanton (2012), who wrote that: “data science refers to an emerging area of work concerned with the collection, preparation, analysis, visualisation, management, and preservation of large collections of information.” (p.ii). According to the general consensus of literature, data science is a systematic process, hence the word ‘science’, that involves a combination of statistics and analytics to gain knowledge about the world (Dhar, 2013). There is undoubtedly a lot of hype and excitement about data science, and the potential opportunities it presents.

Human Health

The beauty of data science is that it allows for more effective decision-making, as it produces empirical data that is more objective and reliable than subjective human opinion. Strong evidence suggests that a variety of different industries which have embraced data analytics, including banking, retail and sports, have seen a number of benefits and improvements to the efficiency of its service. This paper focuses on the benefits and opportunities presented by data science in the field of human health. This includes observing how data can improve the quality and delivery of healthcare services; how it can help in developing and testing new medicines and treatments; and how it can improve human health and nutrition in general.

According to the World Health Organisation (2016, p. V), the biggest global challenges to human health include reducing maternal and child mortality, reducing diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and hepatitis, and improving nutrition. For Western countries, the challenges are different. In Britain, for example, the major priorities include an ageing population, rising medical and technology costs, bad lifestyle choices, such as poor diet and substance abuse (Scantlebury & Moody, 2015; Snowden, 2015; My Health London, 2016).

Opportunities

The application of data science to the field of human health is genuinely exciting and could be truly revolutionary. If one had the choice of utilising data science in any particular field, healthcare is arguably the most important. Effective collection and analysis of data can literally save many lives. The consensus is that data science has the potential to improve the quality, speed and efficiency of healthcare. (Institute for Health Technology Transformation, 2013, p.7; Harvard Business Review, 2014). According to a McKinsey & Company (2013) report: “researchers can mine data to see what treatments are most effective for particular conditions, identify patterns related to drug side effects or hospital readmissions, and gain other important information that can help patients and reduce costs.” (p.1).

Perhaps one of the most significant benefits for physicians and patients is that big data allows for more personalised healthcare tailored towards specific individual needs. Unfortunately, in healthcare, what works for one patient may not necessarily work well for another. As a result, a more individualist approach is preferable. A patient-centred model is one in which “patients actively participate in their own care and receive services focused on individual needs and preferences, informed by advice and oversight from their healthcare providers.” (Chawla & Davis, 2013, p. 661). Taking into account genetic, environmental, historical and lifestyle factors, physicians can use data to efficiently determine the health of a patient, predicting diseases and illnesses which they are at risk of developing. This view is shared by Benker et al. (2016), who states that:

“A dataset with millions of treatment outcomes joined with tens of thousands of genomic and tumour sequences would be a game-changer. It would allow researchers to study relationships between specific genetic variations and responsiveness to different treatments, moving us closer to truly individualized medicine.” (p.8)

In addition, large research databases, such as sequencing of human genome data, will almost certainly provide useful and meaningful information to scientists and medical professionals, helping them to diagnose, understand and treat conditions like cancer better, benefiting whole populations of people (O’Driscoll, Daugelaite, & Sleator, 2013, p.777).

General citizens can also keep track of their diet and fitness, and make better informed decisions about their health by using smart phone applications such as MyFitnessPal and other new technologies such as Fitbit (Ipjian & Johnston, 2016). This information is collected as data which can be visualised, providing empirical data about health in a cheap, simple and convenient manner. It is often stated that ‘prevention is better than cure’; this and other similar digital technologies can allow the chance for prevention to become truly possible. Individuals can access scientific information about their health without ever needing to visit a doctor or professional, potentially saving huge amounts of money in healthcare.

McKinsey & Company (2013) proficiently summarises the five main potential benefits of big data as: improving ‘living’ – ensuring patients take an active role in treatment and prevention; ‘care’ – ensuring patients receive timely and appropriate treatment; ‘provider’ – allowing patients to be treated by high-performing professionals; ‘value’ – ensuring cost-effective treatment; and ‘innovation’ – advancing new technologies, therapies and approaches to medicine. (pp. 6-7).

Challenges

Although data science presents a number of potentially positive opportunities, the data revolution in healthcare is very much in its early days and is, unfortunately, lagging behind other industries. A number of challenges need to be addressed and overcome in order for the benefits to truly be attained. One of the main challenges facing the industry is that there appears to be a fairly strong resistance to change from the traditional ways of operating. Many physicians are accustomed to using their own subjective professional judgement on making treatment decisions rather than making decisions driven by data (McKinsey & Company 2013, p. 2). In addition, many hospitals and treatment centres are culturally dependent upon using paper and are reluctant to completely embrace the transition to digitalisation and big data (Institute for Health Technology Transformation, 2013, p. 13). In order to take full advantage of the potential opportunities presented by data science, patients, physicians and stakeholders require a shift in their mentality away from traditional practices towards new, data-driven, analytical practices in healthcare (McKinsey & Company, 2013, p.10).

Another major challenge within the industry is that there are concerns regarding the readiness to be able to deal with the sheer volume and complexity of the data. Many of the IT systems and technology used in healthcare are outdated, under-invested and in need of modernising. Healthcare data is often unstructured, fragmented and produced in incompatible formats making data mining and data analysis very time-consuming and very difficult (Institute for Health & Technology Transformation, 2013, p. 13). Furthermore, there is a shortage of supply of individuals with the knowledge, technical skills and expertise to be able to handle the data effectively. As a result, there is a growing demand to increase the supply of data scientists, with calls for more and more educational institutions to offer data related courses and private companies to offer on-the-job training (McKinsey & Company, 2013, p.13). A data scientist is no easy job however. An effective data scientist must be efficient in many areas, including cleaning, analysing and visualising data, ensuring that data are quality, usable and trustworthy. Data scientists are required to be competent in statistics and computer programming, with a respect for the scientific method and an ability to be able to spot trends and communicate their findings effectively (Schutt & O’Neil, 2013, pp.10-12).

One of the largest concerns, particularly for the general public, is regarding privacy of information. Healthcare data is perceptibly sensitive and it is reasonable to assume that most people would prefer their information to remain private. It is completely reasonable for people to have concerns over what healthcare providers are doing with collected data and so a level of transparency is required to ensure data is not being misused. As McKinsey & Company (2013) notes:

“In other data-driven revolutions, some players have taken advantage of data transparency by pursuing objectives that create value only for themselves. In healthcare, some stakeholders may try to take advantage of big data more quickly and aggressively than their competitors, without regard to clinically proven outcomes.” (p.9)

On the other hand, effective use of big data necessitates a certain degree of openness and sharing of data; if privacy is overbearing it would severely limit the potential benefits of data science. Thus, a correct balance must be weighted which sensibly protects patient privacy and at the same time does not limit the potential of data-driven healthcare.

In summary, the main challenges facing the application of data science to healthcare include letting go of traditional methods, improving technology, developing skilled data scientists and dealing with ethical concerns regarding privacy.

References

Benker, K., Harris, T., Malone, K., Mancini, A., Topczewska, O., & Wagner, D. (2016). Big Data Analytics and the Cancer Moonshot. Civis Analytics.

Bloor, R. (2013). A Data Science Rant. Inside Analysis. Retrieved from http://insideanalysis.com/2013/08/a-data-science-rant/

Chawla, N. & Davis, D. (2013). Bringing Big Data to Personalized Healthcare: A Patient-Centered Framework. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 28(S3), 660-665. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11606-013-2455-8

Davenport, T. & Patil, D. (2012). Data Scientist: The Sexiest Job of the 21st Century. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2012/10/data-scientist-the-sexiest-job-of-the-21st-century

Dhar, V. (2013). Data Science and Prediction. Communications of The ACM, 56(12), 64-73.
Harvard Business Review. (2014). How Big Data Impacts Healthcare. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/resources/pdfs/comm/sap/18826_HBR_SAP_Healthcare_Aug_2014.pdf

Ipjian, M. & Johnston, C. (2016). Smartphone technology facilitates dietary change in healthy adults. Nutrition, 1-5. http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nut.2016.08.003

Institute for Health Technology Transformation. (2013). Transforming Health Care Through Big Data: Strategies for leveraging big data in the health care industry. Retrieved from http://c4fd63cb482ce6861463-bc6183f1c18e748a49b87a25911a0555.r93.cf2.rackcdn.com/iHT2_BigData_2013.pdf

McKinsey & Company. (2013). The ‘big data’ revolution in healthcare: Accelerating value and innovation. Center for US Health System Reform.

My Health London. (2016). Today’s NHS – our current challenges. Retrieved 4th November, 2016 from https://www.myhealth.london.nhs.uk/help/nhs-today

O’Driscoll, A., Daugelaite, J., & Sleator, R. (2013). ‘Big data’, Hadoop and cloud computing in genomics. Journal Of Biomedical Informatics, 46(5), 774-781. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2013.07.001

Scantlebury, R. & Moody, A. (2015). Health Survey for England, 2014: Chapter 9, Adult Obesity and Overweight. The Health and Social Care Information Centre. Retrieved from http://content.digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB19295/HSE2014-ch9-adult-obe.pdf

Schutt, R. & O’Neil, C. (2013). Doing Data Science (1st ed.). O’Reilly Media.

Snowden, C. (2015). Death and Taxes. Institute of Economic Affairs. Retrieved from https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Death%20and%20Taxes%20December%202015.pdf

Stanton, J. (2012). An Introduction to Data Science. Syracuse University. Retrieved from https://ischool.syr.edu/media/documents/2012/3/DataScienceBook1_1.pdf

World Health Organisation. (2016). World Health Statistics 2016: Monitoring health for the SDGs. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2016/en/

 

Data Science and Sports

There is a great deal of hype about data science at the moment. Much of the talk is regarding the potential ways in which data can contribute to society as a whole. Yet, there is a large amount of ambiguity about what data science actually is. Unfortunately, a generally accepted definition of data science is lacking, however, recent contributors to the field have attempted to define the topic. For example, Stanton (2012) defines data science as: “an emerging area of work concerned with the collection, preparation, analysis, visualisation, management, and preservation of large collections of information.” (p.ii). The role of a data scientist is to collect, clean and interpret data using a range of statistical and software engineering tools; the data scientist then must effectively visualise and communicate their findings (O’Neill and Schutt, 2013, p.16). This short paper discusses what data science is and how data, statistics and analytics have benefited professional sports.

The purpose of data is essentially to tell us information about how the real world is. As Kitchen (2014) states, “data are clearly a base material for how we make sense of the world” (p.12). Many authors within the field explain the process of extracting knowledge from data by depicting an image of a pyramid. At the base of the pyramid there is the real world, which data is abstracted from. This data provides information which, when interpreted, allows us to gain knowledge about how the world is. The highest levels of the pyramid represent understanding and wisdom about the truths of the world (Kitchen, 2014, p.9; Stanton, 2012, p.9). In other words, data provides us with empirical evidence about how the world is, which consequently, allows us to move towards basing our knowledge and decisions on objective facts rather than subjective opinion.
It is quite clear that an evidence based, objective approach can benefit a vast number of different industries and trades. A UK Government (2013) report outlined the significance of data and the opportunity it presents in contributing to businesses, services and society as a whole in the UK:

“The wider social and economic benefits are manifold: such as better health outcomes for NHS patients as a result of analysis of clinical trials data; consumers receiving personalised marketing of goods as businesses analyse spending habits; and greater transparency and accountability of government to citizens with the release of more open data.” (p.10)

A large amount of evidence suggests that data has improved the efficiency of the decision making process in a wide range of different industries.

Sport, in particular, is one of the clearest instances in how data analytics has had a positive impact. Perhaps the most famous sporting example is described in Moneyball, which details how financially constrained Oakland Athletics baseball team became a strong team, able to compete with the richest baseball teams in the league. They did this by adopting an analytic approach to recruiting amateur players (Lewis, 2013). The book argues that scouting methods at the time were outdated and flawed. Recruitment of players was down to subjective, human opinion, which is often completely irrational. Scouts and coaches had the propensity to generalise wildly from their own experience, and be excessively swayed by a player’s most recent performance. “The human mind played tricks on itself when it relied exclusively on what it saw, and every trick it played was a financial opportunity for someone who saw through the illusion to the reality.” (p.18). It was only after adopting a scientific approach to recruiting players, such as rigorously analysing percentage statistics, that the Oakland A’s began to spend money effectively, win games and become successful.

Similar success stories can be found in many other different sports. As sports teams strive for improvement, it is no surprise that sport science and data analytics is completely booming. Teams with the high levels of resources adopt sophisticated methods of collecting various types of data. Large numbers of sports scientists are employed who analyse in detail player performance and the effects of different training methods and strategies. Evidence suggests that there has been a clear positive impact on performance and, in particular, on fitness. For example, rugby and American football teams have notable seen reductions in the number of injuries to players due to “wearable sensors that monitor the intensity of activity and impact of collisions” (Marr, 2015). However, some sports are easier to extract data from than others. For instance, as Brooks, Kerr and Guttag (2016) point out, sports such as baseball, American football and tennis are much easier to break up into individual events, than sports such as soccer – which, despite being the most popular sport in the world, is yet to accomplish similar levels of sophisticated performance data analytics as other sports (p.49-50). Yet, a lot of data scientists and statisticians are developing new models of performance analysis to improve the game even further.

In conclusion, data science involves collecting, preparing, analysing and presenting data about how the world is in order to gain knowledge and understanding of the world. The majority of evidence suggests that data science is making a positive contribution to society, as it allows for more effective decision making in countless different fields. The main benefit is that it gives empirical evidence which is more objective and reliable than subjective human opinion. This paper has focused on how it has had a positive impact on sports, in particular looking at the famous Moneyball example, in which the Oakland A’s baseball team used data analytic techniques to improve player recruitment and become a strong and successful team. Evidence suggests that performance, fitness and health of athletes has improved because of using data.

Reference List

Brooks, J., Kerr, M., & Guttag, J. (2016). Developing a Data-Driven Player Ranking in Soccer Using Predictive Model Weights. KDD ’16, 49-55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2939672.2939695

Kitchen, R. (2014). The Data Revolution. SAGE publications Ltd.

Lewis, M. (2003). Moneyball. New York: W.W. Norton.

Marr, B. (2015). Big Data: The Winning Formula In Sports. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/03/25/big-data-the-winning-formula-in-sports/#45d3db6e26dc

O’Neill, C. & Schutt, R. (2013). Doing Data Science: Straight Talk from the Frontline. O’Reilly Media.

Stanton, J. (2012). An Introduction to Data Science. Syracuse University. Retrieved from https://ischool.syr.edu/media/documents/2012/3/DataScienceBook1_1.pdf

UK Government. (2013). Seizing the data opportunity: A strategy for UK data capability. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254136/bis-13-1250-strategy-for-uk-data-capability-v4.pdf

Free Speech History and Campus Censorship

For the most part of history freedom of speech has been suppressed, with governments often criminalising unpopular and provocative opinions. A prominent, early example of this occurred in the times of the Ancient Greeks, when Socrates, who was one of the first known martyrs of freedom of speech, went about challenging his fellow man, spreading truth and wisdom throughout the city. Socrates explained that it was his duty assigned by the Gods to act as a ‘gadfly’ in the city of Athens, ‘God has assigned me to this city, as if to a large thoroughbred horse which because of its great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimulation of some stinging fly.’ (Plato, Tarrant and Tredennick, 2003, p.57.) In 399BC, Socrates was put on trial before a jury for ‘corrupting the minds of the youth’ and for ‘believing in supernatural things of his own invention instead of the gods recognised by the State.’ (ibid, p.48.) During the trial, Socrates argued that he would rather be sentenced than be silenced:

Suppose that… you said to me, ‘Socrates, on this occasion we shall disregard Anytus and acquit you, but only on one condition: that you give up spending your time on this quest and stop philosophizing. If we catch you going on in the same way, you shall be put to death.’ Well … I should reply, ‘Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and devoted servant, but I owe a greater obedience to God than to you; and so long as I draw breath and have my faculties, I shall never stop practising philosophy and exhorting you and indicating the truth for everyone that I meet’… ‘I am not going to alter my conduct, not even if I have to die a hundred deaths.’ (ibid, pp.55-56)

Socrates was found guilty by the jury, and was sentenced to the death penalty by drinking hemlock poison. Likewise, Jesus Christ was famously crucified by the order of the Roman Prefect Pontius Pilate after preaching his message which contradicted the Roman authorities.

A similar case transpired in the early part of the 17th century, when Italian astronomer and physicist Galileo Galilei was condemned for believing in Heliocentrism, which is the idea that the Sun is the centre of the Solar System, and the Earth and planets revolve around the Sun. Galileo was put on trial by the Roman Catholic Inquisition in 1633. He was found guilty of heresy, and was sentenced to formal imprisonment, later altered to house arrest, in which he remained under for the rest of his life. In addition to which, his book Dialogue was outlawed, and the publication of any of his works were prohibited (Finocchiaro, 1989).

Around this time, governments across Europe enjoyed widespread control over the printing press, with the fear that widespread distribution of information was dangerous and harmful to society. Individuals were required to obtain an official state license in order to trade and produce any books or papers. In response to this control, John Milton wrote his 1644 pamphlet Areopagitica, which made a passionate case against licensing, regulations and government controls. It was Milton who introduced the idea of ‘the marketplace of ideas’ as a rationale for free speech, and his works turned out to be one of history’s most fervent and influential defences of free speech and freedom of the press (Morehouse, 2009).

By the 18th century, with the age of the enlightenment, the notion of freedom of speech was largely discussed by thinkers all over the Western world (Stearns, 2012, p.62). In 1770, the popular French philosopher Voltaire supposedly wrote the famous phrase: ‘I disapprove of everything you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ And in 1791, the First Amendment to Constitution in the United States was adopted, which bluntly states: ‘Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ The changes in attitude can be highlighted, for example, when Charles Darwin released his book ‘On the Origin of Species’ in 1859. The book introduced the theory of evolution, which largely contradicted common thought at the time. Although he was initially faced with hostility, he was never punished for his views. Instead, the political and theological implications of his theories were intensely debated, eventually leading to the general acceptance of the theory of evolution among scientists and the general public.

Perhaps the most prominent and influential defences of the right to freedom of speech came from British philosopher John Stuart Mill, who wrote the classic essay On Liberty in 1859. Mill was a significant figure in the development of the liberal philosophy, and his essay outlined the essential components of a free society. His view was that without freedom of speech the progress of science, law and politics would be stifled. Furthermore, Mill argues that freedom of expression acts as a marketplace of ideas, in which, ultimately, the truth outcompetes falsity, and so we need not worry about opinions that are false (Sanders, 2003, pp.66-67). However, Mill did recognise that there are limits to free speech. According to Mill: ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill, 2003, p.8). This is known as the ‘Harm Principle’, which means that the freedom of speech of individuals should only be restricted to prevent harm to others. According to the Harm Principle, only speech which directly causes harm or incites violence, are illegitimate forms of speech; mere offensiveness does not constitute harm, therefore offensive speech is permissible (Brink, 2001, p.120). Although Mill wrote his classic in the 1850’s, his writings often remain the starting point for discussions on free speech.

A triumph for free speech occurred in 1948, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed, which included the right to freedom of speech. Article 19 states: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.’ The Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 48 in favour, none against, and eight abstentions, and remains the world’s most translated document (Guinness World Records, 2009).

The counterculture movement of the 1960s and 1970s in Britain and the United States, saw a significant rise in the number of politically progressive movements advocating freedom, tolerance and equality. Great advancements were made in the civil rights movements for ethnic minorities; the feminist movement for women’s rights; the gay rights movement for homosexuals; and the anti-war movement for peace. All of which provided a fight back against the cultural norms of the time, and all of which led a staunch defence for free speech in the advancement of their cause (Kersch, 2003, pp.142-151). For example, Martin Luther King (1967) said: ‘Curtailment of free speech is rationalized on grounds that a more compelling American tradition forbids criticism of the government when the nation is at war…Nothing can be more destructive of our fundamental democratic traditions than the vicious effort to silence dissenters.’ Furthermore, whereas first-wave feminism of the 19th and early 20th centuries fought for increased free speech in terms of the right to vote, second-wave feminism of the 1960s to 1980s aimed to challenge cultural and gender norms, promoting equality and arguing that women were just as capable as men. These movements were seen most prevalently on college and university campuses, most famously at the University of California in Berkeley, were a strong student protest, named the ‘Free Speech Movement’, fought back against university bureaucrats who were strictly limiting free speech and political organisation on campus, between 1964 and 1965 (Kersch, 2003, pp.148-151).

However, despite the United Kingdom having a rich history in the promotion of free speech, more recent times have seen increased measures to censor. In 1986, section 5 of the Public Order Act was passed, making it an offence if a person ‘(a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting’ (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1986). In 2012, a campaign was launched to reform section 5, urging for the use of the word ‘insulting’ to be removed as it is seen as a violation of free speech. A number of high-profile activists supported the campaign, such as comedians Rowan Atkinson and Stephen Fry; politicians David Davis and Nigel Farage, and many others. Atkinson argued that language or behaviour that is merely ‘insulting’ should never be criminalised because of the difficulty in interpretation. ‘Criticism is easily construed as insult. Ridicule is easily construed as insult. Sarcasm, unfavourable comparison, merely stating an alternative point of view can be interpreted as insult. And because so many things can be interpreted as insult, it is hardly surprising that so many things have been’ (Reform Section 5, 2012). In January 2013, the government announced that it would accept the amendment, and the word ‘insulting’ was dropped.

Around the time of the Public Order Act 1986, with Britain becoming a more tolerant and multicultural society, the incentive to protect certain groups increased. A drive to censor offensive speech emerged within society, particularly among left wing progressives. Toleration for speech deemed racist, sexist or prejudice diminished (Kersch, 2003, pp.151-153). This mind-set seems to have filtered into the university campus. Now, speech on campus that could potentially offend a students’ race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation is being forbidden. Guest speakers, events, societies, newspapers and songs have all been banned at some point by many UK universities, more specifically in most cases, the student unions.

Deanna Garrett (2002) claims that for students at universities, the implications of being offended are particularly significant. Her reasoning is that students cannot grow and develop if they are forced to study in hostile environments. Students who are busy worrying about their emotional safety have no time or energy to participate in university activities, therefore universities should be obligated to ensure a safe environment for students. In other words, universities have a right and duty to provide an educational environment, where all students can learn and live free from bigotry (Mitchell, 1992, pp.822).

However, this is condescending attitude towards students, treating them as young children that cannot be exposed to certain ideas or criticisms, and who are in need of ‘swaddling in safety blankets’ (Hume, 2015, p.121). According to O’Neill (2015, p.120) it reinforces the ‘poisonous idea’ of inherent human weakness and incapacity; that students are fragile and therefore speech and interactions must be monitored and policed. In this view, the best way to empower individuals is for them to become immune from offence, for students to develop a thicker skin. As Atkinson put it:

The best way to increase society’s resistance to insulting or offensive speech is to allow a lot more of it. As with childhood diseases, you can better resist those germs to which you have been exposed. We need to build our immunity to taking offence, so that we can deal with the issues that perfectly justified criticism can raise. Our priority should be to deal with the message, not the messenger (Reform Section 5, 2012).

In addition, being offended is a subjective experience. Almost anything can cause irritation and exasperation of some individuals. And, furthermore, there could be many different reasons one may give as to why they are offended. For example, it could be either the sound of the word that offends; the meaning of the word that offends; the historical use of the word which carries offensive baggage; and so on (Shoemaker, 2000, pp.575-581). Making a widespread decision, law or policy based on something so subjective is unwise and impractical.

According to some, universities should aim to instil values of ‘human decency’ within the students, such as respect, equality, diversity and tolerance. The idea is that by working to improve students’ ‘spiritual and moral growth’, a new generation of ‘more caring, more globally aware, and more committed to social justice’ will be created (Astin and Astin, 2015, p.73; Mitchell, 1992, pp.822). Some go even further, advocating that the central work of the university teacher is to push towards a ‘fully multiculturalist, postcolonial’ university (Matsuda, 1993, p.14). However, Bloomberg (2014, p.256) argues that the role of universities is not to teach students what to think, but to teach students how to think. Although diversity of gender, ethnicity, and orientation is important, Bloomberg argues, the role of universities is not to promote an ideology, it is to provide scholars and students with a neutral forum for researching and debating issues. It should not repress unpopular views, or favour one particular political ideology, otherwise the university, and those who conduct its research, will lose credibility (ibid).

To conclude, the achievement of freedom of speech is one of humanities greatest, and hard fought accomplishments. Dating back to the times of Socrates and Ancient Greece, the fight for free speech has had a long history. It was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the West that the notion of freedom of speech was largely discussed in philosophical circles and put into law by policy makers. Perhaps most notably, it was John Stuart Mill that produced the strongest defence of free speech in his influential book On Liberty. By the early twentieth century, freedom of speech was largely accepted and adopted as a universal human right. By the middle of the twentieth century, greater freedom, tolerance and equality was brought about for certain marginalised groups within society who fought hard for free speech. However, the later twentieth century saw an increasing movement to limit certain speech. Speech which were deemed offensive were now outlawed, and the Public Order Act 1986 law was passed in the UK, which banned ‘insulting’ words. This mentality spread across society, including on university campuses, leading to a culture of political correctness and campus censorship. Although there are people who hold abhorrent views who we would prefer not to engage with, the best way to deal with controversial opinions is to confront and debate them freely and openly, exposing their falsehoods and shortcomings with reason and evidence, rather than simply censoring and pretending they do not exist.

 

References

Astin, A. and Astin, H. (2015). Achieving Equity in Higher Education: The Unfinished Agenda. Journal of College and Character, 16(2), pp.65-74.

Bloomberg, M. (2014). Not to Teach Students What to Think, But to Teach Students How to Think. Vital Speeches of the Day, 80(8), pp.254-257.

Brink, D. (2001). Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech. Legal Theory, 7, pp.119-157.

Finocchiaro, M. (1989). The Galileo affair: A Documentary History. Berkeley: University of California.

Garrett, D. (2002). Silenced Voices: Hate Speech Codes on Campus. [online] The University of Vermont. Available at: http://www.uvm.edu/~vtconn/?Page=v20/garrett.html [Accessed 20 Jan. 2016].

Guinness World Records, (2009). Most translated document. [online] Available at: http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/most-translated-document/ [Accessed 22 Oct. 2015].

Hume, M. (2015). Trigger warning: Is the Fear of Being Offensive Killing Free Speech? London: William Collins.

Kersch, K. (2003). Freedom of Speech: Rights and Liberties under the Law. ABC-CLIO.

King, M. (1967). The Causalities of the War in Vietnam. Los Angeles, California. [online] Available at: http://www.faculty.fairfield.edu/faculty/hodgson/Courses/progress/King1.pdf

Matsuda, M. (1993). Words that wound. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Mill, J. (2003). On Liberty (Dover Thrift Editions). New York: Dover Publications Inc.

Mitchell, C. (1992). The Political Correctness Doctrine: Redefining Speech on College Campuses. Whittier Law Review, 13(3), pp.805-829.

Morehouse, I. (2009). Areopagitica: Milton’s Influence on Classical and Modern Political and Economic Thought. Libertarian Papers, [online] 1(38), pp.1-14. Available at: http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2009/lp-1-38.pdf.

O’Neill, B. (2015). A Duty to Offend. Connor Court Publishing Pty Ltd.

Plato, Tarrant, H. and Tredennick, H. (2003). The Last Days of Socrates. 5th ed. Penguin Classics

Reform Section 5, (2012). Rowan Atkinson’s speech at Reform Section 5 Parliamentary reception. Available at: http://reformsection5.org.uk/2012/10/rowan-atkinsons-speech-at-rs5-parliamentary-reception/ [Accessed 22 Oct. 2015].

Sanders, K. (2003). Ethics & Journalism. London: Sage.

Shoemaker, D. (2000). “Dirty Words” and the Offense Principle. Law and Philosophy, 19(5), pp.545-584.

Stearns, P. (2012). Human rights in world history. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Plato’s view of Education presented in The Allegory of the Cave

The influence of Plato’s literature has undoubtedly been significant, with his words and ideas spanning across centuries. Plato and his student Aristotle are generally considered to be the most influential theorists on Western philosophy and tradition. Perhaps Plato’s best-known work to date was The Republic, which, as is often the case in Plato’s writings, is presented in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and different interlocutors, yet it is likely that Plato used the character of Socrates as a mouthpiece of his own ideas.

In his book, Plato outlines his ideal society based on his philosophical beliefs. Consequently, The Republic has had a tremendous impact upon political philosophy. The book also contains metaphysical, epistemological and ethical content. Amongst other things, Plato discusses the meaning of justice, the role of the state and the structure of education. Ultimately, Plato advocates for a society that is ruled by ‘philosopher-kings’ who would rule out of duty and obligation rather than out of desire for power and personal gain. The goal of education then, for Plato, is to harvest these so-called ‘philosopher-kings’, only then will there be a just and happy society. As Socrates explains, the just and utopian society that Plato advocates will not exist ‘till philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers’ (Plato, Republic, 473d). This view holds that philosophers are incorruptible and capable of handling power; running counter to the common liberal view, expressed best by Lord Acton, that ‘power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’

Plato devotes a large portion of The Republic delineating what the curriculum ought to be in order to produce these philosopher-kings. However, before he does so, he presents the ‘Allegory of the Cave’, in Book VII, which is intended to compare ‘the effect of education and the lack of it on our nature’ (ibid, 514a). Described as ‘haunting’ by Davis and Williams (2003, p.253), the allegory of the cave presents Plato’s philosophy of education metaphorically in a remarkable fashion. Socrates describes a scene that goes as follows:

Imagine an underground chamber like a cave, with a long entrance open to the daylight and as wide as the cave. In this chamber are men who have been prisoners there since they were children, their legs and necks being so fastened that they can only look straight ahead of them and cannot turn their heads. Some way off, behind and higher up, a fire is burning, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them runs a road, in front of which a curtain-wall has been built… Imagine further that there are men carrying all sorts of gear along behind the curtain-wall, projecting above it and including figures of men and animals made of wood and stone and all sorts of other materials, and that some of these men, as you would expect, are talking and some not (Plato, Rep. 514a-515a).

As Glaucon points out, this is an odd image that Socrates has described, with fairly strange prisoners; yet, Socrates says that ‘they are drawn from life’ (ibid, 515a). What he means is that the prisoners represent a particular group of the population, namely the non-philosophers or the uneducated. The darkness of the cave represents the state of ignorance. For the prisoners, the only reality they are aware of is the shadows from the figures cast by the fire’s light. They talk about these shadows as if they were real; however, they are just figures of men and animals made out of wood and stone. As Socrates puts it, the prisoners ‘would believe that the shadows of the objects we mentioned were the whole truth,’ (ibid, 515c) yet, of course, they would be mistaken.

Next, Socrates asks us to suppose that one of the prisoners is freed and then physically forced to turn, look at and walk towards the fire. We can assume that this would be an uncomfortable and somewhat painful experience for the prisoner, as he is dazzled by the brightness of the fire. Despite this initial discomfort, the prisoner would be a step closer to the truth, as he realises that the fire and figures are more real than the shadows he previously saw. This part of the story displays one particular aspect of Plato’s idea of education. To be precise, it tells us that education is not a pleasurable experience. In fact, it can be quite a painful one. We are led to believe that we would naturally recoil from education, just as we naturally recoil from physical pain. In practical terms, a child may show reluctance towards receiving new information. It may be confusing and uncomfortable, especially considering that it could make them realise how little they know.

The story continues with the prisoner being ‘forcibly dragged up the steep and rugged ascent and not let go until he had been dragged out into the sunlight’ (ibid, 515e-516a). Again, this demonstrates that education is painful and uncomfortable. The prisoner would be objecting to it, yet he is being brought closer and closer to the sunlight. The light clearly represents truth, knowledge and understanding. The prisoner would initially find the brightness of the surroundings overwhelming; however, after some time he would grow accustomed to it all. ‘First he would find it easiest to look at shadows, next at the reflections of men and other objects in water, and later on at the objects themselves’ (ibid, 516a-b). As the prisoner sees the real objects, the real trees, flowers and animals, he would realise that they are more real than the figures made of wood, and much more real than the shadows of the figures deep inside the cave. Eventually, he would come to be able to look directly at the sun itself, concluding that it is the sun that is responsible for everything. The sun can be interpreted, of course, as God; and metaphysically speaking, the outside of the cave represents the higher world. It is at this stage that the person can be considered a ‘philosopher-king’, capable of ruling society, as he has reached a stage of adequate knowledge and understanding. As Heidegger (1998, p.170) notes ‘the essence of ‘education’ is grounded in the essence of ‘truth.’’

In practical terms, the person is sufficiently educated enough to become a teacher. And so, the allegory continues with the prisoner, or former prisoner now, returning back into the cave to tell the other prisoners of what he knows. He does this as he feels a sense of pity for his fellow prisoners, therefore he feels obligated to inform them of what he knows. This coincides with the idea that philosopher-kings rule out of a sense of duty. This means that a teacher should not be motivated by self-interest. You should not become a teacher because of the satisfaction felt from teaching a student a new skill, or the enjoyment from communicating with children and so on. Rather it should be primarily out of a sense of obligation.

When returning to the cave, the freed prisoner has difficulty being able to see in the darkness of the cave. He starts bumping into things and falling over, subsequently making a fool of himself in front of the prisoners. The prisoners would say that ‘his visit to the upper world had ruined his sight, and that the ascent was not worth even attempting’ (Plato, Rep. 517a). This signifies the difficulty that an educator or philosopher faces when trying to communicate with students or the uninformed masses. The teacher must present his or herself in a certain manner, or else the majority of students will completely reject what he or she has to say. ‘So when he sees a mind confused and unable to see clearly he will not laugh without thinking’ (ibid, 518a).

According to Plato (518b-c):

We must reject the conception of education professed by those who say that they can put into the mind knowledge that was not there before – rather as if they could put sight into blind eyes…Capacity for knowledge is innate in each man’s mind… the organ by which he learns is like an eye which cannot be turned from darkness to light unless the whole body is turned; in the same way the mind must be turned away from the world of change until its eye can bear to look straight at reality, and at the brightest of all realities which is what we call the good.

Here, he means that education is not as simple as just telling students information. As said above, educators must conduct themselves in a certain manner. An uninformed mind simply cannot process complex and outlandish information. The teacher must hold the capacities of students in high regard. When Plato uses the word ‘turning’, Losin (1996) points out the significance of this word, ‘this notion of orientation [or turning] is central to Plato’s idea of education: he later describes real education as the art of orientation.’ This turning, according to Plato, requires the use of force or coercion. ‘Our job as lawgivers [or educators] is to compel the best minds to attain what we called the highest forms of knowledge, and to ascend to the vision of the good as we have described, and when they have achieved this and see well enough, prevent them behaving as they are not allowed to’ (Plato, Rep. 519c-d). This demonstrates another key part of Plato’s philosophy of education, which is that education requires an authority figure who must force content on students in a top-down manner. Just as the prisoner was physically forced out of the cave, the educator must compel the student to learn for the greater good. Today, this view seems somewhat outdated and illiberal. Although compulsory education does still exist, the use of physical force in schools is strictly outlawed. According to liberal philosopher Karl Popper (1957), Plato’s utopia is more of a totalitarian dystopia due to the approval of coercion and the lacking of democracy that Plato endorses, ultimately to a degree being responsible for the fascist and communist regimes of modern times.

To conclude, in The Republic, Plato portrays his ideal society, in which the citizens are ruled by philosopher-kings. These philosopher-kings have both a sufficient level of knowledge and a love of wisdom. They are also incorruptible by power, ruling out of a genuine sense of duty to help the people and promote justice throughout the city. The education system, therefore, should be arranged in such a fashion, which best harvests these philosopher-kings. Plato demonstrates his philosophy on education metaphorically in Book VII of The Republic. ‘The Allegory of the Cave’ presents a number of points about education. Firstly, that the process can initially be a painful and uncomfortable experience, however if persistent, it is extremely beneficial as it brings one closer to the truth. Secondly, a student requires an authority figure to force him to learn, often by means of compulsion. This is to account for the resistance a student may show to acquiring new information. Thirdly, those who reach an adequate level of knowledge and capability have a duty to enhance the lives of others, in order to improve society. He should not teach based upon self-interested motives. Finally, teaching is more complex than simply passing on knowledge. The teacher must attempt to ‘turn the soul’ of the student in order to maximise education.

Overall, ‘The Allegory of the Cave’ is an extraordinary piece of literature that still holds a significant influence today. A possible reason for this is because the story is relatable and can be interpreted in many different ways. The darkness of the cave signifies ignorance and unknowing, and the light from the sun signifies knowledge, truth and understanding. Despite the criticisms of Plato’s ideal society, we can all appreciate the allegory of the cave.

Bibliography

Davis, A. and Williams, K. (2003). Epistemology and Curriculum. In: N. Blake and P. Smeyers, ed., Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, 1st ed. Blackwell Publishing.

Heidegger, M. (1998). Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. In: W. McNeill, ed., Pathmarks, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.155-182.

Losin, P. (1996). Education and Plato’s Parable of the Cave. Journal of Education, 178(3), pp.49-65.

Plato, Lane, M. and Lee, D. (2007). The Republic. 3rd ed. Penguin Classics.

Popper, K. (1957). The open society and its enemies. London: Routledge & K. Paul.

Perception of Immigration by Social Class

Hypothesis

Operational hypothesis: The working class of society are more likely than the upper class to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Null hypothesis: The working class of society are not more likely than the upper class to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Introduction

The following report analyses secondary data from the Eurobarometer data service. The European Commission established the Eurobarometer in 1973, with the aim of providing a series of public opinion surveys that addresses a wide variety of issues related to the Member States of the European Union. The data set analysed in the following report originates from data officially released by the Eurobarometer in March 2014.

The software used for statistical analysis in the report is ‘IBM SPSS Statistics’. This programme is used widely as a tool for statistical analysis within a variety of fields such as social science, market research and health analytics. According to the solution brief on the IBM website, SPSS Statistics is proficient at making sense of complex patterns and associations, enabling users to draw conclusions, and make predictions, ultimately improving decision-making (IBM, 2013).

The two variables within the data examined in the report are ‘Social Class’ and ‘Statement: immigrants contribute a lot’ (which will be referred to as ‘Immigrant Contribution’). The ‘Social Class’ variable is a nominal variable type, with set categories that have no logical or progressive order. The ‘Immigrant Contribution’ variable is an ordinal type of variable, with an ordered set of responses, gauging from ‘totally agree’ to ‘totally disagree’. The Independent Variable (IV) is ‘Social Class’, as this is the variable which has influence over the other and in this circumstance cannot be changed. The Dependent Variable (DV) is ‘Immigrant Contribution’, as the IV will influence this variable. In other words, the perception of immigrant contribution (DV) could change based upon particular social class (IV).

In the interest of data analysis, the ‘Social Class’ variable, which originally contained seven different categories for participants to place themselves, is recoded to contain fewer categories. To elaborate, the original categories: ‘Other (SPONT.)’, ‘None (SPONT.)’, ‘Refusal (SPONT.)’, and ‘DK’, are combined into just one category, simply named ‘Other’. As a result, seven categories are reduced to just four categories, including: ‘Working Class’, ‘Middle Class’, ‘Upper Class’, and ‘Other’. This reduces the amount of information to examine, without losing relevant data needed for analysis, allowing for more concise and efficient data analysis.

The report is structured as follows: first, the variables are contextualised, providing an account into the reasons why the two variables were chosen for analysis, including information regarding previous work and theories related to both variables. Second, the data is presented in tables and graphs ready for analysis. Essential information needed to establish whether a relationship exists between the variables is provided, including cross-tabulations, Chi-square and Cramer’s V. Next, the data presented is analysed and critically reviewed, and final conclusions are drawn, referring to the validity of the hypothesis.

 

Contextualisation of Variables

Immigration is an extremely contemporary topic that has become one of the most important issues discussed in politics today. 50% of the British public named immigration as one of the most important issues facing Britain, with 32% voting it as the single most important (Ipsos MORI, 2015). According to another study, immigration is the most important issue selected by the British public (45%), followed by the NHS (40%) and then the economy (26%) (Blinder, 2015). A further study revealed that large majorities in both Greece (86%) and Italy (80%) want to reduce the number of immigrants coming into their countries; with more than half of the British and French populations holding this view, and 47% of Spanish (Pew Research Center, 2014, p.26).

The results of these studies may explain the recent rise of anti-mass immigration parties across Europe, including the Swiss People’s Army, the Danish People’s Party, the Swedish Democrats, the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) (Recknagel, 2015; Robins-Early, 2015). Notably, UKIP have gained an increasing amount of support in working class areas of Britain. An article by The Independent claims that UKIP has overcome the Labour party as the party of the working classes (Blackhurst, 2014). Further articles in The Guardian (Healey, 2015) and The Daily Mail (Chorley, 2014) share this view; two newspapers that are typically on opposite sides of the political spectrum.

This report aims to determine whether there is a correlation between social class and perceptions on immigration. The hypothesis being, that the working class are more likely to have a negative view of immigration than the upper class. However, reasons for this can only be speculated.

One potential explanation could be because a large percentage of immigrants who migrate into the country tend to directly compete with the working class for jobs. Therefore, a larger number of working class are more likely to have negative perceptions of immigration than that of upper and middle classes, who face less competition from immigrants.

A different, but relevant argument claims that immigration is making rich people richer and poor people poorer. According to the article, immigration allows the rich to prosper due to the cheap labour associated with migrants. Whereas the poor are unable to compete with migrants who are willing to work for less than living wage (Toynbee, 2006).

Critics of immigration also cite possible social issues, such as increases in crime rate and terrorist threat, as reasons to tighten immigration. In addition, the increasing population size potentially leads to a number of social issues, such as overcrowding, housing shortages, congestion, pollution, and pressure on welfare and public services (Pettinger, 2015).

On the other hand, some evidence suggests that the positives of immigration outweigh the negatives. The consensus amongst both left wing and right wing economists is in favour of immigration (Thoma, 2006). Their argument being, that it benefits the economy, as it increases labour market supply and demand, leading to an increase in the potential output capacity of the economy, with an increase in aggregate demand (Pettinger, 2015). However, others point this out as only true in the case of ‘skilled’ migrants. Entrepreneurially speaking, there is however an argument to suggest that immigration has a net positive effect; creating businesses, employment, increasing consumption whilst also paying taxes, all of which provide a healthy contribution to the economy (Prosser, 2015).

An alternative view highlights the role the mainstream media plays in generating adverse perceptions of immigration. According to this view, media outlets tend to dehumanise immigrants and create an “enemy at the gates” mentality, rather than shifting focus on positive contributions by immigrants (Esses, Medianu and Lawson, 2013). This view suggests that the public are highly susceptible to negative influences portrayed by media, in particular the working classes.

To conclude, there are a variety of arguments for and against limiting immigration.  This report aims to identify whether a connection between social class and opinion of immigrants does or does not exist.

Presentation of Data

Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Working Class 12160 43.5 43.5
Middle Class 13833 49.5 93.1
Upper Class 806 2.9 95.9
Other 1133 4.1 100.0
Total 27932 100.0

Figure 1: Frequency table displaying respondents’ self-assessment of Social Class

This table shows the frequency in which Eurobarometer survey respondents’ placed themselves in a social class category. Data shows that the majority of participants identified themselves as ‘Middle Class’ (49.5%), with ‘Working Class’ the second most prevalent (43.5%). A very small number of participants assessed themselves as ‘Upper Class’ (2.9%) or ‘Other’ (4.1%).

Figure 2: Bar graph displaying respondents’ self-assessment of Social Class

 Bar graph displaying respondents_ self-assessment of Social Class

Figure 3: Frequency table displaying respondent’s opinion of the statement: immigrants contribute a lot

 

 

Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid Totally agree 3106 11.1 11.1
Tend to agree 8875 31.8 42.9
Tend to disagree 8680 31.1 74.0
Totally disagree 5485 19.6 93.6
DK 1786 6.4 100.0
Total 27932 100.0

This table shows the frequency in which Eurobarometer survey participants responded to the statement: immigrants contribute a lot. The majority of people ‘tend to agree’ that immigrants contribute a lot (31.8%), with ‘tend to disagree’ closely second (31.1%). More people ‘totally disagree’ with the statement (19.6%) than ‘totally agree’ with the statement (11.1%).

Figure 4: Bar graph displaying respondent’s opinion of the statement: immigrants contribute a lot

Bar graph displaying respondent_s opinion of the statement immigrants contribute a lot

Figure 5: Table displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement: immigrants contribute a lot

Self-assessment of social class
Working Class Middle Class Upper Class Other
STATEMENTS: IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE A LOT Totally agree 9.4% 12.4% 14.6% 11.7%
Tend to agree 26.8% 35.9% 39.7% 30.0%
Tend to disagree 32.8% 30.1% 28.8% 26.1%
Totally disagree 23.8% 16.4% 12.9% 18.7%
DK 7.3% 5.2% 4.0% 13.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

This table shows a cross-tabulation between social class and opinion of the statement that immigrants contribute a lot. The majority of the working classes tended to disagree that immigrants contribute a lot (32.8%). The majority of the middle classes (35.9%) and upper classes (39.7%) tended to agree with the statement.

Figure 6: Cluster bar graph displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement: immigrants contribute a lot

Cluster bar graph displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement immigrants contribute a lot

Figure 7: Scatter graph displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement: immigrants contribute a lot

Scatter graph displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement immigrants contribute a lot

 Figure 8: Table displaying Pearson’s Chi-Square test of variables

Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 614.896a 12 .000
Likelihood Ratio 598.503 12 .000
Linear-by-Linear Association 162.219 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 27932
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 51.54.

 Figure 9: Table displaying Cramer’s V measure of variables

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .148 .000
Cramer’s V .086 .000
N of Valid Cases 27932

Figure 10: Table displaying observed and expected counts of Cross-tabulation of variables

Self-assessment of social class
Working Class Middle Class Upper Class Other
Count % Count % Count % Count %
STATEMENTS: IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE A LOT Totally agree Count 1141 9.4 1714 12.4 118 14.6 133 11.7
Expected Count 1352.2 11.1 1538.2 11.1 89.6 11.1 126.0 11.1
Tend to agree Count 3254 26.8 4961 35.9 320 39.7 340 30.0
Expected Count 3863.7 31.8 4395.2 31.8 256.1 31.8 360.0 31.8
Tend to disagree Count 3984 32.8 4168 30.1 232 28.8 296 26.1
Expected Count 3778.8 31.1 4298.7 31.1 250.5 31.1 352.1 31.1
Totally disagree Count 2896 23.8 2273 16.4 104 12.9 212 18.7
Expected Count 2387.9 19.6 2716.4 19.6 158.3 19.6 222.5 19.6
DK Count 885 7.3 717 5.2 32 4.0 152 13.4
Expected Count 777.5 6.4 884.5 6.4 51.5 6.4 72.4 6.4
Total Count 12160 N/A 13833 N/A 806 N/A 1133 N/A
Expected Count 12160.0 N/A 13833.0 N/A 806.0 N/A 1133.0 N/A

This table displays the observed count, meaning the frequency that actually occurred; and the expected count, meaning the frequency estimated to occur if no relationship exists between the variables. The greater the percentage difference between the observed and expected count, the greater statistical significance there is. 

Data Analysis

The Eurobarometer collected data relating to the social class that survey respondents identified themselves. The data is displayed in ‘Figure 1’ and ‘Figure 2’ in the previous section. Out of the 27,932 survey participants, the vast majority were either ‘Working Class’ (43.5%) or ‘Middle Class’ (49.5%). A very small number of participants assessed themselves as ‘Upper Class’ (2.9%) or ‘Other’ (4.1%). The ‘Other’ category includes people who either: believe that they belong to a different type of social class not listed; do not know which social class they belong to; believe they do not belong to a social class; or refuse to say which social class they belong.

Data was also collected relating to survey participants’ opinion on the statement: immigrants contribute a lot to society. This data is presented in ‘Figure 3’ and ‘Figure 4’ in the previous section. The majority of people selected the less weighted answers, such as ‘tend to agree’ (31.8%) and ‘tend to disagree’ (31.1%). Interestingly, almost twice the number of people selected ‘totally disagree’ (19.6%) than ‘totally agree’ (11.1%).

The cross-tabulation of the two variables are presented in ‘Figure 5’. The data tells us that the majority of people who identify as ‘Working Class’ tend to disagree with the statement: immigrants contribute a lot (32.8%). This is particularly interesting because every other category of social class selected ‘tend to agree’ as the most popular answer. The second most popular selected answer by the working classes is ‘tend to agree’ (26.8%), closely followed by ‘totally disagree’ (23.8%).

The most popular answer for the ‘Middle Class’ category is ‘tend to agree’ (35.9%), with 30.1% selecting ‘tend to disagree’. Similar results are displayed in the ‘Upper Class’ category, with 39.7% answering ‘tend to agree’ and 28.8% ‘tend to disagree’ with the statement. Note, this is the largest percentage difference between the categories ‘tend to agree’ and ‘tend to disagree’.  Interestingly, the ‘Upper Class’ is the only social class in which a higher percentage of respondents answered ‘totally agree’ (14.6%) than ‘totally disagree’ (12.9%).

A number of patterns within the data seem to have occurred, which can best be observed on display in ‘Figure 6’ and ‘Figure 7’. One correlation is that the higher the social class an individual belongs, the more likely they are to ‘tend to agree’ and ‘totally agree’ that immigrants contribute a lot. If we are to look at both the dark blue and light blue lines on ‘Figure 7’, which represent ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to agree’, we can see that both these lines rise as the social class gets higher, ignoring the ‘Other’ category. 26.8% of the ‘Working Class’ ‘tend to agree’ with the statement, and just 9.4% ‘totally agree’. Whereas 35.9% of ‘Middle Class’ ‘tend to agree’ and 12.4% ‘totally agree’. A substantial 39.7% of ‘Upper Class’ ‘tend to agree’ and 14.6% ‘totally agree’. Here is evidence to support a positive correlation between higher social class and agreement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Another correlation is that the lower the social class an individual belongs, the more likely they are to ‘tend to disagree’ and ‘totally disagree’ that immigrants contribute a lot. Again, on ‘Figure 7’ we can see that both the dark and light red lines, which represent ‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to disagree’, fall as the social class increases, ignoring the ‘Other’ category. 32.8% of ‘Working Class’ ‘tend to disagree’ with the statement, and a substantial 23.8% ‘totally disagree’. Meanwhile, 30.1% of ‘Middle Class’ ‘tend to disagree’ and 16.4% ‘totally disagree’; and 28.8% of the ‘Upper Class’ ‘tend to disagree’ and just 12.9% ‘totally disagree’. Here is evidence to support a negative correlation between higher social class and disagreement that immigrants contribute a lot.

An additional relationship seems to occur in the data which is the lower the social class, the more likely they are to answer that they do not know (‘DK’) whether immigrants contribute a lot. 7.3% of ‘Working Class’ answered this way; whereas 5.2% of ‘Middle Class’ and just 4% of ‘Upper Class’. It could be speculated that it is because lower classes have less knowledge of the subject than the higher classes, alternatively it could just be that they are more humble. However, this discussion is not the topic of this report.

‘Figure 8’ in the previous section displays Pearson’s Chi-Squared test of independence, which calculates whether there is a relationship between the two variables. The Chi-Square test tells us whether we can accept or reject the operational hypothesis. According to the data, the significance figure is 0.000. This means that a relationship does exist between the variables, therefore we are more likely to accept the operational hypothesis: The working class of society are more likely than the upper class of society to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

‘Figure 9’ displays Cramer’s V test, which calculates the strength of the relationship between two variables. According to the data, the Cramer’s V value is 0.086, which suggests a weak association between the variables. Although a relationship between the variables does exist, this relationship is weak, perhaps due to the numerous other factors which could play a part in forming attitudes on immigration such as age, gender, and ethnicity and so on.

‘Figure 10’ displays a table showing the observed and expected counts. The observed count is the actual frequency that occurred in the data. The expected count is the frequency which is assumed to occur if no relationship exists between the variables. The Chi-Squared test establishes that a relationship does exist between the variables. The information within ‘Figure 9’ allows us to see precisely where this relationship exists. The larger the difference between the expected and observed count, the greater the statistical significance.

The social class which saw the biggest difference between observed and expected counts is the ‘Upper Class’ category. The observed counts for ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to agree’ is much higher than expected – a difference of 3.5% for ‘totally agree’ and 7.9% for ‘tend to agree’. Furthermore, the observed counts for ‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to disagree’ are much lower than expected – a difference of 6.7% for ‘totally disagree’ and 2.3% for ‘tend to disagree’. This tells us that upper class people have a more positive view of immigrants than expected.

Other significant differences occur between observed and expected counts in the ‘Working Class’ category. The observed count for ‘tend to agree’ is much lower than expected – just 26.8%, as opposed to the expected count which is 31.8% (a 5% difference). Alternatively, the observed count for ‘totally disagree’ is much lower than expected – 23.8%, as opposed to the expected count which is 19.6% (a 4.2% difference). This tells us that working class people have a more negative view of immigrants than expected.

Conclusion

This report has used March 2014 data from the Eurobarometer, a service which was established by the European Commission. Using the software program SPSS statistics, the report concentrated on two variables of survey data: ‘Social Class’ and ‘Immigrant Contribution’, with the aim of establishing whether a relationship exists between the social class an individual identifies and opinion of immigrants. In the interest of efficient data analysis, the ‘Social Class’ variable was recoded from 7 categories into just 4: ‘Working Class’, ‘Middle Class’, ‘Upper Class’, and ‘Other’.

The reason why these variables were chosen for analysis is because immigration is an extremely contemporary issue, with many studies suggesting that the majority of Britons view it as the most important issue facing the country, and many anti-mass immigration parties across Europe gaining support. With the growth in support of UKIP in traditionally working class areas of Britain, does it suggest that the working class are more likely to view immigrants negatively? Although this report is wholly descriptive and does not aim to determine reasons why the working class would have a more negative perception of immigrants than the other classes, the reasons why are speculated in the ‘Contextualisation of variables’ section. One reason speculated is because immigrants are more likely to directly compete with the working class for jobs. The richest within society could also be more likely to appreciate the cheap labour of immigrants. Another theory is that the working class are more susceptible to the negative view of immigrant portrayed by the media. Others note the social issues such as crime, terrorism, overcrowding and pressure on public services as reasons to limit immigration.

In analysing the data, evidence shows that the majority of ‘Working Class’ respondents ‘tend to disagree’ with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot. Whereas the majority of ‘Middle Class’ and ‘Upper Class’ respondents ‘tend to agree’ with the statement. Data also suggests that the higher the social class, the more likely they are to have a positive view of immigrants; and the lower the social class, the more likely they are to have a negative view. The Chi-Squared test calculated that a relationship does seem to exist between the two variables; however Cramer’s V suggests that it is only a weak relationship. The comparison of the observed and expected results revealed that the ‘Upper Class’ display a more positive view of immigrants than expected if no relationship exists between the variables. Additionally, the ‘Working Class’ display a more negative view than expected.

To conclude, the data suggests that we are more likely to accept the operational hypothesis than the null hypothesis. The working class of society are more likely than the upper class to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Recommendations for Future Research

There are many different ways in which research can be taken further. Future research could adopt a more causal style of research by asking respondents to include reasons why they view immigrants the way they do. For example, if the respondent selects ‘totally agree’ or ‘tend to agree’, what is the motivation behind their choice? Is it because they believe immigrants improve the economy? Or because they support multiculturalism? Similarly, if the respondent selects ‘totally disagree’ or ‘tend to disagree’, is it because they believe immigrants take jobs? Or because of related social issues? This sort of research allows a greater understanding of the motivation behind people’s opinion of immigrants, helping communication and gaining a greater understanding about certain viewpoints, biases or falsehoods that people have.

Future research could also include additional options to select for the ‘Social Class’ variable. For example, the introduction of ‘Lower-Middle Class’, ‘Middle-Middle Class’, and ‘Upper-Middle Class’ categories. The reason for this is because many sociologists and academics view the traditional three-class system of working class, middle class and upper class as old, outdated and necessary for modernisation. It is argued that the traditional model is incompatible with today’s society, potentially causing difficulty for respondents to answer to the social class question proficiently. If true, this could be a major limitation in the collected data. If updated to consist of more categories that better reflects today’s social class structure, respondents may find it easier to place themselves confidently into a particular social class. This would help provide more efficient data which is more proficient in reflecting today’s society.

Future research could also look at how the current data, which was collected in 2014, compares with older data sets. This would allow researchers to notice any recent trends and patterns in data emerging, and how they have changed over time.

Moreover, there are many variables different from social class which could also have an effect upon opinion of immigrants. Research could examine the influence that age has, that gender has, that ethnicity has, or that nationality has on the opinion of individuals on immigrants. All of which could have a greater or weaker strength of relationship than social class, therefore it would be useful to examine in future research.

 

References

Blackhurst, C. (2014). ‘Farage has made Ukip, not Labour, Britain’s most working-class party.’ The Independent. [Online] 3rd April. [Accessed 14th December 2015] http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/ukip-not-labour-is-now-britain-s-most-working-class-party-9236118.html

Blinder, S. (2015). UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern. Migration Observatory. Briefing University of Oxford: COMPAS. [Online] [Accessed 11th December 2015] http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Public%20Opinion-Overall%20Attitudes%20and%20Level%20of%20Concern.pdf

Chorley, M. (2014). ‘Now Ukip is beating Labour to the white working class vote, days after Miliband tried to win back white van man.’ The Daily Mail. [Online] 25th November. [Accessed 14th December 2015] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2848526/Now-Ukip-beating-Labour-white-working-class-vote-days-Miliband-tried-win-white-van-man.html

Esses, V. Medianu, S. and Lawson, A. (2013). ‘Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role of the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization of Immigrants and Refugees.’ Journal of Social Issues, 69(3) pp. 518-536.

Healey, J. (2015). ‘Why Labour must win back working class voters from Ukip.’ The Guardian. [Online] 23rd May. [Accessed 14th December 2015] http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/23/labour-win-working-class-voters-ukip

(2013). IBM SPSS Statistics Editions: Get the analytical power you need for better decision-making. United States of America. [Online] [Accessed on 7th December 2015] ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/software/uk/pdf/YTS03009USEN.pdf

Ipsos MORI. (2015). Ipsos MORI Issues Index: August 2015. [Online] [Accessed on 11th December 2015] https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3614/EconomistIpsos-MORI-August-2015-Issues-Index.aspx

Pettinger, T. (2015). Impact of Immigration on UK Economy. Economics help. [Online] [Accessed 17th December 2015] http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/6399/economics/impact-of-immigration-on-uk-economy/

Pew Research Center. (2014). A Fragile Rebound for EU Image on Eve of European Parliament Elections. [Online] [Accessed 13th January 2016] http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/2014-05-12_Pew-Global-Attitudes-European-Union.pdf

Prosser, D. (2015). ‘Small Talk: Immigrants start businesses, create jobs and pay taxes: let’s welcome them.’ The Independent. [Online] 20th April. [Accessed 18th December 2015] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/sme/small-talk-immigrants-start-businesses-create-jobs-and-pay-taxes-let-s-welcome-them-10188526.html

Recknagel, C. (2015). The Rise of Europe’s New Right. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. [Online] [Accessed 13th January 2016] http://www.rferl.org/content/antimigrant-voices-boost-standing-as-migrant-crisis-drags-on/27316781.html

Robins-Early, N. (2015). ‘How The Refugee Crisis Is Fueling The Rise Of Europe’s Right.’ The Huffington Post. [Online] 28th October. [Accessed 13th January 2016] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe-right-wing-refugees_562e9e64e4b06317990f1922

Thoma, M. (2006). The Debate over Immigration. [Online] [Accessed 17th December 2015] http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/07/the_debate_over.html

Toynbee, P. (2006). ‘Immigration is now making the rich richer and the poor poorer.’ The Guardian. [Online] 11th August. [Accessed 16th December 2015] http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/11/comment.politics

 

 

English Education Policy, Intelligence and Nature vs. Nurture

According to Professor Danny Dorling, English education policy is based on the ‘nasty little theory that not all children have it in them to think like a few are able to think.’ (Dorling, 2013: online). He explains that the ‘assumption is that children vary greatly in what they might be able to achieve, that some have far greater potential to do well than others, but all have only a fixed potential.’ (ibid). The core of his argument seems to be referring to the continuous debate regarding nature vs. nurture. It is a debate which has been ongoing for a very long time and is discussed within the hard sciences and the social sciences. The conflict is over the extent to which behaviours and traits are either inherited genetically, or learned through the environment. One school of thought holds that genetic inheritance holds more significance in shaping the behaviours and traits of an individual; the other school of thought is that it is the environment. It is quite clear that Dorling subscribes to the ‘nurture’ school of thought, criticising the current government’s education policy, which he argues holds ‘a nasty little assumption’ that we are fixed in our potential. The following paper looks at the history of British education policy, the current policy and the relationship it has to the nature/nurture debate.

Historical background

The 1944 Education Act established, what is known as, the Tripartite System of state-funded education. The basic theory of the system was that all students, irrespective of background, should be entitled to an education suitable to their needs and abilities, and, as students differ in needs and abilities, they should be suited to different curricula. This system supported the view that every human being is born with certain unique faculties and potential. Some people are more academically suited and some people are more manually gifted. The ‘eleven-plus’ examination which was taken by final year primary students, would decide which secondary school pupils would attend. Grammar schools taught a highly academic curriculum, focusing on intellectual subjects, such as literature, classics and complex mathematics. Secondary technical schools were designed to train children skilled in mechanical and scientific subjects. The focus was on subjects such as physics, chemistry, advanced mathematics and biology, in order to prepare pupils to become scientists, engineers and technicians. Secondary modern schools would train pupils in practical and vocational skills.

Opponents of the tripartite system, including Dorling, were critical of the eleven-plus exam. Chitty (2009: 24-25) rejects the idea that it is possible to predict a child’s future accomplishments based on the results of a test that a child takes at ages 10 or 11. Similar to Dorling, he argues that it is ‘based on the view that every child was born with a given quota of ‘intelligence’ which remained constant throughout his or her life, and that this key quality was a direct product of genetic endowment and therefore not susceptible to any educational influence.’ (Chitty, 2009: 24). In addition, the tripartite system has been accused of maintaining social class structures, in which grammar schools would be for middle class students, and secondary modern schools would be for working class students (Carvel, 1999).

However, it is argued that standardised testing of academic aptitude, in particular IQ tests, are a good predictor of grades at school, performance at work and economic success (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994: 21-23; Nisbett et al, 2012: 131). Supporters of the exam, such as prominent psychologist Cyril Burt, argued that, like IQ tests, the eleven-plus examination could be used to identify children from the lower classes who could profit from a more academic schooling. In his view, intelligence genes exist and are not confined just to the upper classes (a prevalent view at the time). He saw the eleven-plus exam as the solution to increasing opportunities for the intelligent among the working class (Fletcher and Hattie, 2011: 23). Likewise, Sesardic (2005: 43) argues that the eleven-plus exam provided a more objective and fairer method of selection than the previous way, which included interviewing students or parents which Sesardic claims was a more unplanned and chaotic method of selection. Sesardic (ibid: 43-44) claims that the IQ test in the eleven-plus exam was beneficial and should not have been taken out: ‘when the local education authority [in Hertfordshire] dropped IQ tests from its 11+ exams, there was an immediate and significant decrease in the proportion of children from working class families entering grammar schools’.

However, certain flaws in the implementation of the tripartite system became increasingly apparent in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Chitty, 2009: 24-25). Logistical difficulties in the building of enough schools and the failure to develop the technical part of the system undermined the whole structure. Very few technical schools opened, due to lack of funds and shortage of suitably qualified teachers, meaning that the tripartite system was, in practice, a two-tier system, with grammar schools considered the best schools and modern schools perceived the bottom of the tier with less funding available. As a result, Harold Wilson’s Labour government declared its intention to end eleven-plus selection in circular 10/65, moving towards a comprehensive education system that does not select on the basis of ability or wealth. The 1976 Education Act effectively outlawed selection by ability, leading to the closure of numerous grammar schools, officially ending the tripartite system. Comprehensive schools would provide a wide ranging curriculum, with all students learning academic, technical and vocational skills. The comprehensive system supports the view that human capacities are dependent almost entirely upon the environment. That all students are born equal in potential and can succeed supposing the education system allows them to do so.

However, a general mood of pessimism and re-evaluation had set in by the middle of the 1970’s, in particular in the education system. Secondary schools were failing to prepare students for work; youngsters were leaving early and were increasingly disrespectful of authority; and the accountability of schools and teachers was brought into question (Chitty, 2009: 34-45). By the 1980’s, around half of the students left full time education altogether after the age of 16, with more than two thirds entering the labour market with no academic qualifications at all (Machin and Vignoles, 2006). The current chief inspector of schools, Sir Michael Wilshaw, argued that a lingering damage was caused by the reforms of schools in the 1960’s and 1970’s. He said: ‘the ideologues who drove the comprehensive agenda confused equality with equity. They took it to mean that one size should fit all. As a consequence, there was a wholesale dumbing down of standards.’ (Espinoza, 2016: online).

Interestingly, a split had emerged on the right over education policy. The more traditionalist conservatives wanted to preserve grammar schools and eleven-plus selection; while the more liberal right were keen to experiment with the educational voucher system, a system in which parents receive a government coupon equivalent to the amount that the state spends on each pupil that can be ‘cashed-in’ at a school of their choice. Both sides were willing to compromise, however, and following Conservative governments, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, introduced a number of ‘market mechanisms’ and reforms into the education system. The 1988 Education Reform Act aimed to increase parental choice and improve accountability of schools. The idea was that parents could choose which school their child attended and have representation on school governing bodies. Schools were given greater autonomy in their operations, specifically over which students they admitted to the school. Educational ‘league-tables’ were established, showing the position of schools relative to one another, for example in terms of their examination success rates, providing a more competitive environment. The notion was to have schools competing for pupils by offering various specializations, meanwhile parents were encouraged to consult league tables as reliable guides to performance.

This system was largely supported by Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ Government, who saw the traditional left wing socialist ideology of the Labour party as outdated and incompatible with the modern market economy. Making education a top priority for his Government, Blair had a keen interest in improving the standards of education, increasing the number of assessments and targets; also increasing the amount of setting within subjects instead of mixed-ability classing, which had previously been common (Ward and Eden, 2009: 23-24; Sukhnandan and Lee, 1998: 13).  The current Conservative Government have also largely implemented the ideas of parental choice and specialist schools. David Cameron has expanded upon the academies programme, which was introduced by Blair, and plans eventually to turn every school into an academy, removing local authority control (Stone, 2015: online). There is also an increasing number of grammar school advocates arguing for the return of selective education. The UK Independence Party’s official education policy is to introduce grammar schools in every town (Mason, 2014: online). However, many on the left argue that the mere existence of parental choice, selection by ability and the general marketization of schools undermines the whole comprehensive education system (Ward and Eden, 2009: 43-44).

The Blank Slate view

As we have seen, the nature vs. nurture debate holds a strong presence in the discussions over education, in particular on the topic of selection by ability. Those on the left, motivated by the ideal of egalitarianism, tend to subscribe more so on the nurture side of the debate. They argue that every human has an equal potential for intelligence, and mental capabilities are solely learned through the environment. Thus, they are opposed to any kind of selection by ability, as it is perceived as unfair on those who do not pass the exam. This view derives from 17th century philosopher John Locke, who argued that humans are born with the absence of any innate psychological content, and all knowledge comes from experience or perception. This is known as tabula rasa, or the blank slate view. According to this view, all behaviours, including any differences in intellectual ability are constructed entirely by culture. Disparities in mental capacities are generally caused by existing social structures that have historically treated certain genders, races or classes subordinately. This is the view of Dorling (2013: online), who cites 1920’s psychiatrist Abraham Myerson, who once said: ‘We often hear of hereditary talents, hereditary vices, and hereditary virtues, but whoever will critically examine the evidence will find that we have no proof of their existence.’ The nurture side often criticises the nature side of reductionism and genetic determinism. The idea that a child’s characteristics are hard-wired by the genes of its parents, with no account taken of environmental and cultural influences, is completely opposed (Rose and Rose, 2000). It is also argued that the human nature argument has been used to justify existing hierarchical social structures, for example the role of women in society (ibid). Marxists argue that emphasis on nature and heritability has been used to oppose social change, as evolution and adaptation validates the way things are; and against social justice reform, for example the argument that the rich are only rich because they’ve inherited greater abilities, so programmes intended to raise the standards of the poor are doomed to fail (Lewontin, Rose and Kamin, 1984).

However, modern scientists largely reject the extreme nurture view of the complete blank slate, especially since the development of the human genome project (Dawkins, 2006; Pinker, 2002; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; Wade, 2014). Yet, the blank slate view is still popular among the social sciences and humanities. Steven Pinker (2002) claims that those who hold the blank slate view deny the existence of the very heart of our being – human nature. ‘A surprising number of intellectuals, particularly on the left, do deny that there is a such thing as inborn talent, especially intelligence.’ (ibid, p.149). Furthermore, he states:

There is now ample evidence that intelligence is a stable property of an individual, that it can be linked to features of the brain (including overall size, amount of gray matter in the frontal lobes, speed of neural conduction, and metabolism of cerebral glucose), that it is partly heritable among individuals, and that it predicts some of the variation in life outcomes such as income and social status. (ibid, p.150)

Of course, the extreme nature view that everything is hereditary is equally incorrect and rejected largely by modern science. Evidence shows that the environment and culture plays a significant part in the shaping of human behaviours and traits, however Pinker (ibid) criticises those who deny that heritability is a contributor at all to intellectual capacity. Pinker accepts that there are other contributing factors, such as: ‘sheer luck, inherited wealth, race and class prejudice, unequal opportunity (such as in schooling and connections), and cultural capital; habits and values that promote economic success.’ Yet, he claims that: ‘Acknowledging that talent matters does not mean that prejudice and unequal opportunity do not matter.’

Dorling’s claim that: ‘when it comes to our mental abilities, we are not made up of classes or races or genders’ also seems incorrect, according to research. There is evidence of differences in mental abilities between classes, races and genders, however, it is very difficult to know the extent to which it is the environment or genes that account for these differences. Yet, as the theory of evolution is vastly accepted to explain the development, adaptations and biological differences of human bodies between different races and genders, in respect to skin colour, bone size, muscle size, and so on; it seems irrational to say that evolution has had no effect on the physical human brain. Evidence shows that social class greatly effects the IQ of children, however, it seems more plausible that this is environmental (Nisbett et al, 2012: 136). IQ scores also differ between the ethnicities, with Asians displaying on average higher IQ’s than whites, and whites displaying higher than blacks, but the gap is narrowing. There is an argument for a genetic basis for this difference, however, culture is obviously significant too. (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994:269-270). In addition, research shows that there are differences in mental ability between the sexes. Although most tests show little or no difference in general intelligence, there are, however, certain aspects in which males excel over females, and females excel over males. For example, females tend to have an advantage in verbal abilities, such as fluency and memory abilities, performing slightly better in vocabulary and reading comprehension, and significantly higher in speech production and essay writing. Meanwhile, males have an advantage in visuospatial abilities, performing better at spatial visualisation, spatial perception, and mental rotation. (Nisbett et al, 2012: 144-146). These variances may explain why women tend to favour the arts and humanities, while men tend to favour the sciences and engineering.

The consequence of this, in regards to education policy, is that standardised testing, selection by ability and increased school choice is a valid education system and should not be completely rejected. There is evidence that we are born with certain innate characteristics and talents, moreover, the notion that we are born with a complete blank slate is vastly rejected. The comprehensive education system assumes that everyone is equal in terms of potential intellectual ability and skillset; that any talents or proficiencies exist because of the environment and how the child is brought up, and that inheritance plays no part. This is contrary to the evidence, however, which suggests that genes do play a part, and that variations exist between the social classes, races and genders. Every individual human being is born unique, not only in fingerprint, but also in abilities, needs and interests, and a one-size-fits-all education policy undermines this basic fact. Therefore, greater parental choice and school specialisation makes sense to account for these differences. For example, a parent with a child that shows proficiency and interest in sports, ought to send their child to a school that specialises in sport, and a parent with a child that shows proficiency and interest in technology, ought to send their child to a school that specialises in technology. Similarly, a child which displays academic talent should attend a school that has an academic focus, a child that displays technical talent should attend a school that has a technical focus, and a child that displays vocational talent should attend a school that has a vocational focus, and so on. Testing is an evident way to exhibit proficiencies that a child may have.

Conclusion

To conclude, British education policy previously consisted of a tripartite system, in which students took the eleven-plus exam that determined the type of secondary school they would attend. The more academic students attended grammar schools, which had an academic focus; the more technical students attended technical schools, and the more practical students attended secondary modern schools, which had a vocational focus. The theoretical basis for this education system was that every student has different needs and abilities, and so the school they attend and curricula they learn should accommodate for these differences. The system aimed to increase social mobility, providing the chance for students from poorer backgrounds to have the same opportunities as students from well-off backgrounds. Selection by ability accepts the idea genetics does play a role in determining the mental capacities of students, which Dorling rejects.

The tripartite system, however, faced logistical difficulties in the developing of technical schools, which undermined the whole system. In practice, the system was a two tier system, with those who passed the eleven-plus exam going to grammar schools, and those failed going to secondary modern schools. Critics accused the system of being unfair, and preserving class structures, rather than improving social mobility that was the original intention.

As a result, the comprehensive education system was established, which did not allow schools to select on the basis of ability. Comprehensive secondary schools taught a wide-ranging curriculum rather than a specific focus, endorsing the idea of mixed-ability classes and egalitarianism. The view was that students are born equal in potential, and the environment shapes the talents and abilities of students, with genetics playing little or no part. This view became popular with the writings of John Locke, who introduced the tabula rasa – the idea that humans are born with a blank slate of knowledge. That there are no innate psychological capacities. This view is largely discredited by modern science, however, as it ignores the influence of biology, evolution and human nature.

By the mid-1970’s and early 1980’s, the consensus was that the education system was failing, therefore, a number of market mechanisms have been introduced into the system over the last 30 years, including school choice, league tables and specialist schooling, in an effort to improve the standards and accountability of schools. Dorling rejects these reforms on the basis that it undermines comprehensive education, and is based upon ‘a nasty little theory’ that children vary greatly in what they might be able to achieve. Dorling claims that ‘when it comes to our mental abilities, we are not made up of classes or races or genders,’ however, on the contrary, evidence shows that there are differences in mental abilities between classes, races and genders. Therefore, there is valid justification for school choice and selection by ability.

 

References

Carvel, J. (1999) ‘Grammar schools ‘no escape route for poorer children’. The Guardian. [Online] 29th May. [Accessed on 10th March 2016] http://www.theguardian.com/education/1999/may/29/grammarschools.secondaryschools

Chitty, C. (2009) Education Policy in Britain. 2nd ed., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dawkins, R. (2006) The Selfish Gene: 30th Anniversary Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dorling, D. (2013) ‘English education policy is based on a nasty little theory’. The Guardian. [Online] 22nd July. [Accessed on 10th February 2016] http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/jul/22/education-policy-childrens-potential

Espinoza, J. (2016) ‘’One size fits all’ secondary education is failing youngsters, warns Ofsted head’. The Telegraph. [Online] 18th January. [Accessed on 15th March 2016] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/12105026/One-size-fits-all-secondary-education-is-failing-youngsters-warns-Ofsted-head.html

Fletcher, R. and Hattie, J. (2011) Intelligence and Intelligence Testing.

Herrnstein, R. and Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve. New York: The Free Press.

Lewontin, R. Rose, S. and Kamin, L. (1984) Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature. New York: Pantheon Books.

Machin, S. and Vignoles, A. (2006) Education Policy in the UK. Centre for the Economics of Education. London School of Economics. [Online] [Accessed on 7th March 2016] http://cee.lse.ac.uk/ceedps/ceedp57.pdf

Mason, R. (2014) ‘Nigel Farage lays out Ukip plans for schools and taxes’. The Guardian. [Online] 1st June. [Accessed 11th March 2016] http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/01/nigel-farage-ukip-schools-taxes

Nisbett, R., Aronson, J., Blair, C., Dickens, W., Flynn, J., Halpern, D. and Turkheimer, E. (2012) ‘Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments.’ American Psychologist, 67(2), pp.130-159.

Pinker, S. (2002) The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Penguin Books.

Rose, H. and Rose, S. (2000) Alas, poor Darwin: Arguments against Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Harmony Books.

Sesardic, N. (2005) Making Sense of Heritability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stone, J. (2015) ‘David Cameron says he will turn every school into an academy’. The Independent. [Online] 7th October. [Accessed 10th March 2016] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-says-he-will-turn-every-school-into-an-academy-a6684616.html

Sukhnandan, L. and Lee, B. (1998) Streaming, Setting and Grouping by Ability: a review of the literature. Berkshire: National Foundation for Educational Research. [Online] [Accessed 10th March 2016] https://www.nfer.ac.uk/publications/SSG01/SSG01.pdf

Wade, N. (2014) A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History. New York: Penguin Books.

Ward, S. and Eden, C. (2009) Key Issues in Education Policy. Sage Publications Ltd.

John Locke on Personal Identity

Personal identity is an interesting philosophical topic that raises a number of thought-provoking questions regarding existence, such as: who am I? What am I? Does life exist after death? What is it to be a person? What has a person got that a non-person does not? And so on. The main enquiry that this paper, and the personal identity topic in general, attempts to answer is the question of what it is that makes a person the same person over time. Sameness and time are concepts relating to the theory of personal identity, along with persistence and change. Identity can be symbolised by the equals sign (=) as it is a relation between a thing and itself. A typical identity statement would go as follows: Barack Obama is the President of the United States; Paul McCartney is a musician; the Earth is globular etc. In these statements the word is can be easily interchanged with the equals sign (=).

17th Century, British philosopher John Locke was a major influence in the personal identity discussion. Locke’s account for personal identity was revolutionary and is still of interest today. The discussion on personal identity took place in Book II Chapter XXVII of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) and was remarkably profound, which is particularly impressive considering he played a large role in the invention of the topic. The chapter, which is titled “Of Identity and Diversity” remains one the most significant chapters in the whole of the essay. The essay itself outlined Locke’s empiricist philosophy, providing a groundwork which influenced future empiricists such as David Hume and George Berkeley.

One may ask why the personal identity topic is important, and why should we care about it? Well, one reason is because personal identity has a major legal importance. If someone commits a crime, yet legitimately cannot remember doing so, is he/she still responsible for committing that crime? Likewise, if a surgeon places your brain into someone else’s body, who would be responsible for the following actions? Identity is important because it is related to justice and moral responsibility. Only persons can act freely, and as a result be accountable morally and rationally for their actions. You are responsible for your own actions – but who is you? Are you your body or your mind or something else? In addition, personal identity has a role to play in ethical debates regarding controversial issues such as abortion and euthanasia.

The following paper will address the topic of personal identity, firstly by delineating what is known as the persistence question, which is the question of what is necessary and sufficient for a past or future being to be you. Three different approaches to the question are addressed: one approach is the Cartesian view which identifies a person with an immaterial soul; another approach is a materialist view which identifies a person with their body; and the final approach is a psychological one which relates personhood to the mind. Locke takes a psychological approach, in which he considers a person to be defined by his consciousness. Locke’s whole conception of personal identity will be outlined and examined, along with his criticisms of the other approaches to personal identity.

Persistence question

There is a problem with personal identity which many philosophers attempt to answer, and it is known as the persistence question. The persistence question asks what is necessary and sufficient for a past or future being to be you. Is a person in one point in time the same person as in a later point in time? And if so, what is it that makes it the same person? Am I the same person as I was when I was a baby? A lot has changed since I was a baby – I have grown taller, I weigh more, and I have a lot more cognitive ideas in my head. Despite these changes, it is generally accepted that I am the same person now as I was when I was a baby. Similarly, if, all of a sudden, a previously healthy person gets hit by a car damaging his brain and leaving him in a vegetative state – is he the same person as he was previously? What is it exactly that constitutes sameness over time? According to Olson (2010) the persistence question goes as follows: under what possible circumstances is a person who exists at one time identical with something that exists at another time?

In order to avoid confusion, it is imperative to make a key distinction between numerical identity and qualitative identity. In regards to the persistence question, we are talking about numerical identity. When two things are one in the same, they are said to be numerically identical, i.e. I am one in the same person as that baby years ago, and Paul McCartney today is one in the same person as the Paul McCartney that was a member of the Beatles fifty years ago. Qualitative identity, on the other hand, is when two things have similar qualities – they are qualitatively similar, i.e. they are more or less the same in appearance and have various properties in common. Identical twins are a good example to demonstration this distinction. Identical twins are qualitatively similar, in that they look more or less the same and probably have similar personality traits; however they are not numerically identical as there are two of them. This distinction allows us to realise that the persistence question is not about what it takes for a past or future being to be qualitatively similar to you. On the contrary, it is about what it takes for a past or future being to be you, as opposed to someone or something like you. Qualitatively I am not identical to as I was when I was a baby, but numerically I am.

The Soul approach

The traditional conception of personal identity, prior to Locke, was the soul approach. According to this view personhood is related to an immaterial soul that was implanted in the body by God. The soul theory is associated in particular with Plato, Descartes and numerous of the world’s religions. According to Descartes the soul is a non-physical, thinking substance that is distinct from the body. It is the soul that makes up a person, thus sameness of person over time is the sameness of soul over time. If it is the same soul, it is the same person. If it is a different soul, it is a different person. I am the same person as that baby, insofar as I have the very same soul as the baby. In this view the sameness of the body is irrelevant, bodies are contingent and are not necessary for personhood. The relation of person and soul allows for the existence of an afterlife, which Yaffe (2007) argues is the reason why this view is allied with Christianity.

For Locke, however, this view on personal identity is simply not plausible. Although Locke was a committed Christian who believed in the existence of the afterlife, he did not believe that personhood is defined by the existence of souls. In considering the soul theory, Locke identified two questions that must be answered: Is it possible to have different souls yet the same person? Which he answers “yes”. And, is it possible to have the same soul yet different persons? Which he also answered “yes”. Locke presents this in the following thought experiment:

Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, that he has in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the constant change of his Body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself: Let him also suppose it to be the same Soul, that was in Nestor or Thersites, at the Siege of Troy, (For Souls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their Nature, indifferent to any parcel of Matter, the Supposition has no apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man: But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either of Nestor or Thersites, does, or can he, conceive himself the same Person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their Actions? Attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the Actions of any other Man, that ever existed? (E II.xxvii.14: 339)

The point that Locke is making is that by having Nestor or Thersites soul does not necessitate that you have concernment towards their actions (Yaffe, 2007, pp. 208-209). Locke assumes that it is possible for you to have Nestor or Thersites soul without ever being concerned for what they did. In addition, according to Locke we cannot exclude the possibility that our souls can switch at a point in time. Suppose when you went to bed last night, either God or an evil demon destroyed your soul during the night and replaced it with a different soul. Suppose this new soul has all same beliefs, memories and desires as the previous soul, thus when you wake up the next day you feel no different and have no way of knowing that your body contains a different soul. So now, according to the soul view, you are a different person to the one before you went to bed last night. We cannot exclude the possibility that this switching of souls occurs every single night in fact, or every hour, or every minute. There is simply no way of knowing that the soul has been switched. This is too big of a jump to make for Locke, and so he rejects the soul approach, concluding that it is an inconceivable theory on personal identity.

The Body approach

An alternative theory on personal identity is the body approach. Whereas the soul approach states that sameness of soul is key to personal identity, the body approach states that sameness of body is key to personal identity. This theory is also known as the somatic approach, and is commonly associated with materialism. The general thesis is that identity over time consists in some brute physical relation. If it is the same physical body, then it is the same person. If it is a different physical body, then it is a different person. Here, sameness of soul is irrelevant, as is sameness of mind. I am the same person as that baby, insofar as I have the same physical body as the baby. Unlike the soul approach to personal identity, the body approach does not allow for an afterlife – when your body shuts down and decomposes, you as a person are dead. If a person has an accident and loses all mental capabilities, a supporter of the body approach would not accept that that person has ceased to exist. Its advocates state that we are only people contingently (Olson, 2006).

There are problems with this theory however. As human beings, our bodies age and grow, replacing old cells with new cells, causing us to lose and gain matter. Does this mean that I am a different person simply because I consist of different matter than before? Locke proposed a similar scenario concerning a sock which gets a hole. If the hole where to be patched, would it still be the same sock? How about if two patches where added, or three patches or four and so on until all the material of the original sock has been replaced (Cohen, 2010). Surely now it is a different sock? Moreover, another problem with this theory is when considering the example of brain transplants. Suppose a surgeon transfers one person’s brain, let us call him John, into another person’s body, call him George. We are left with John’s brain inside George’s body, thus George’s body contains all the thoughts, memories, beliefs and character traits of John. Although George looks identical to how he did before and has the exact same physical body, it seems wrong to say he is exactly the same person as before. John could have had a polar opposite set of beliefs, personality type and cognitive functioning to George, and so this new person behaves in a completely different way to how George would have done previously. Can we still say that George is the same person as before, simply because he has the same physical body? It would seem wrong to say so.

John Locke’s conception

So, Locke rejects both the soul approach to personal identity, and the body approach to personal identity. And so, he comes up with his own theory which, in a way, bridges the gap between the two schools of thought on the subject. Locke takes a psychological approach to personal identity. According to Locke, identity of person is defined by identity of consciousness: “[T]he same consciousness being preserv’d, … the personal identity is preserv’d” (E II.xxvii.13: 338). Locke goes about answering the persistence question by bringing things down to a fundamental atomic level. He says that a single particle of matter, i.e. an atom, continues in existence for as long as it remains self-identical. Atom a at one point in time, and atom b at a later point in time, are the exact same particle, insofar as there is a continuous trajectory leading from one to the other.

Let us suppose an atom, i.e. a continued body under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place; it is evident, that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For, being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued; for so long it will be the same, and no other. (E II.xxvii.3: 330)

Next, he moves on to address bodies of matter – also known as composite objects. The thing that constitutes the identity of a composite object is dependent upon the identity of the particles that constitute it. The body of matter is the same body of matter if, and only if, it is the same group of particles, even if they are differently arranged. For example, if you sit on a bean bag causing it to squash; that bean bag is still the same bean bag, despite the particles being differently organised.

[I]f two or more Atoms be joined together into the same Mass, every one of those Atoms will be the same, by the foregoing Rule: And whilst they exist united together, the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same Body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled: But if one of these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same Mass, or the same Body. (E II.xxvii.3: 330)

Locke makes a strict rule that if just one atom is added or taken away, it is no longer the same composite object. This rule could potentially be seen as overly strict, especially when considering the paradox of the heap. If you have a heap of sand and just one grain of sand is taken away, is it now a different heap of sand? According to Locke “yes”.

Locke moves on to address living organisms. He recognises that he cannot apply the strict rule that he imposed on composite objects to physical organisms. A plant or animal is not a mere collection of matter, he describes them as “an organisation of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life” (E II.xxvii.4). And so the identity of an organism over time is constituted by a continuous history of such an organised life. Bodies of living organisms are constantly changing overtime, and it is an essential component of being a living thing that we lose old matter and gain new matter. As long as there is a continuous history linking them, we can say that there is a single organism.

An oak, growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt, grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse; though, in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of parts; so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter. (E II.xxvii.3)

Following this, his next job is to define what a person is. According to Locke a person is:

A thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself, that which he calls self. (E II.xxvii.9: 335)

And so, Locke conception is that consciousness constitutes personal identity. Sameness of person overtime is sameness of consciousness over time. If it is the same consciousness, it is the same person. If it is a different consciousness, it is a different person. Locke’s answer to the persistence question is that it is memory that preserves personal identity. Memory is what mediates the linking of continuous history. If Paul McCartney can remember being a member of the Beatles fifty years ago, then he is the exact same person. This raises a number of questions and criticisms of Locke’s theory. If one cannot remember what he had for breakfast the day before, is he a different person? According to Locke “yes”. Thomas Reid famously raised an objection to Locke. He pondered that a retired general can remember what he did as a young lieutenant in the army, but cannot remember being a child. If memory constitutes personal identity then the lieutenant is one in the same person as the child and the general is one in the same person as the lieutenant, but the general is not the same person as the child. According to Reid, this is a contradiction. Importantly, Locke distinguishes a person from a human being. A human being is a living organism like others, but a person is a thinking intelligent being.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are typically three ways of approaching the personal identity topic. The traditional view is the soul theory, which states that persons are immaterial souls, and it is sameness of soul that constitutes sameness of person. The problem with this theory is that there is no way of proving the existence of souls, and you cannot exclude the possibility that souls can be switched at a point in time. For Locke, this view is simply not plausible.

Another approach is the body theory, which states that persons are physical bodies, and it is sameness of body that constitutes sameness of person. The problem with this view is that our bodies change all the time, and so are we different persons because of this fact? The body theory also has major problems with the challenge of brain transplants.

Locke rejects both of these views, and so brings in consciousness as the solution. A person is there consciousness, and sameness of person over time is constituted by sameness of consciousness. This is dependent upon memory. If we can remember what we did yesterday, then we are the same person. If we cannot remember, then we are not the same person. This view on personal identity has been criticised, yet it does not take away the significant influence of Locke on the topic.

 

Bibliography

Cohen, M. (2010). Philosophy for Dummies. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Korfmacher, C. (2015). Personal Identity. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [online] Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/

Locke, J. (1959). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Dover Publications.

Olson, E. (2006). Is there a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? University of Sheffield.

Olson, E. (2010). Personal Identity. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2010 Edition. [online] Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal

Uzgalis, W. (2010). John Locke. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2014 Edition. [online] Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/supplement.html

Weinberg, S. (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass, 6(6), pp.398-407.

Williams, B. (1956). Personal Identity and Individuation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57, pp. 229 – 252.

Yaffe, G. (2007). Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity. In: L. Newman, The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, pp. 192 – 230.

Aristotle on Friendship, Virtue and Eudaimonia

Introduction

It has been said that Aristotle’s most influential and historically significant work is Nicomachean Ethics, in which he outlines and defines his ethical theory, addressing major topics such as virtue and happiness, moral education, the doctrine of the mean, the unity of the virtues, the importance of friendship and the life of contemplation. The following paper will examine Aristotle’s conception of friendship, including the definition and importance of friendship, the different kinds that exist and the grounds of friendship, all of which he addresses in books VIII and IX of the treatise. The words and arguments Aristotle puts forward are essentially about human relationships which still hold true today, despite being written thousands of years ago.

One thing that Aristotle’s ethical theory places a major significance upon is character and virtue. For Aristotle eudaimonia, which is translated as true happiness or human flourishing, is the highest goal in life[1] and one must be virtuous in order to attain true happiness. “A contented, fulfilled and flourishing life with added serenity and lots of activity”[2] is a good way of summing up what is meant by eudaimonia. Aristotle ties friendship very closely to virtue and this document will observe whether or not he is correct in doing so; however the terms virtue and friendship must be defined before the discussion begins. A virtuous person is someone who has ideal character traits. Aristotle defines virtue as a disposition to act in the correct way and as a mean between extremes of deficiency and excess, which are known as vices.[3] Take, for example, the virtue of ‘courage’; having an excess of courage is known as ‘rashness’ and having a deficiency of courage is ‘cowardice’, both of these are vices, and the point of greatest courage lies not exactly in the middle, but at a point which is sometimes closer to one extreme than the other depending upon the situation. It is known as the Doctrine of the Mean, and the mean is relative and determined by a rational principle. According to Aristotle virtue is not inherited or acquired through reasoning or instruction. Virtue is learned primarily through habit, training and practice, and training comes from example, so if you are set the wrong example, then virtue does not develop.[4]

Aristotle defines friendship, or philia, as love and affection. When you have a friend, you have a loved one, or a philos. A friendship, for Aristotle, is “justice in the fullest sense”[5] and includes the act of loving, more so than the act of being loved. Friendships are purposeful, goal-directed and designed for a particular function. A good friendship demands certain necessary features, comprising mainly of wishing each other well, mutual affection and awareness; therefore an inanimate object (e.g. wine) cannot be counted as a friend because “there is no return of affection and no wish for the good of the object.”[6] Therefore, a friendship involves a reciprocal feeling of goodwill between two individuals.

Why is friendship important?

At the very beginning of the chapter, Aristotle establishes the axiom that friendship not only is important, but is a necessity for living.[7] As previously mentioned, true happiness is the goal of life and virtue is required in order to achieve true happiness; friendship is a kind of virtue, or implies virtue, thus friendship is a necessity.  In other words, friendship is one of the greatest goods in life, so it is impossible to achieve perfect happiness without friends. It is important to note here that he is referring to ‘true’ friendships, not superficial ones, as an insincere friendship is not a virtuous one. Aristotle says “nobody would choose to live without friends,”[8] although this is a general statement to make, it is a fairly reasonable one.

Another doctrine Aristotle draws is that you can only have a few true friends. It could be argued that it is better to have many friends, but Aristotle would maintain that there is a limit to how many close friendships someone can sustain. This is because if you have many friends, there is a tall chance that a lot of the perceived friendships are shallow; it is more desirable to have a few intimate friends, than many. It is not possible to have perfect friendship with many different people, even if you lived in city full of virtuous people, mainly because perfect friendship takes such a long time to build and maintain; however it is possible to have many friends based on usefulness or pleasure. It would be safe to assume that Aristotle would surely agree with the proverb that: ‘you can count your true friends on one hand.’

Friendship is important for everybody, but there are different reasons why, for different types of people. Friends help the young in keeping them from mistakes and they help the old in caring for them when they are weak. For people living in poverty or deprivation friends can be their only refuge. Also, those that have wealth and power have a special need for friendship, it is pointless having such prosperity if they cannot share it with friends. Furthermore, wealth does not equal happiness, and friendship is essential for achieving happiness. So, as we have seen friendship is important for everybody from all walks of life. Without having real relationships, or friendships, there is a greater chance of feeling loneliness and achieving eudaimonia becomes impossible.

Three kinds of friendship

According to Aristotle, there are three kinds of friendship that exist: friendship based on utility, friendship based on pleasure and friendship based on goodness. A friendship based on utility occurs when two people derive some kind of benefit from each other, happening most frequently between the elderly and in business and professional relationships. A friendship based on pleasure occurs when two people are drawn to each other’s wit, good looks, and pleasant qualities; this occurs most commonly between the young, especially if it’s an erotic relationship. Finally friendship based on goodness is where two people admire each other’s virtue and help each other in striving for perfect goodness, according to Aristotle this is the only ‘true’ kind of friendship. A reason being because the first two kinds of friendships have several drawbacks.

One drawback is that the first two types are brief and short-lived because pleasures and needs are subject to change over time, if one no longer finds pleasure or utility in the other then the friendship disbands. Friendships based on pleasure tend to break down simply because tastes and affections change, especially with advancing years. Friendships based on utility have the most problems because utility is an impermanent thing and circumstances change most frequently, for example you could change jobs or location meaning that the other person is no longer useful to you. Two people who are friends because of utility don’t particularly spend much time together, possibly because they may not even get along with each other, and they are only together when in circumstances where they are mutually useful to each other. Another significant drawback of the first two kinds of friendship is that they are both motivated by self-interest rather than a genuine concern for one another. It is only when it is in ones best interest do they wish the other person well, an example being in a work environment, one person may hope their friend gains a promotion but only because they can then have a chance of taking their friend’s previous job role.

Alternatively, friendships based on goodness are long-lasting and genuine, they involve honesty and decency. They are the best kinds of friendship because they are the most virtuous. Although they are rare and take time to develop, they are the most rewarding because they involve both utility and pleasure, and also goodness. Only good people can achieve this kind of friendship because they are not motivated by self-interest, rather a genuine concern for the other’s well-being. “It is those who desire the good of their friends for their friends’ sake that are most truly friends, because each loves the other for what he is, and not for any incidental quality.”[9] These friendships are enduring for as long as both people remain virtuous; if one becomes more virtuous than the other, the friends could grow apart, however this is very unlikely because with virtue comes stability.

Aristotle also points out a different kind of friendship that occurs, involving affection between two people of unequal standing.  An example being friendship between ruler and subject, or between parent and child. These relationships require a different kind of love from each person, as the two friends give and receive different things; also the amount of love or affection ought to be proportional to the virtue of each person.

Aristotle argues that all friendship is rooted in self-love (philautia), and one must love himself more than he loves others.[10] It is important to note that he does not mean for someone to be a narcissist, as this would be an excess of self-love. What he means is that good men should take joy in being true to their own values, and the love of virtue should be expressed. It is only when one has a love of himself and his virtues that he can acquire a virtuous friendship with another, similarly virtuous and good person. Aristotle argues that “it is right for the good man to be self-loving, because then he will both be benefited himself by performing fine actions and also help others.”[11] However, it is not right for bad men to have self-love because he will harm himself and others around him.

Conclusion

To conclude, Aristotle has a fundamental view that human beings are social beings and we need virtuous friendships because the ultimate goal is to be truly happy. Things like wealth and fame and so on, could not possibly lead to a happy life. Even an individual who is virtuous but has no friend with similar virtue to share, will struggle in achieving true happiness. It is only morally good men that can attain perfect friendship, morally bad men can never acquire it because they are primarily motivated by their own self-interest, and they do not genuinely care about the other. The morally bad can only gain friends on the basis of pleasure or usefulness, which are not true friendships. Friendship is essential for everybody in achieving eudaimonia, regardless of gender, age or wealth etc. Also, a morally good man should have self-love because other people will benefit. A good person who expresses virtue can be a good role-model for other people to aspire to. And the spread of virtue among a community will undoubtedly have positive consequences, leading to more friendships based on virtue, thus more people achieving the highest goal of life – true happiness.

[1] Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. 1095a20/pp.6-7

[2] Woodfin, R., Groves, J. and Appignanesi, R. (2010). Introducing Aristotle. Pg.120.

[3] 1105b20/pp.38-40

[4] 1103a25/p.31

[5] 1155a28/p.201

[6] 1155b28/p.203

[7] 1155a2/p.200

[8] 1155a5/p.200

[9] 1156b10/p.205

[10] 1168b11/p.243

[11] 1169a12/p.245

 

Bibliography

Annas, J. (1977). Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism. Mind, New Series, 86(344), pp.532-554.

Aristotle, Thomson, J., Tredennick, H. and Barnes, J. (2004). The Nicomachean ethics. London: Penguin.

Cooper, J. (1977). Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship. The Review of Metaphysics, 30(4), pp.619-648.

Fortenbaugh, W. (1975). Aristotle’s Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning. Phronesis, 20(1), pp.51-62.

Helm, B. (2005). Friendship. [online] Plato.stanford.edu. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/ [Accessed 17 Dec. 2014].

Woodfin, R., Groves, J. and Appignanesi, R. (2010). Introducing Aristotle. New York: Totem Books.

Was the Reagan administration responsible for ending the Cold War?

The Cold War was a time of enormous tension between two of the worlds’ strongest superpowers that were ideologically opposed to one another: the communist Soviet Union, and the capitalist United States of America. When the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Cold War came to an end, it sparked a debate that continues to exist today and will go on for some time. Why did the Soviet Union collapse? Who, or what, was responsible? According to Margaret Thatcher: “Ronald Reagan won the cold war without firing a shot.” This echoes a widely held opinion in the West, especially in America, that it was Reagan who was directly responsible for ending the cold war. Alternative views of history reject this assessment, claiming that the Soviet Union collapsed because of its own problems at home.

The following paper examines both sides of the argument and comes to the conclusion that the impact of Reagan is often overstated in the West, as evidence suggests that he was not directly responsible for ending the Cold War. That is not to say, however, that he did not have any impact at all. The evidence suggests that Reagan’s foreign policy increased pressure on the Soviet Union, speeding up the collapse. Though this collapse was inevitable due to the internal problems facing the U.S.S.R. To make the case, this paper will be structured as follows: First, Reagan’s approach to foreign policy is outlined, followed by the arguments in favour of Reagan being responsible for winning the Cold War. Counter-arguments are then provided, showing how it was the internal problems of the Soviet Union that predominantly led to its collapse.

The Reagan Doctrine

Prior to the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the White House was occupied by Democrat leader Jimmy Carter. Disillusionment was still high within the American public due to Watergate and Vietnam, and so Carter was elected in 1976 to convey a more liberal approach to foreign policy, which emphasised working with others, foreign aid and diplomatic solutions. Conversely, critics argue that this was neither a viable, nor a politically acceptable foreign policy, as it overlooked the imperialist ambitions of the Soviet Union (Layne, 1988, p.96). Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first secretary of state, epitomised this sentiment by claiming that: “the Soviet Union had been seduced by the weakness of the American will and extended itself far beyond the natural limits of its own apparent interests and influence.” Moreover, the failure of the Jimmy Carter administration to resist “this audacious assault upon American interests” further exacerbated the problem (McMahon, 1995, p.371). There is strong evidence showing that during the 1970s, the Soviet Union expanded its military and conventional arsenals, consuming more than one-quarter of its GDP (Kaufman, 2011). For the first time, the Soviet’s military spending grew larger than the U.S’s, which had been descending. As Soviet interventionism expanded into Afghanistan, calls for the U.S. to rebuild its military grew, especially among neoconservatives who had already began shaping the Reagan administration’s foreign policy (Layne, 1988, p.97). Therefore, there is evidence that the 1980 Reagan campaign, which proposed a substantial increase in defence spending, reflected the mood of the American electorate, and so he was elected into office.

The Reagan Doctrine is the name given to the strategy of the Reagan administration to diminish the global influence of the Soviet Union. The plan was to build-up the military, reject arms controls, squeeze the U.S.S.R. economically and support anti-communist “freedom fighters” around the world. Layne (1988, p.98) provides a detailed definition of the Reagan Doctrine, in which he states:

The Reagan Doctrine has never been authoritatively defined, but its content can be inferred from various statements made by President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz and the writings of such neoconservative foreign policy theorists as Charles Krauthammer, Irving Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz. As commonly understood, the Reagan Doctrine committed the United States to resisting Soviet and Soviet-supported aggression wherever it arose, to building U.S.-style democracies in Third World countries, and to rolling back communism by aiding anti-communist insurgencies. The Reagan Doctrine sought to create an ideologically congenial world and assumed that U.S. security required nothing less. In some quarters, moreover, the doctrine’s objectives were framed more expansively to include bringing about the Soviet empire’s breakup and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet state itself by inflicting a series of what Kristol called “small defeats” on Moscow in the Third World (presumably undermining the Soviet regime’s domestic legitimacy), engaging the Kremlin in a high-tech arms race, and pressuring the Soviet Union economically.

This plan was quickly put into practice. Within his first five years the military budget had doubled, increasing from $142.6 billion to $286.6 billion (Korb, 1988, p.84). Reagan had purchased nearly 3,000 combat aircraft, 3,700 strategic missiles, 200 ships, and approximately 10,000 tanks in the first six years of his administration (ibid, p.86). By the middle of the decade, U.S. military expenditures surpassed the Soviet Union’s for the first time since the late 1960’s (ibid, p.84). In addition to which, the CIA began arming and financing the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan (Operation Cyclone), and the indigenous anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua – known as the Contras. In response to Martial Law in Poland (1981-1983), the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on the U.S.S.R, banning the exportation of equipment needed to build a pipeline between Russia and Western Europe.

It has been argued that it is mainly these policies that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kaufman (2011) argues that the doubling in the size of the defence budget, had the consequence of modernising the American military, which in turn, wiped out the Soviet’s military advantage that it had gained in the 1970s, and badly strained the Soviet economy. He argues that Reagan understood more clearly than others the “evil essence” of the Soviet Union and communism, and how to defeat it, and that the Soviet system was vulnerable to “sustained economic, military, moral, and political pressure.” Christopher Layne (1988, p.108), who by no means was a supporter of Ronald Reagan, conceded that the Reagan administration had restored national pride and self-confidence to the U.S. that had been badly damaged by Vietnam and the Iran hostage crisis (1979-1980). Supporters of Reagan’s foreign policy, also claim that his plans of developing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) posed a great technological threat to the Soviets which they simply could not compete with. SDI, or as critics called “Star Wars”, was a program that was intended to develop a sophisticated, space-based, anti-ballistic missile system which would prevent attacks from other countries, and, according to Reagan, “render nuclear weapons obsolete” (Brown, 2007, p.6). There is evidence that suggests that the Soviets were concerned about these plans. According to Busch (1997, pp.455-456) SDI became an “obsession” for the Soviet leadership, and they were “thrown into a state of despair”. At the Geneva summit in 1985, they proposed for the U.S. to abandon the program in return for a sharp reduction in Soviet nuclear arsenals, however, Reagan refused. The argument is that SDI had placed a strategic, technological and economic burden upon the Soviet Union which contributed as much as any other single factor to the end of the Cold War (ibid).

On the other hand, there is an evident problem with this line of thinking. The argument that the Reagan Doctrine was directly responsible for bringing about the end of the Cold War, fails to take into account the shift in Reagan’s approach towards foreign policy during his second term in The White House. In his second term, there is a strong indication that Reagan switched to a more pragmatic and conciliatory position, which encouraged dialogue, cooperation and understanding with the Soviet Union, and placed a greater emphasis on arms reduction (Fischer, 1997, pp.488-496).  As in his first term, it was expected that the surge in defence spending would continue into his second administration. However, this was not the case. On the contrary, the budget began to decrease. Congress slashed the 1986 request by 10 percent, and the defence budget dropped in nominal terms (Korb, 1988, p.86). In addition, the two superpowers began communicating with each other, notably at the Geneva summit in 1985, at Reykjavik Iceland in 1986, and at Moscow in 1988. It appears that Reagan’s attitude towards the Soviet Union had changed. No longer were they the “evil empire” which he had called them previously. By 1988, he was referring to Gorbachev as “my friend”. As Ravenal (1988, p.125) points out, the administration had gone from “accusations of lying and cheating and committing “any crime” to the warm handshakes of three summits and the tangible accomplishments of the double-zero, intermediate-range arms reduction agreement and the foundation of a substantial cut in strategic nuclear arms.” Ironically, a portion of the neoconservative Republicans had began to complain that Reagan had become too soft and friendly towards the Soviets at the end.

The reason why Reagan changed his policy is up for debate. One reason could be attributed to the growing national deficit. In his first term in office, Reagan had succeeded in doubling the size of the defence budget, but also in doubling the size of the national deficit (Korb, 1988, p.90). For someone who was supposed to be a “fiscal conservative”, this does not seem very economically responsible. Another reason could have been in response to the events of Able Archer in 1983. Able Archer was a ten-day NATO exercise that provoked the Soviet Union to ready their nuclear forces for attack, due to the realistic nature of the exercise. This event had almost caused nuclear war, which may have led Reagan to believe that dialog would be the best approach, as not long after, he gave a speech in which he stated that: “Reducing the risk of war-and especially nuclear war is priority number one” (Fischer, 1997, p.487). Other reasons could be because of the growing public dissatisfaction with the Reagan Doctrine and scepticism about U.S. involvement overseas (Layne, 1988, p.101); or because of the rise of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership, who was a more democratic and cooperative leader. Regardless, the point remains that the Soviet Union did not collapse during Reagan’s first term, when he had taken a firm attitude towards the Soviet Union and focused on military build-up. On the contrary, the Soviet Union collapsed after Reagan’s shift in attitude and policy, and when the relationship between the two superpowers had improved. This seems to contradict the argument that the Reagan Doctrine brought about the collapse.

Internal problems

In some ways, supporters of communism are happy to place the blame on Reagan for the fall of the Soviet Union, as it takes away responsibility from the inherent flaws and inefficiencies of an authoritarian, centrally controlled economic system. In the late 1970s the Soviet Union was immersed in a mass of problems which it would not recover from, not least because its economy was stagnating. Price controls and collectivisation were having devastating effects on its agriculture sector, factories and technology were backwards and outdated, and consumers were faced with widespread shortages and low-quality products (Stoner-Weiss, 2009, pp.4-5). Moreover, prices had tripled, taxes had increased and living conditions were deteriorating (Crouch, 1989, pp.26-27). The absence of natural market forces such as supply and demand, and the lack of economic incentives meant that workers were unproductive and lacked a work ethic. “We pretend to work, while you pretend to pay us” was a common joke that circulated within its factories (Stoner-Weiss, 2009, p.45). These inefficiencies were predicted in the 1920s by economist Ludwig von Mises who argued that the Soviet system was unsustainable and would ultimately collapse because of the problems with state ownership of the means of production. A system that does not have private ownership of the means of production and capital markets does not have a functioning price and profit mechanism, therefore does not have information available about desirability and abundance of a good, and as a consequence there is no way of rationally allocating resources. Hence why the Soviet economy was so unproductive, wasteful and plagued with scarcities (Von Mises, 1990).

The vulnerability of the Soviet economy was not helped by the prioritisation of military build-up and its costly interventions abroad. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which turned out to be an almost ten year long war, involving approximately one million Soviet troops, tens of thousands of which either died or were injured (Reuveny and Prakash, 1999, p.696). Often labelled as “Russia’s Vietnam” by Western media, there is a strong case that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was one of the contributing factors that led to its collapse, not least because of the economic burden that it placed on the Soviet economy. The war discredited the perceived military strength of the Soviet army. Furthermore, the corruption, looting, plundering and other atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers destroyed its moral legitimacy, which consequently had profound implications for the survivability of the Soviet Union (ibid, p.698).

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he recognised that something needed to change. Unproductivity, corruption, cover-ups, and mismanagement had built-up in the Soviet system over many years, and reorganisation was not just needed, it was necessary. Not many would predict the scale of the reforms that Gorbachev brought in, however, as his plans were quite radical. His strategy was to reorganise the political and economic system, encourage transparency in its institutions, and rethink the interventionist approach to foreign policy. “Glasnost” meaning “openness” was one of the policies which Gorbachev introduced, and its effects were momentous. Gorbachev wanted to win the trust of the public by increasing dialogue between the government and its citizens, starting off by literally going out on the streets of Russia to talk to the people – something which had seemed impossible a few years before. The policy entailed greater freedom of speech for the citizens and the media, reducing censorship and controls, and opening up political debate. Brown (2007, pp.6-7) argues that these measures of political reform and democratisation were the most radical of Gorbachev’s reforms as they introduced a whole range of freedoms, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which were ultimately significant in ending the Cold War. Gorbachev’s glasnost policy had devastating consequences for the Soviet system, which we can assume was no part of his intention. The result was for the crimes and atrocities that had been carried out by the Soviet government to be exposed to the general public, and for them to learn about the higher standard of living that exists in the United States and in the West. A snowballing effect occurred which proved that revealing just a small amount of truth was almost impossible; “as soon as the iron-fist of the regime eased its grip, facts more and more damaging to the Soviet government were rapidly exposed” (Zilper, 1991, p.46). The evidence strongly suggests that Glasnost was a major contributing factor to the end of the Cold War.

Similarly, “Perestroika,” meaning “restructuring,” was another policy which Gorbachev introduced, that attempted to revive the Soviet economy. As the problems with central planning came to fruition, it became apparent that the command economy needed reforming. Gorbachev’s plan was to introduce various market-like reforms with the goal of making socialism work more efficiently. He attempted to increase competition between businesses by passing anti-monopoly legislation, and allowing some semi-private industries to form. In addition, he encouraged productivity and responsibility by removing the guarantee of bailouts for failing companies and introducing performance-related bonuses for workers and managers (Nuti, 1988, pp.377-380). The reforms did not go far enough, however, as price controls were kept in place, along with the inconvertibility of the currency and government controls over the means of production. Ultimately, Perestroika failed to provide the stimulation to the Soviet economy that it desperately needed, and eventually the Soviet Union collapsed on 25th December 1991. In reflection, Gorbachev (2013, p.40) claimed that “Perestroika’s greatest achievement was to awaken and liberate the mind. People were freed to think without the constraint of fear.” However, he does admit that mistakes were made, for example he regrets that he did not “decentralise[ ] more quickly.” (ibid).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the foreign policy of the Reagan administration was known as the Reagan Doctrine, and it planned to weaken the global influence of the Soviet Union by the combination of building up the military, rejecting arms controls and supporting anti-communist “freedom fighters” around the world. The evidence shows that the strategy did increase external pressures on the Soviet Union, in particular with the SDI programme, however, the degree to which is often overstated by Reagan’s supporters, who fail to take into account Reagan’s shift in policy towards the Soviet Union during his second term in office.

The evidence more strongly suggests that it was the internal problems of the Soviet Union that predominantly led to its collapse. The inherent flaws of a largely authoritarian and centrally planned economy had come to fruition. Factories and mines were dilapidated, corruption was rife, and consumers were faced with widespread shortages and low-quality products. Gorbachev’s well-intentioned reforms, including glasnost and perestroika, failed to revive the Soviet economy that it so desperately needed. As a result, by giving the public a small amount of freedom, Gorbachev sealed the fate of the Soviet Union, as the crimes and failures of communism came to the surface. Ultimately, freedom and national sovereignty became much more appealing to the people than totalitarian collectivism, and so the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end.

 

Bibliography

Brown, A. (1996). The Gorbachev factor. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Brown, A. (2007). Perestroika and the End of the Cold War. Cold War History, 7(1), pp.1-17.

Busch, A. (1997). Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 27(3), pp.451-466.

Crouch, M. (1989). Revolution and Evolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Politics. London: Philip Allan.

Fischer, B. (1997). Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War. Political Science Quarterly, 112(3), pp.477-496.

Gorbachev, M. (2013). Perestroika 20 Years Later. New Perspectives Quarterly, 30(4), pp.40-44.

Kaufman, R. (2011). The First Principles of Ronald Reagan’s Foreign Policy. The Heritage Foundation.

Korb, L. (1988). The Reagan Defense Budget and Program: The Buildup That Collapsed. In: D. Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, pp.83-94.

Layne, C. (1988). Requiem for the Reagan Doctrine. In: D. Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, pp.95-112.

McMahon, R. (1995). Making Sense of American Foreign Policy during the Reagan Years. Diplomatic History, 19(2), pp.367-384.

Nuti, D. (1988). Perestroika: transition from central planning to market socialism. Economic Policy, 3(2), pp.353-389.

Ravenal, E. (1988). Reagan’s Failed Restoration: Superpower Relations in the 1980s. In: D. Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, pp.125-141.

Reuveny, R. and Prakash, A. (1999). The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union. Review of International Studies, 25(4), pp.693-708.

Stoner-Weiss, K. (2009). Domestic and International Influences on the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and Russia’s Initial Transition to Democracy (1993). CDDRL Working Papers.

Tucker, R. (1981). The Purpose of American Power. Foreign Affairs, 59(2), p.265.

Von Mises, L. (1990). Economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig Von Mises Institute, Auburn University.

Zilper, N. (1991). The Consequences of Glasnost. Library Journal, 116(9), pp.44-49.

 

Campaign Finance Reform

Introduction

The issue of campaign finance is one that has been debated among academics for many years, and has gained greater public attention in recent years due to the enormous, and constantly increasing money spent on political campaigns. It has been estimated that $7 billion were spent at the 2012 American election, the most expensive in U.S. history, which comprised of 3,514 candidates running for 475 seats. Much of that money was spent communicating to the public on the merits of candidates and their views on public issues (Weintraub and Tausanovitch 2013). Numerous books, journals and articles have been written on the topic of Campaign finance, with opinion split between those who claim that campaign finance is a problem, thus reform is necessary, and those who see reform as unnecessary and an infringement upon First Amendment rights. In studying the literature on the topic, it was noticeable that there were different approaches or techniques used by the authors to make their argument and to come to particular conclusions. Some favoured a more conceptual and ideological approach, outlining their philosophy and how campaign finance reform fits or doesn’t fit with it (Barrone 1986; Levine 1997; Sullivan 1998; Boaz 2009; Taylor Jr. 2009; Rubin 2010; Smith 2012). With this approach, it was permissible to use older literature due to its timeless nature. Whereas, others favoured a more empirical approach that included numerical data, tables and graphs in order to make their point (McSweeney 2005; Stratmann 2006; Gulati 2012; Johnstone 2013; Pastine and Pastine 2013). With this approach, only recent literature could be used because numerical data quickly becomes outdated and therefore irrelevant. It was also noticeable that there tended to be three schools of thought on the subject: those in favour of campaign finance reform; those against campaign finance reform; and those that preferred to portray both sides of the argument in an unbiased and balanced way. Books and articles from all sides of the argument are reviewed to gain a broad knowledge of the different schools of thought on the subject of campaign finance reform.

The Problem of Campaign Finance

Campaign Finance refers to the funding of electoral campaigns at federal, state and local levels. This involves public and/or private money being donated to a candidate that is used to pay for the financial expenditures that a political campaign entails. Typically, this covers costs of travel, hotels, catering, grassroots fundraising, management and research, communication and advertisements i.e. billboards, lawn signs and leaflets. The biggest expense of campaigning in modern times is television advertising (Gulati 2012), which includes positive advertising and, more controversially, negative advertising. Attack ads, push polls and smear campaigns are all contentious techniques used most frequently in U.S. campaigns, due to the lack of restrictions on campaign finance.

Political Action Committees (PACs) and Super PACs are the organisations that raise the money to influence elections and legislation. Super PACs can raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, associations and individuals and then spend unlimited amounts of money on things like TV advertisements (Gulati 2012). In the 2012 election, Super PACs spent an estimated $1.3 billion, the vast majority of which came from a small set of “ultra-wealthy mega-donors” (Pursley 2014). A criticism of Super PACs is that because they are capable of funding entire campaigns on their own, they circumvent parties and eliminate the need to cultivate small donors (Pursley 2014). Super PACs have been described as “ethics-deprived organisations” that “lack redeeming social value” but instead “spread fear, distort issues, squelch opportunity for meaningful debate, and are spoiling politics with irresponsible and dishonest political advertisements.” (Gulati 2012). A common argument against campaign finance is that when an individual, PAC or Super PAC makes a contribution to a candidate they are likely to expect something in return, a quid pro quo. A system that involves quid pro quo campaign contributions is more than likely to worsen the chance of politics to become a process of accommodating particular groups with particular selfish interests, instead of an effort to reach the best decisions for society as a whole (Strauss 1994).

The most frequently expressed concern about Campaign Finance within the literature is the risk of corruption that an unregulated system would be unable to prevent (Strauss 1994; Grant 2004; Gulati 2012; Johnstone 2013; Pursley 2014). It is very possible in the current system that politicians have the potential to be bribed by certain special interest groups, thus creating the problem of politicians serving the needs of the campaign donor rather the public, and because politicians are more likely to serve the needs of his/her donor rather than the needs of the public or the constituency, it causes a “swamping” of that constituency’s influence in general, thus undermining federalism (Pursley 2014). A common argument is that unlimited and unregulated campaign finance creates substantial implications for democracy (Yang 2000; Taylor Jr 2009; Pastine and Pastine 2013; Pursley 2014). Democratic participation is threatened and one reason articulated is because of the growing perception that wealthy interests either control or at the very least have too much influence over government, causing the public to lose confidence in the political process, with acknowledgement to numerous questionable fundraising methods and vast amounts of money being collected and spent on the campaign process (Yang 2000; Pursely 2014). The fact is that it is virtually impossible to get into office without raising and spending large amounts of money, and this need or obligation weakens the connection between politicians’ policy preferences and their actual actions, thus undermining and distorting the fundamental premise of a representative democracy (Taylor Jr 2009; Pastine and Pastine 2013).

The solutions to Campaign Finance

Attempts to curtail the problems associated with Campaign Finance date back as early as 1867, yet most efforts were largely ineffective and hardly ever enforced. It was not until the 1970s that the US Government made serious attempts to address the problem. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was successfully passed in 1971, which required wide disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures. The act was amended in 1974, following the public reaction to the Watergate Scandal, introducing limits on contributions to and spending by congressional candidates, a taxpayer-financed system of funding presidential elections along with contribution and spending limits for presidential campaigns, and a new federal agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), to enforce the law. However, a challenge to the constitutionality of the new rules as violations of freedom of speech, led to the Supreme Court striking down parts of the legislation while upholding other provisions in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) (Grant 2004). The most recent major reform to campaign finance is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, also known as the McCain-Feingold law. This legislation prohibited unlimited and unregulated contributions, known as “soft money”; and defined political issue ads paid for by corporations or unions as “electioneering communications”, banning the broadcast of such ads within 30 days of a primary or within 60 days of a general election (Campaign-Finance Reform: History and Timeline | Infoplease.com).

It is a commonly held view on both sides of the argument that the reforms that have been made have not been successful and the system is still broken. It is within the proposed solutions to the problem that the debate begins, with some saying that the reforms don’t go far enough and more restrictions and regulations are needed; and others saying that the regulations are the problem as they are counter-productive causing unintended consequences.  Probably the least controversial solution proposed is disclosure of where campaign contributions come from. It is the most adopted form of campaign finance regulation in democracies around the world (Briffault 2010), perhaps because the lack of transparency over where money has come from, causes the public to hold trepidations. It is argued that disclosure requirements provide a valid means of deterring corruption and strengthening democracy, providing voters with valuable accountability regarding where campaign participants money has come from and how it is spent; thus, enabling the public to make more informed decisions on who ought to be, or ought not to be, elected (Yang 2000; Briffault 2010).  A further argument is that disclosure plays an important role in educating the public about how the electoral system works, how government decision making occurs, and the relationship of campaign finance and government action (Briffault 2010). Disclosure is generally accepted from the public, and academics from both sides of the debate. Campaign finance disclosure frequently displays very high levels of public support in opinion polls. Among academics, both campaign finance reformers and campaign finance sceptics have endorsed support for disclosure. This can be put down to the universally held belief that government transparency is essential for public accountability (Briffault 2010).

Another commonly proposed solution to the problem of campaign finance is that there ought to be limits on campaign contributions (Hill 2006; Stratmann 2006; Hunker 2013). The argument is that limiting the amount of money an individual, group or corporation can give to a candidate is an effective way of reducing the influence of money in politics, thus strengthening representative democracy. There are currently just six states in the U.S that place no limitations of campaign donations – Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Utah and Virginia; and another six states that have very minimal contribution limits – Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Supporters of contribution limits also tend to support limiting the amount a candidate can spend in their campaign, and the arguments for both contribution limits and expenditure limits are very similar. Stratmann in his paper Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending empirically analyses the data and comes to the conclusion that campaign expenditures by incumbents and challengers are more productive when candidates run in states with campaign contribution limits, as opposed to in states without limits. He argues that campaign advertising is more productive when spending ability is curtailed by contribution limits (Stratmann 2006). However, this study was done in 2006, and so could possibly be outdated now.

A final proposed reform to campaign finance is public financing of campaigns. Small-scale public financing of campaigns already exists in numerous states, but many academics would like to see the program extended. Perhaps one of the most radical and controversial kinds of reforms proposed is the idea of “Clean Elections” which uses public funds to finance a candidate’s entire campaign (Gartner 2013). The argument is that public financing helps to level the playing field by giving all candidates sufficient resources to pay for campaign expenditures, with evidence for this in New York City and Los Angeles which uses public financing for mayor, city council and other races (Hill 2006). Supporters of Public financing claim that public financing helps to minimise money’s role in politics and opens up American democracy to new voices and ideas by “opening up the system”, allowing lesser-funded candidates to challenge better-funded candidates, whilst providing a broader and livelier debate (Hill 2006). Public financing helps challengers to overcome potential financial barriers to entering campaigns, providing a more competitive election (Gartner 2013). Critics of this reform say that tax-payer financing of elections is merely “welfare for politicians,” and concerns are raised over the expense of public financed elections, especially at a time of continuing budget deficits (Smith 1999; Boaz 2009).

Arguments against Campaign Finance Reform

On the other side of the debate is those who are against campaign finance reform. The main argument against reform that is regularly expressed throughout the literature is that any restrictions and regulations on campaign finance is a violation of the First amendment of the constitution – a violation a freedom of speech (Sullivan 1998; Smith 2001; Samples 2006; Boaz 2009; Rubin 2010; Smith 2012). In the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that: “A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.” This ruling caused certain amounts of ridicule within the pro campaign finance reform community, who perceived the ruling as meaning “money equals speech.” However, those against campaign finance reform are quick to note that the court did not say “money equals speech,” the ruling said that political speech requires spending money, and so restricting money translates to restricting speech (Boaz 2009; Smith 2012). Opponents of campaign finance reform point out that it is obvious and little more than common sense that limiting money means limiting speech. Consider a law saying that “the retail price of a political book may not exceed twenty dollars.” It is true that such a law is just about the money, and not about the book, nevertheless the law limits the amount and effectiveness of political speech as it affects the incentives to write and publish such books (Sullivan 1998). Money is related to speech because money buys the means of communicating with voters and freedom of speech means government places no restrictions on what can be said in response to fundamental political questions (Samples 2006).

Adversaries of Campaign Finance Reform not only argue that campaign finance restrictions are an attack of freedom of speech, but also that there are a number of unintended consequences associated with the reforms. One of these unintended consequences is that campaign finance restrictions causes, or at least plays a part in, the lack of competition that incumbents have in elections (Boaz 2009). In fact, incumbent members of Congress nearly always win re-election when they run; since 1998 they have been re-elected more than 98 percent of the time (Samples 2006). This figure could now be outdated though. It is undoubtedly true that incumbents have a significant advantage over challengers in campaign spending and one reason for this is because restrictions on campaign finance actually chokes out political competition. From the very beginning of races, incumbents enjoy a number of inherent advantages over challengers including money for staff and high name and issue recognition among voters. In order for challengers to overcome these advantages and build a recognition for themselves among voters, they are obliged to spend huge amounts of money, but they are limited by campaign spending limits. For this reason, spending limits harm challengers more than incumbents, thus, by undermining the competitiveness of elections, campaign finance laws undermine democracy (Sullivan 1998; Samples 2006; Smith 2012). An additional unintended consequence of campaign finance restrictions raised in the literature is that limiting campaign spending causes a reduction in public knowledge, attention and involvement in elections. John J. Coleman of the University of Wisconsin did a study which concluded that campaign spending increases public knowledge of candidates across the population, therefore if we are to believe that voters should be informed and participate in the democratic process, we ought to be encouraging campaign spending, not restricting it (Boaz 2009).

One of the most significant philosophical differences between academics on either side of the debate is associated with trust in government. For people who advocate campaign finance reform, government is a trustworthy institution whose power can be used to bring about what is best for society; hence why reforms and laws are made in an attempt to eliminate evils from the system, such as corruption, and promote democratic and egalitarian ideals. Alternatively, academics who are opposed to such laws and reforms, view the government as the founders did, as an inherently untrustworthy institution, especially when it comes to regulating political speech, which is the reason why the First Amendment exists (Smith 2012). Campaign finance reform opponents have a grievance with the ubiquitousness of government, which promotes corruption due to the vast powers it has over virtually every aspect of life (Boaz 2009). It is the incumbent legislators and elected officials that writes the rules and regulations, and then employs the referees (Congress created and oversees the Federal Election Commission), therefore it is no coincidence that campaign finance laws have a tendency to advance the interests of incumbents and public officials (Samples 2006).

Conclusion

In closing, there are thousands of pieces of academic literature on the topic of Campaign Finance Reform, all with various different viewpoints and arguments for and against reform. Typical arguments for reform are that campaign finance causes corruption because it is a form of legalised bribery, consequently democracy and equality is threatened and/or affected. Three kinds of solutions are often proposed to remedy the problem, including: disclosure over where funds have come from and how it is spent; limits on campaign contributions and spending; and public financing of campaigns. Typical arguments on the opposite side are that restrictions on money are a desecration of freedom of speech, as money is required to get the message out there into the public sphere, and also that campaign finance laws favour incumbents and limit competition.

As with various other issues and aspects of the U.S. political system, the topic of campaign finance reform is complex as it comes into contest with the Constitution, which attempts to limit the size and scope of government, and uphold the inalienable rights of the individual. This highlights a philosophical difference between conservatives and libertarians – who are sceptical of government; and liberals and progressives – who believe in government.

Although the subject of campaign finance reform is well debated amongst academics, it is not debated widely within the general public, so change is unlikely. This hinders both advocates and sceptics of reform, because, what is clear from the literature is that neither side is happy with the current system.

 

Bibliography

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Boaz, D. (2009). Cato Handbook for Policymakers. 7th ed. Lanham: Cato Institute, pp.99-106.

Briffault, R. (2010). Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0. Election Law Journal, 9(4), p.273.

Fellay, S. (2013). Future of Campaign Finance: The Multi-Billion Dollar Enterprise. Harvard International Review, 34(4), p.45.

Fleming, T. (1998). The Long, Stormy Marriage of Money and Politics. American Heritage, 49(7), pp.45-53.

Gartner, D. (2013). The Future of Clean Elections. Arizona State Law Journal, 45, p.735.

Grant, A. (2004). Reforming American Election Campaign Finance. Political Quarterly, 75(2), p.132.

Gulati, G. (2012). Super PACs and Financing the 2012 Presidential Election. Society, 49(5), pp.409-417.

Hill, S. (2006). How to Minimize Money’s Role in Politics. National Civic Review, 95(2), pp.17-27.

Hunker, K. (2013). Elections across the pond: comparing campaign finance regimes in the United States and United Kingdom. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 36(3), p.1099.

Johnstone, A. (2013). Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law. Yale Law & Policy Review, 32(1), p.217.

Levine, B. (1997). Campaign Finance Reform Legislation in the United States Congress: A Critique. Crime, Law and Social Change, 28(1), pp.1-25.

McSweeney, D. (2005). Reform in a Cold Climate: Change in US Campaign Finance Law. Government and Opposition, 40(4), pp.492-514.

Pastine, I. and Pastine, T. (2013). Soft Money and Campaign Finance Reform. International Economic Review, 54(4), pp.1117-1131.

Pursley, G. (2014). The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism. Emory Law Journal, 63(4), p.781.

Rubin, J. (2010). A Triumph for Political Speech: An Important Supreme Court decision may mark the end of misbegotten campaign-finance “reform”. Commentary, 129(5), p.16.

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Smith, B. (1999). Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 148(2), p.591.

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