Free Speech History and Campus Censorship

For the most part of history freedom of speech has been suppressed, with governments often criminalising unpopular and provocative opinions. A prominent, early example of this occurred in the times of the Ancient Greeks, when Socrates, who was one of the first known martyrs of freedom of speech, went about challenging his fellow man, spreading truth and wisdom throughout the city. Socrates explained that it was his duty assigned by the Gods to act as a ‘gadfly’ in the city of Athens, ‘God has assigned me to this city, as if to a large thoroughbred horse which because of its great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimulation of some stinging fly.’ (Plato, Tarrant and Tredennick, 2003, p.57.) In 399BC, Socrates was put on trial before a jury for ‘corrupting the minds of the youth’ and for ‘believing in supernatural things of his own invention instead of the gods recognised by the State.’ (ibid, p.48.) During the trial, Socrates argued that he would rather be sentenced than be silenced:

Suppose that… you said to me, ‘Socrates, on this occasion we shall disregard Anytus and acquit you, but only on one condition: that you give up spending your time on this quest and stop philosophizing. If we catch you going on in the same way, you shall be put to death.’ Well … I should reply, ‘Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and devoted servant, but I owe a greater obedience to God than to you; and so long as I draw breath and have my faculties, I shall never stop practising philosophy and exhorting you and indicating the truth for everyone that I meet’… ‘I am not going to alter my conduct, not even if I have to die a hundred deaths.’ (ibid, pp.55-56)

Socrates was found guilty by the jury, and was sentenced to the death penalty by drinking hemlock poison. Likewise, Jesus Christ was famously crucified by the order of the Roman Prefect Pontius Pilate after preaching his message which contradicted the Roman authorities.

A similar case transpired in the early part of the 17^th century, when Italian astronomer and physicist Galileo Galilei was condemned for believing in Heliocentrism, which is the idea that the Sun is the centre of the Solar System, and the Earth and planets revolve around the Sun. Galileo was put on trial by the Roman Catholic Inquisition in 1633. He was found guilty of heresy, and was sentenced to formal imprisonment, later altered to house arrest, in which he remained under for the rest of his life. In addition to which, his book Dialogue was outlawed, and the publication of any of his works were prohibited (Finocchiaro, 1989).

Around this time, governments across Europe enjoyed widespread control over the printing press, with the fear that widespread distribution of information was dangerous and harmful to society. Individuals were required to obtain an official state license in order to trade and produce any books or papers. In response to this control, John Milton wrote his 1644 pamphlet Areopagitica, which made a passionate case against licensing, regulations and government controls. It was Milton who introduced the idea of ‘the marketplace of ideas’ as a rationale for free speech, and his works turned out to be one of history’s most fervent and influential defences of free speech and freedom of the press (Morehouse, 2009).

By the 18^th century, with the age of the enlightenment, the notion of freedom of speech was largely discussed by thinkers all over the Western world (Stearns, 2012, p.62). In 1770, the popular French philosopher Voltaire supposedly wrote the famous phrase: ‘I disapprove of everything you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ And in 1791, the First Amendment to Constitution in the United States was adopted, which bluntly states: ‘Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ The changes in attitude can be highlighted, for example, when Charles Darwin released his book ‘On the Origin of Species’ in 1859. The book introduced the theory of evolution, which largely contradicted common thought at the time. Although he was initially faced with hostility, he was never punished for his views. Instead, the political and theological implications of his theories were intensely debated, eventually leading to the general acceptance of the theory of evolution among scientists and the general public.

Perhaps the most prominent and influential defences of the right to freedom of speech came from British philosopher John Stuart Mill, who wrote the classic essay On Liberty in 1859. Mill was a significant figure in the development of the liberal philosophy, and his essay outlined the essential components of a free society. His view was that without freedom of speech the progress of science, law and politics would be stifled. Furthermore, Mill argues that freedom of expression acts as a marketplace of ideas, in which, ultimately, the truth outcompetes falsity, and so we need not worry about opinions that are false (Sanders, 2003, pp.66-67). However, Mill did recognise that there are limits to free speech. According to Mill: ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill, 2003, p.8). This is known as the ‘Harm Principle’, which means that the freedom of speech of individuals should only be restricted to prevent harm to others. According to the Harm Principle, only speech which directly causes harm or incites violence, are illegitimate forms of speech; mere offensiveness does not constitute harm, therefore offensive speech is permissible (Brink, 2001, p.120). Although Mill wrote his classic in the 1850’s, his writings often remain the starting point for discussions on free speech.

A triumph for free speech occurred in 1948, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed, which included the right to freedom of speech. Article 19 states: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.’ The Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 48 in favour, none against, and eight abstentions, and remains the world’s most translated document (Guinness World Records, 2009).

The counterculture movement of the 1960s and 1970s in Britain and the United States, saw a significant rise in the number of politically progressive movements advocating freedom, tolerance and equality. Great advancements were made in the civil rights movements for ethnic minorities; the feminist movement for women’s rights; the gay rights movement for homosexuals; and the anti-war movement for peace. All of which provided a fight back against the cultural norms of the time, and all of which led a staunch defence for free speech in the advancement of their cause (Kersch, 2003, pp.142-151). For example, Martin Luther King (1967) said: ‘Curtailment of free speech is rationalized on grounds that a more compelling American tradition forbids criticism of the government when the nation is at war…Nothing can be more destructive of our fundamental democratic traditions than the vicious effort to silence dissenters.’ Furthermore, whereas first-wave feminism of the 19th and early 20th centuries fought for increased free speech in terms of the right to vote, second-wave feminism of the 1960s to 1980s aimed to challenge cultural and gender norms, promoting equality and arguing that women were just as capable as men. These movements were seen most prevalently on college and university campuses, most famously at the University of California in Berkeley, were a strong student protest, named the ‘Free Speech Movement’, fought back against university bureaucrats who were strictly limiting free speech and political organisation on campus, between 1964 and 1965 (Kersch, 2003, pp.148-151).

However, despite the United Kingdom having a rich history in the promotion of free speech, more recent times have seen increased measures to censor. In 1986, section 5 of the Public Order Act was passed, making it an offence if a person ‘(a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting’ (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1986). In 2012, a campaign was launched to reform section 5, urging for the use of the word ‘insulting’ to be removed as it is seen as a violation of free speech. A number of high-profile activists supported the campaign, such as comedians Rowan Atkinson and Stephen Fry; politicians David Davis and Nigel Farage, and many others. Atkinson argued that language or behaviour that is merely ‘insulting’ should never be criminalised because of the difficulty in interpretation. ‘Criticism is easily construed as insult. Ridicule is easily construed as insult. Sarcasm, unfavourable comparison, merely stating an alternative point of view can be interpreted as insult. And because so many things can be interpreted as insult, it is hardly surprising that so many things have been’ (Reform Section 5, 2012). In January 2013, the government announced that it would accept the amendment, and the word ‘insulting’ was dropped.

Around the time of the Public Order Act 1986, with Britain becoming a more tolerant and multicultural society, the incentive to protect certain groups increased. A drive to censor offensive speech emerged within society, particularly among left wing progressives. Toleration for speech deemed racist, sexist or prejudice diminished (Kersch, 2003, pp.151-153). This mind-set seems to have filtered into the university campus. Now, speech on campus that could potentially offend a students’ race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation is being forbidden. Guest speakers, events, societies, newspapers and songs have all been banned at some point by many UK universities, more specifically in most cases, the student unions.

Deanna Garrett (2002) claims that for students at universities, the implications of being offended are particularly significant. Her reasoning is that students cannot grow and develop if they are forced to study in hostile environments. Students who are busy worrying about their emotional safety have no time or energy to participate in university activities, therefore universities should be obligated to ensure a safe environment for students. In other words, universities have a right and duty to provide an educational environment, where all students can learn and live free from bigotry (Mitchell, 1992, pp.822).

However, this is condescending attitude towards students, treating them as young children that cannot be exposed to certain ideas or criticisms, and who are in need of ‘swaddling in safety blankets’ (Hume, 2015, p.121). According to O’Neill (2015, p.120) it reinforces the ‘poisonous idea’ of inherent human weakness and incapacity; that students are fragile and therefore speech and interactions must be monitored and policed. In this view, the best way to empower individuals is for them to become immune from offence, for students to develop a thicker skin. As Atkinson put it:

The best way to increase society’s resistance to insulting or offensive speech is to allow a lot more of it. As with childhood diseases, you can better resist those germs to which you have been exposed. We need to build our immunity to taking offence, so that we can deal with the issues that perfectly justified criticism can raise. Our priority should be to deal with the message, not the messenger (Reform Section 5, 2012).

In addition, being offended is a subjective experience. Almost anything can cause irritation and exasperation of some individuals. And, furthermore, there could be many different reasons one may give as to why they are offended. For example, it could be either the sound of the word that offends; the meaning of the word that offends; the historical use of the word which carries offensive baggage; and so on (Shoemaker, 2000, pp.575-581). Making a widespread decision, law or policy based on something so subjective is unwise and impractical.

According to some, universities should aim to instil values of ‘human decency’ within the students, such as respect, equality, diversity and tolerance. The idea is that by working to improve students’ ‘spiritual and moral growth’, a new generation of ‘more caring, more globally aware, and more committed to social justice’ will be created (Astin and Astin, 2015, p.73; Mitchell, 1992, pp.822). Some go even further, advocating that the central work of the university teacher is to push towards a ‘fully multiculturalist, postcolonial’ university (Matsuda, 1993, p.14). However, Bloomberg (2014, p.256) argues that the role of universities is not to teach students what to think, but to teach students how to think. Although diversity of gender, ethnicity, and orientation is important, Bloomberg argues, the role of universities is not to promote an ideology, it is to provide scholars and students with a neutral forum for researching and debating issues. It should not repress unpopular views, or favour one particular political ideology, otherwise the university, and those who conduct its research, will lose credibility (ibid).

To conclude, the achievement of freedom of speech is one of humanities greatest, and hard fought accomplishments. Dating back to the times of Socrates and Ancient Greece, the fight for free speech has had a long history. It was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the West that the notion of freedom of speech was largely discussed in philosophical circles and put into law by policy makers. Perhaps most notably, it was John Stuart Mill that produced the strongest defence of free speech in his influential book On Liberty. By the early twentieth century, freedom of speech was largely accepted and adopted as a universal human right. By the middle of the twentieth century, greater freedom, tolerance and equality was brought about for certain marginalised groups within society who fought hard for free speech. However, the later twentieth century saw an increasing movement to limit certain speech. Speech which were deemed offensive were now outlawed, and the Public Order Act 1986 law was passed in the UK, which banned ‘insulting’ words. This mentality spread across society, including on university campuses, leading to a culture of political correctness and campus censorship. Although there are people who hold abhorrent views who we would prefer not to engage with, the best way to deal with controversial opinions is to confront and debate them freely and openly, exposing their falsehoods and shortcomings with reason and evidence, rather than simply censoring and pretending they do not exist.

 

References

Astin, A. and Astin, H. (2015). Achieving Equity in Higher Education: The Unfinished Agenda. Journal of College and Character, 16(2), pp.65-74.

Bloomberg, M. (2014). Not to Teach Students What to Think, But to Teach Students How to Think. Vital Speeches of the Day, 80(8), pp.254-257.

Brink, D. (2001). Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech. Legal Theory, 7, pp.119-157.

Finocchiaro, M. (1989). The Galileo affair: A Documentary History. Berkeley: University of California.

Garrett, D. (2002). Silenced Voices: Hate Speech Codes on Campus. [online] The University of Vermont. Available at: http://www.uvm.edu/~vtconn/?Page=v20/garrett.html [Accessed 20 Jan. 2016].

Guinness World Records, (2009). Most translated document. [online] Available at: http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/most-translated-document/ [Accessed 22 Oct. 2015].

Hume, M. (2015). Trigger warning: Is the Fear of Being Offensive Killing Free Speech? London: William Collins.

Kersch, K. (2003). Freedom of Speech: Rights and Liberties under the Law. ABC-CLIO.

King, M. (1967). The Causalities of the War in Vietnam. Los Angeles, California. [online] Available at: http://www.faculty.fairfield.edu/faculty/hodgson/Courses/progress/King1.pdf

Matsuda, M. (1993). Words that wound. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Mill, J. (2003). On Liberty (Dover Thrift Editions). New York: Dover Publications Inc.

Mitchell, C. (1992). The Political Correctness Doctrine: Redefining Speech on College Campuses. Whittier Law Review, 13(3), pp.805-829.

Morehouse, I. (2009). Areopagitica: Milton’s Influence on Classical and Modern Political and Economic Thought. Libertarian Papers, [online] 1(38), pp.1-14. Available at: http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2009/lp-1-38.pdf.

O’Neill, B. (2015). A Duty to Offend. Connor Court Publishing Pty Ltd.

Plato, Tarrant, H. and Tredennick, H. (2003). The Last Days of Socrates. 5th ed. Penguin Classics

Reform Section 5, (2012). Rowan Atkinson’s speech at Reform Section 5 Parliamentary reception. Available at: http://reformsection5.org.uk/2012/10/rowan-atkinsons-speech-at-rs5-parliamentary-reception/ [Accessed 22 Oct. 2015].

Sanders, K. (2003). Ethics & Journalism. London: Sage.

Shoemaker, D. (2000). “Dirty Words” and the Offense Principle. Law and Philosophy, 19(5), pp.545-584.

Stearns, P. (2012). Human rights in world history. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Perception of Immigration by Social Class

Hypothesis

Operational hypothesis: The working class of society are more likely than the upper class to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Null hypothesis: The working class of society are not more likely than the upper class to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Introduction

The following report analyses secondary data from the Eurobarometer data service. The European Commission established the Eurobarometer in 1973, with the aim of providing a series of public opinion surveys that addresses a wide variety of issues related to the Member States of the European Union. The data set analysed in the following report originates from data officially released by the Eurobarometer in March 2014.

The software used for statistical analysis in the report is ‘IBM SPSS Statistics’. This programme is used widely as a tool for statistical analysis within a variety of fields such as social science, market research and health analytics. According to the solution brief on the IBM website, SPSS Statistics is proficient at making sense of complex patterns and associations, enabling users to draw conclusions, and make predictions, ultimately improving decision-making (IBM, 2013).

The two variables within the data examined in the report are ‘Social Class’ and ‘Statement: immigrants contribute a lot’ (which will be referred to as ‘Immigrant Contribution’). The ‘Social Class’ variable is a nominal variable type, with set categories that have no logical or progressive order. The ‘Immigrant Contribution’ variable is an ordinal type of variable, with an ordered set of responses, gauging from ‘totally agree’ to ‘totally disagree’. The Independent Variable (IV) is ‘Social Class’, as this is the variable which has influence over the other and in this circumstance cannot be changed. The Dependent Variable (DV) is ‘Immigrant Contribution’, as the IV will influence this variable. In other words, the perception of immigrant contribution (DV) could change based upon particular social class (IV).

In the interest of data analysis, the ‘Social Class’ variable, which originally contained seven different categories for participants to place themselves, is recoded to contain fewer categories. To elaborate, the original categories: ‘Other (SPONT.)’, ‘None (SPONT.)’, ‘Refusal (SPONT.)’, and ‘DK’, are combined into just one category, simply named ‘Other’. As a result, seven categories are reduced to just four categories, including: ‘Working Class’, ‘Middle Class’, ‘Upper Class’, and ‘Other’. This reduces the amount of information to examine, without losing relevant data needed for analysis, allowing for more concise and efficient data analysis.

The report is structured as follows: first, the variables are contextualised, providing an account into the reasons why the two variables were chosen for analysis, including information regarding previous work and theories related to both variables. Second, the data is presented in tables and graphs ready for analysis. Essential information needed to establish whether a relationship exists between the variables is provided, including cross-tabulations, Chi-square and Cramer’s V. Next, the data presented is analysed and critically reviewed, and final conclusions are drawn, referring to the validity of the hypothesis.

 

Contextualisation of Variables

Immigration is an extremely contemporary topic that has become one of the most important issues discussed in politics today. 50% of the British public named immigration as one of the most important issues facing Britain, with 32% voting it as the single most important (Ipsos MORI, 2015). According to another study, immigration is the most important issue selected by the British public (45%), followed by the NHS (40%) and then the economy (26%) (Blinder, 2015). A further study revealed that large majorities in both Greece (86%) and Italy (80%) want to reduce the number of immigrants coming into their countries; with more than half of the British and French populations holding this view, and 47% of Spanish (Pew Research Center, 2014, p.26).

The results of these studies may explain the recent rise of anti-mass immigration parties across Europe, including the Swiss People’s Army, the Danish People’s Party, the Swedish Democrats, the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) (Recknagel, 2015; Robins-Early, 2015). Notably, UKIP have gained an increasing amount of support in working class areas of Britain. An article by The Independent claims that UKIP has overcome the Labour party as the party of the working classes (Blackhurst, 2014). Further articles in The Guardian (Healey, 2015) and The Daily Mail (Chorley, 2014) share this view; two newspapers that are typically on opposite sides of the political spectrum.

This report aims to determine whether there is a correlation between social class and perceptions on immigration. The hypothesis being, that the working class are more likely to have a negative view of immigration than the upper class. However, reasons for this can only be speculated.

One potential explanation could be because a large percentage of immigrants who migrate into the country tend to directly compete with the working class for jobs. Therefore, a larger number of working class are more likely to have negative perceptions of immigration than that of upper and middle classes, who face less competition from immigrants.

A different, but relevant argument claims that immigration is making rich people richer and poor people poorer. According to the article, immigration allows the rich to prosper due to the cheap labour associated with migrants. Whereas the poor are unable to compete with migrants who are willing to work for less than living wage (Toynbee, 2006).

Critics of immigration also cite possible social issues, such as increases in crime rate and terrorist threat, as reasons to tighten immigration. In addition, the increasing population size potentially leads to a number of social issues, such as overcrowding, housing shortages, congestion, pollution, and pressure on welfare and public services (Pettinger, 2015).

On the other hand, some evidence suggests that the positives of immigration outweigh the negatives. The consensus amongst both left wing and right wing economists is in favour of immigration (Thoma, 2006). Their argument being, that it benefits the economy, as it increases labour market supply and demand, leading to an increase in the potential output capacity of the economy, with an increase in aggregate demand (Pettinger, 2015). However, others point this out as only true in the case of ‘skilled’ migrants. Entrepreneurially speaking, there is however an argument to suggest that immigration has a net positive effect; creating businesses, employment, increasing consumption whilst also paying taxes, all of which provide a healthy contribution to the economy (Prosser, 2015).

An alternative view highlights the role the mainstream media plays in generating adverse perceptions of immigration. According to this view, media outlets tend to dehumanise immigrants and create an “enemy at the gates” mentality, rather than shifting focus on positive contributions by immigrants (Esses, Medianu and Lawson, 2013). This view suggests that the public are highly susceptible to negative influences portrayed by media, in particular the working classes.

To conclude, there are a variety of arguments for and against limiting immigration.  This report aims to identify whether a connection between social class and opinion of immigrants does or does not exist.

Presentation of Data

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Working Class	12160	43.5	43.5
	Middle Class	13833	49.5	93.1
	Upper Class	806	2.9	95.9
	Other	1133	4.1	100.0
	Total	27932	100.0

Figure 1: Frequency table displaying respondents’ self-assessment of Social Class

This table shows the frequency in which Eurobarometer survey respondents’ placed themselves in a social class category. Data shows that the majority of participants identified themselves as ‘Middle Class’ (49.5%), with ‘Working Class’ the second most prevalent (43.5%). A very small number of participants assessed themselves as ‘Upper Class’ (2.9%) or ‘Other’ (4.1%).

Figure 2: Bar graph displaying respondents’ self-assessment of Social Class

 

Figure 3: Frequency table displaying respondent’s opinion of the statement: immigrants contribute a lot

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Totally agree	3106	11.1	11.1
	Tend to agree	8875	31.8	42.9
	Tend to disagree	8680	31.1	74.0
	Totally disagree	5485	19.6	93.6
	DK	1786	6.4	100.0
	Total	27932	100.0

This table shows the frequency in which Eurobarometer survey participants responded to the statement: immigrants contribute a lot. The majority of people ‘tend to agree’ that immigrants contribute a lot (31.8%), with ‘tend to disagree’ closely second (31.1%). More people ‘totally disagree’ with the statement (19.6%) than ‘totally agree’ with the statement (11.1%).

Figure 4: Bar graph displaying respondent’s opinion of the statement: immigrants contribute a lot

Figure 5: Table displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement: immigrants contribute a lot

		Self-assessment of social class
		Working Class	Middle Class	Upper Class	Other
STATEMENTS: IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE A LOT	Totally agree	9.4%	12.4%	14.6%	11.7%
	Tend to agree	26.8%	35.9%	39.7%	30.0%
	Tend to disagree	32.8%	30.1%	28.8%	26.1%
	Totally disagree	23.8%	16.4%	12.9%	18.7%
	DK	7.3%	5.2%	4.0%	13.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

This table shows a cross-tabulation between social class and opinion of the statement that immigrants contribute a lot. The majority of the working classes tended to disagree that immigrants contribute a lot (32.8%). The majority of the middle classes (35.9%) and upper classes (39.7%) tended to agree with the statement.

Figure 6: Cluster bar graph displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement: immigrants contribute a lot

Figure 7: Scatter graph displaying Cross-tabulation of Social Class and opinion of statement: immigrants contribute a lot

 Figure 8: Table displaying Pearson’s Chi-Square test of variables

Chi-Square Tests
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	614.896a	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	598.503	12	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	162.219	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	27932
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 51.54.

 Figure 9: Table displaying Cramer’s V measure of variables

Symmetric Measures
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.148	.000
	Cramer’s V	.086	.000
N of Valid Cases		27932

Figure 10: Table displaying observed and expected counts of Cross-tabulation of variables

			Self-assessment of social class
			Working Class		Middle Class		Upper Class		Other
			Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
STATEMENTS: IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE A LOT	Totally agree	Count	1141	9.4	1714	12.4	118	14.6	133	11.7
		Expected Count	1352.2	11.1	1538.2	11.1	89.6	11.1	126.0	11.1
	Tend to agree	Count	3254	26.8	4961	35.9	320	39.7	340	30.0
		Expected Count	3863.7	31.8	4395.2	31.8	256.1	31.8	360.0	31.8
	Tend to disagree	Count	3984	32.8	4168	30.1	232	28.8	296	26.1
		Expected Count	3778.8	31.1	4298.7	31.1	250.5	31.1	352.1	31.1
	Totally disagree	Count	2896	23.8	2273	16.4	104	12.9	212	18.7
		Expected Count	2387.9	19.6	2716.4	19.6	158.3	19.6	222.5	19.6
	DK	Count	885	7.3	717	5.2	32	4.0	152	13.4
		Expected Count	777.5	6.4	884.5	6.4	51.5	6.4	72.4	6.4
Total		Count	12160	N/A	13833	N/A	806	N/A	1133	N/A
		Expected Count	12160.0	N/A	13833.0	N/A	806.0	N/A	1133.0	N/A

This table displays the observed count, meaning the frequency that actually occurred; and the expected count, meaning the frequency estimated to occur if no relationship exists between the variables. The greater the percentage difference between the observed and expected count, the greater statistical significance there is. 

Data Analysis

The Eurobarometer collected data relating to the social class that survey respondents identified themselves. The data is displayed in ‘Figure 1’ and ‘Figure 2’ in the previous section. Out of the 27,932 survey participants, the vast majority were either ‘Working Class’ (43.5%) or ‘Middle Class’ (49.5%). A very small number of participants assessed themselves as ‘Upper Class’ (2.9%) or ‘Other’ (4.1%). The ‘Other’ category includes people who either: believe that they belong to a different type of social class not listed; do not know which social class they belong to; believe they do not belong to a social class; or refuse to say which social class they belong.

Data was also collected relating to survey participants’ opinion on the statement: immigrants contribute a lot to society. This data is presented in ‘Figure 3’ and ‘Figure 4’ in the previous section. The majority of people selected the less weighted answers, such as ‘tend to agree’ (31.8%) and ‘tend to disagree’ (31.1%). Interestingly, almost twice the number of people selected ‘totally disagree’ (19.6%) than ‘totally agree’ (11.1%).

The cross-tabulation of the two variables are presented in ‘Figure 5’. The data tells us that the majority of people who identify as ‘Working Class’ tend to disagree with the statement: immigrants contribute a lot (32.8%). This is particularly interesting because every other category of social class selected ‘tend to agree’ as the most popular answer. The second most popular selected answer by the working classes is ‘tend to agree’ (26.8%), closely followed by ‘totally disagree’ (23.8%).

The most popular answer for the ‘Middle Class’ category is ‘tend to agree’ (35.9%), with 30.1% selecting ‘tend to disagree’. Similar results are displayed in the ‘Upper Class’ category, with 39.7% answering ‘tend to agree’ and 28.8% ‘tend to disagree’ with the statement. Note, this is the largest percentage difference between the categories ‘tend to agree’ and ‘tend to disagree’.  Interestingly, the ‘Upper Class’ is the only social class in which a higher percentage of respondents answered ‘totally agree’ (14.6%) than ‘totally disagree’ (12.9%).

A number of patterns within the data seem to have occurred, which can best be observed on display in ‘Figure 6’ and ‘Figure 7’. One correlation is that the higher the social class an individual belongs, the more likely they are to ‘tend to agree’ and ‘totally agree’ that immigrants contribute a lot. If we are to look at both the dark blue and light blue lines on ‘Figure 7’, which represent ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to agree’, we can see that both these lines rise as the social class gets higher, ignoring the ‘Other’ category. 26.8% of the ‘Working Class’ ‘tend to agree’ with the statement, and just 9.4% ‘totally agree’. Whereas 35.9% of ‘Middle Class’ ‘tend to agree’ and 12.4% ‘totally agree’. A substantial 39.7% of ‘Upper Class’ ‘tend to agree’ and 14.6% ‘totally agree’. Here is evidence to support a positive correlation between higher social class and agreement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Another correlation is that the lower the social class an individual belongs, the more likely they are to ‘tend to disagree’ and ‘totally disagree’ that immigrants contribute a lot. Again, on ‘Figure 7’ we can see that both the dark and light red lines, which represent ‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to disagree’, fall as the social class increases, ignoring the ‘Other’ category. 32.8% of ‘Working Class’ ‘tend to disagree’ with the statement, and a substantial 23.8% ‘totally disagree’. Meanwhile, 30.1% of ‘Middle Class’ ‘tend to disagree’ and 16.4% ‘totally disagree’; and 28.8% of the ‘Upper Class’ ‘tend to disagree’ and just 12.9% ‘totally disagree’. Here is evidence to support a negative correlation between higher social class and disagreement that immigrants contribute a lot.

An additional relationship seems to occur in the data which is the lower the social class, the more likely they are to answer that they do not know (‘DK’) whether immigrants contribute a lot. 7.3% of ‘Working Class’ answered this way; whereas 5.2% of ‘Middle Class’ and just 4% of ‘Upper Class’. It could be speculated that it is because lower classes have less knowledge of the subject than the higher classes, alternatively it could just be that they are more humble. However, this discussion is not the topic of this report.

‘Figure 8’ in the previous section displays Pearson’s Chi-Squared test of independence, which calculates whether there is a relationship between the two variables. The Chi-Square test tells us whether we can accept or reject the operational hypothesis. According to the data, the significance figure is 0.000. This means that a relationship does exist between the variables, therefore we are more likely to accept the operational hypothesis: The working class of society are more likely than the upper class of society to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

‘Figure 9’ displays Cramer’s V test, which calculates the strength of the relationship between two variables. According to the data, the Cramer’s V value is 0.086, which suggests a weak association between the variables. Although a relationship between the variables does exist, this relationship is weak, perhaps due to the numerous other factors which could play a part in forming attitudes on immigration such as age, gender, and ethnicity and so on.

‘Figure 10’ displays a table showing the observed and expected counts. The observed count is the actual frequency that occurred in the data. The expected count is the frequency which is assumed to occur if no relationship exists between the variables. The Chi-Squared test establishes that a relationship does exist between the variables. The information within ‘Figure 9’ allows us to see precisely where this relationship exists. The larger the difference between the expected and observed count, the greater the statistical significance.

The social class which saw the biggest difference between observed and expected counts is the ‘Upper Class’ category. The observed counts for ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to agree’ is much higher than expected – a difference of 3.5% for ‘totally agree’ and 7.9% for ‘tend to agree’. Furthermore, the observed counts for ‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to disagree’ are much lower than expected – a difference of 6.7% for ‘totally disagree’ and 2.3% for ‘tend to disagree’. This tells us that upper class people have a more positive view of immigrants than expected.

Other significant differences occur between observed and expected counts in the ‘Working Class’ category. The observed count for ‘tend to agree’ is much lower than expected – just 26.8%, as opposed to the expected count which is 31.8% (a 5% difference). Alternatively, the observed count for ‘totally disagree’ is much lower than expected – 23.8%, as opposed to the expected count which is 19.6% (a 4.2% difference). This tells us that working class people have a more negative view of immigrants than expected.

Conclusion

This report has used March 2014 data from the Eurobarometer, a service which was established by the European Commission. Using the software program SPSS statistics, the report concentrated on two variables of survey data: ‘Social Class’ and ‘Immigrant Contribution’, with the aim of establishing whether a relationship exists between the social class an individual identifies and opinion of immigrants. In the interest of efficient data analysis, the ‘Social Class’ variable was recoded from 7 categories into just 4: ‘Working Class’, ‘Middle Class’, ‘Upper Class’, and ‘Other’.

The reason why these variables were chosen for analysis is because immigration is an extremely contemporary issue, with many studies suggesting that the majority of Britons view it as the most important issue facing the country, and many anti-mass immigration parties across Europe gaining support. With the growth in support of UKIP in traditionally working class areas of Britain, does it suggest that the working class are more likely to view immigrants negatively? Although this report is wholly descriptive and does not aim to determine reasons why the working class would have a more negative perception of immigrants than the other classes, the reasons why are speculated in the ‘Contextualisation of variables’ section. One reason speculated is because immigrants are more likely to directly compete with the working class for jobs. The richest within society could also be more likely to appreciate the cheap labour of immigrants. Another theory is that the working class are more susceptible to the negative view of immigrant portrayed by the media. Others note the social issues such as crime, terrorism, overcrowding and pressure on public services as reasons to limit immigration.

In analysing the data, evidence shows that the majority of ‘Working Class’ respondents ‘tend to disagree’ with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot. Whereas the majority of ‘Middle Class’ and ‘Upper Class’ respondents ‘tend to agree’ with the statement. Data also suggests that the higher the social class, the more likely they are to have a positive view of immigrants; and the lower the social class, the more likely they are to have a negative view. The Chi-Squared test calculated that a relationship does seem to exist between the two variables; however Cramer’s V suggests that it is only a weak relationship. The comparison of the observed and expected results revealed that the ‘Upper Class’ display a more positive view of immigrants than expected if no relationship exists between the variables. Additionally, the ‘Working Class’ display a more negative view than expected.

To conclude, the data suggests that we are more likely to accept the operational hypothesis than the null hypothesis. The working class of society are more likely than the upper class to disagree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot.

Recommendations for Future Research

There are many different ways in which research can be taken further. Future research could adopt a more causal style of research by asking respondents to include reasons why they view immigrants the way they do. For example, if the respondent selects ‘totally agree’ or ‘tend to agree’, what is the motivation behind their choice? Is it because they believe immigrants improve the economy? Or because they support multiculturalism? Similarly, if the respondent selects ‘totally disagree’ or ‘tend to disagree’, is it because they believe immigrants take jobs? Or because of related social issues? This sort of research allows a greater understanding of the motivation behind people’s opinion of immigrants, helping communication and gaining a greater understanding about certain viewpoints, biases or falsehoods that people have.

Future research could also include additional options to select for the ‘Social Class’ variable. For example, the introduction of ‘Lower-Middle Class’, ‘Middle-Middle Class’, and ‘Upper-Middle Class’ categories. The reason for this is because many sociologists and academics view the traditional three-class system of working class, middle class and upper class as old, outdated and necessary for modernisation. It is argued that the traditional model is incompatible with today’s society, potentially causing difficulty for respondents to answer to the social class question proficiently. If true, this could be a major limitation in the collected data. If updated to consist of more categories that better reflects today’s social class structure, respondents may find it easier to place themselves confidently into a particular social class. This would help provide more efficient data which is more proficient in reflecting today’s society.

Future research could also look at how the current data, which was collected in 2014, compares with older data sets. This would allow researchers to notice any recent trends and patterns in data emerging, and how they have changed over time.

Moreover, there are many variables different from social class which could also have an effect upon opinion of immigrants. Research could examine the influence that age has, that gender has, that ethnicity has, or that nationality has on the opinion of individuals on immigrants. All of which could have a greater or weaker strength of relationship than social class, therefore it would be useful to examine in future research.

 

References

Blackhurst, C. (2014). ‘Farage has made Ukip, not Labour, Britain’s most working-class party.’ The Independent. [Online] 3rd April. [Accessed 14th December 2015] http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/ukip-not-labour-is-now-britain-s-most-working-class-party-9236118.html

Blinder, S. (2015). UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern. Migration Observatory. Briefing University of Oxford: COMPAS. [Online] [Accessed 11th December 2015] http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/Public%20Opinion-Overall%20Attitudes%20and%20Level%20of%20Concern.pdf

Chorley, M. (2014). ‘Now Ukip is beating Labour to the white working class vote, days after Miliband tried to win back white van man.’ The Daily Mail. [Online] 25th November. [Accessed 14th December 2015] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2848526/Now-Ukip-beating-Labour-white-working-class-vote-days-Miliband-tried-win-white-van-man.html

Esses, V. Medianu, S. and Lawson, A. (2013). ‘Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role of the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization of Immigrants and Refugees.’ Journal of Social Issues, 69(3) pp. 518-536.

Healey, J. (2015). ‘Why Labour must win back working class voters from Ukip.’ The Guardian. [Online] 23rd May. [Accessed 14th December 2015] http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/23/labour-win-working-class-voters-ukip

(2013). IBM SPSS Statistics Editions: Get the analytical power you need for better decision-making. United States of America. [Online] [Accessed on 7th December 2015] ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/software/uk/pdf/YTS03009USEN.pdf

Ipsos MORI. (2015). Ipsos MORI Issues Index: August 2015. [Online] [Accessed on 11th December 2015] https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3614/EconomistIpsos-MORI-August-2015-Issues-Index.aspx

Pettinger, T. (2015). Impact of Immigration on UK Economy. Economics help. [Online] [Accessed 17th December 2015] http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/6399/economics/impact-of-immigration-on-uk-economy/

Pew Research Center. (2014). A Fragile Rebound for EU Image on Eve of European Parliament Elections. [Online] [Accessed 13th January 2016] http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/2014-05-12_Pew-Global-Attitudes-European-Union.pdf

Prosser, D. (2015). ‘Small Talk: Immigrants start businesses, create jobs and pay taxes: let’s welcome them.’ The Independent. [Online] 20th April. [Accessed 18th December 2015] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/sme/small-talk-immigrants-start-businesses-create-jobs-and-pay-taxes-let-s-welcome-them-10188526.html

Recknagel, C. (2015). The Rise of Europe’s New Right. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. [Online] [Accessed 13th January 2016] http://www.rferl.org/content/antimigrant-voices-boost-standing-as-migrant-crisis-drags-on/27316781.html

Robins-Early, N. (2015). ‘How The Refugee Crisis Is Fueling The Rise Of Europe’s Right.’ The Huffington Post. [Online] 28th October. [Accessed 13th January 2016] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe-right-wing-refugees_562e9e64e4b06317990f1922

Thoma, M. (2006). The Debate over Immigration. [Online] [Accessed 17th December 2015] http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2006/07/the_debate_over.html

Toynbee, P. (2006). ‘Immigration is now making the rich richer and the poor poorer.’ The Guardian. [Online] 11th August. [Accessed 16th December 2015] http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/11/comment.politics

 

 

English Education Policy, Intelligence and Nature vs. Nurture

According to Professor Danny Dorling, English education policy is based on the ‘nasty little theory that not all children have it in them to think like a few are able to think.’ (Dorling, 2013: online). He explains that the ‘assumption is that children vary greatly in what they might be able to achieve, that some have far greater potential to do well than others, but all have only a fixed potential.’ (ibid). The core of his argument seems to be referring to the continuous debate regarding nature vs. nurture. It is a debate which has been ongoing for a very long time and is discussed within the hard sciences and the social sciences. The conflict is over the extent to which behaviours and traits are either inherited genetically, or learned through the environment. One school of thought holds that genetic inheritance holds more significance in shaping the behaviours and traits of an individual; the other school of thought is that it is the environment. It is quite clear that Dorling subscribes to the ‘nurture’ school of thought, criticising the current government’s education policy, which he argues holds ‘a nasty little assumption’ that we are fixed in our potential. The following paper looks at the history of British education policy, the current policy and the relationship it has to the nature/nurture debate.

Historical background

The 1944 Education Act established, what is known as, the Tripartite System of state-funded education. The basic theory of the system was that all students, irrespective of background, should be entitled to an education suitable to their needs and abilities, and, as students differ in needs and abilities, they should be suited to different curricula. This system supported the view that every human being is born with certain unique faculties and potential. Some people are more academically suited and some people are more manually gifted. The ‘eleven-plus’ examination which was taken by final year primary students, would decide which secondary school pupils would attend. Grammar schools taught a highly academic curriculum, focusing on intellectual subjects, such as literature, classics and complex mathematics. Secondary technical schools were designed to train children skilled in mechanical and scientific subjects. The focus was on subjects such as physics, chemistry, advanced mathematics and biology, in order to prepare pupils to become scientists, engineers and technicians. Secondary modern schools would train pupils in practical and vocational skills.

Opponents of the tripartite system, including Dorling, were critical of the eleven-plus exam. Chitty (2009: 24-25) rejects the idea that it is possible to predict a child’s future accomplishments based on the results of a test that a child takes at ages 10 or 11. Similar to Dorling, he argues that it is ‘based on the view that every child was born with a given quota of ‘intelligence’ which remained constant throughout his or her life, and that this key quality was a direct product of genetic endowment and therefore not susceptible to any educational influence.’ (Chitty, 2009: 24). In addition, the tripartite system has been accused of maintaining social class structures, in which grammar schools would be for middle class students, and secondary modern schools would be for working class students (Carvel, 1999).

However, it is argued that standardised testing of academic aptitude, in particular IQ tests, are a good predictor of grades at school, performance at work and economic success (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994: 21-23; Nisbett et al, 2012: 131). Supporters of the exam, such as prominent psychologist Cyril Burt, argued that, like IQ tests, the eleven-plus examination could be used to identify children from the lower classes who could profit from a more academic schooling. In his view, intelligence genes exist and are not confined just to the upper classes (a prevalent view at the time). He saw the eleven-plus exam as the solution to increasing opportunities for the intelligent among the working class (Fletcher and Hattie, 2011: 23). Likewise, Sesardic (2005: 43) argues that the eleven-plus exam provided a more objective and fairer method of selection than the previous way, which included interviewing students or parents which Sesardic claims was a more unplanned and chaotic method of selection. Sesardic (ibid: 43-44) claims that the IQ test in the eleven-plus exam was beneficial and should not have been taken out: ‘when the local education authority [in Hertfordshire] dropped IQ tests from its 11+ exams, there was an immediate and significant decrease in the proportion of children from working class families entering grammar schools’.

However, certain flaws in the implementation of the tripartite system became increasingly apparent in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Chitty, 2009: 24-25). Logistical difficulties in the building of enough schools and the failure to develop the technical part of the system undermined the whole structure. Very few technical schools opened, due to lack of funds and shortage of suitably qualified teachers, meaning that the tripartite system was, in practice, a two-tier system, with grammar schools considered the best schools and modern schools perceived the bottom of the tier with less funding available. As a result, Harold Wilson’s Labour government declared its intention to end eleven-plus selection in circular 10/65, moving towards a comprehensive education system that does not select on the basis of ability or wealth. The 1976 Education Act effectively outlawed selection by ability, leading to the closure of numerous grammar schools, officially ending the tripartite system. Comprehensive schools would provide a wide ranging curriculum, with all students learning academic, technical and vocational skills. The comprehensive system supports the view that human capacities are dependent almost entirely upon the environment. That all students are born equal in potential and can succeed supposing the education system allows them to do so.

However, a general mood of pessimism and re-evaluation had set in by the middle of the 1970’s, in particular in the education system. Secondary schools were failing to prepare students for work; youngsters were leaving early and were increasingly disrespectful of authority; and the accountability of schools and teachers was brought into question (Chitty, 2009: 34-45). By the 1980’s, around half of the students left full time education altogether after the age of 16, with more than two thirds entering the labour market with no academic qualifications at all (Machin and Vignoles, 2006). The current chief inspector of schools, Sir Michael Wilshaw, argued that a lingering damage was caused by the reforms of schools in the 1960’s and 1970’s. He said: ‘the ideologues who drove the comprehensive agenda confused equality with equity. They took it to mean that one size should fit all. As a consequence, there was a wholesale dumbing down of standards.’ (Espinoza, 2016: online).

Interestingly, a split had emerged on the right over education policy. The more traditionalist conservatives wanted to preserve grammar schools and eleven-plus selection; while the more liberal right were keen to experiment with the educational voucher system, a system in which parents receive a government coupon equivalent to the amount that the state spends on each pupil that can be ‘cashed-in’ at a school of their choice. Both sides were willing to compromise, however, and following Conservative governments, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, introduced a number of ‘market mechanisms’ and reforms into the education system. The 1988 Education Reform Act aimed to increase parental choice and improve accountability of schools. The idea was that parents could choose which school their child attended and have representation on school governing bodies. Schools were given greater autonomy in their operations, specifically over which students they admitted to the school. Educational ‘league-tables’ were established, showing the position of schools relative to one another, for example in terms of their examination success rates, providing a more competitive environment. The notion was to have schools competing for pupils by offering various specializations, meanwhile parents were encouraged to consult league tables as reliable guides to performance.

This system was largely supported by Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ Government, who saw the traditional left wing socialist ideology of the Labour party as outdated and incompatible with the modern market economy. Making education a top priority for his Government, Blair had a keen interest in improving the standards of education, increasing the number of assessments and targets; also increasing the amount of setting within subjects instead of mixed-ability classing, which had previously been common (Ward and Eden, 2009: 23-24; Sukhnandan and Lee, 1998: 13).  The current Conservative Government have also largely implemented the ideas of parental choice and specialist schools. David Cameron has expanded upon the academies programme, which was introduced by Blair, and plans eventually to turn every school into an academy, removing local authority control (Stone, 2015: online). There is also an increasing number of grammar school advocates arguing for the return of selective education. The UK Independence Party’s official education policy is to introduce grammar schools in every town (Mason, 2014: online). However, many on the left argue that the mere existence of parental choice, selection by ability and the general marketization of schools undermines the whole comprehensive education system (Ward and Eden, 2009: 43-44).

The Blank Slate view

As we have seen, the nature vs. nurture debate holds a strong presence in the discussions over education, in particular on the topic of selection by ability. Those on the left, motivated by the ideal of egalitarianism, tend to subscribe more so on the nurture side of the debate. They argue that every human has an equal potential for intelligence, and mental capabilities are solely learned through the environment. Thus, they are opposed to any kind of selection by ability, as it is perceived as unfair on those who do not pass the exam. This view derives from 17th century philosopher John Locke, who argued that humans are born with the absence of any innate psychological content, and all knowledge comes from experience or perception. This is known as tabula rasa, or the blank slate view. According to this view, all behaviours, including any differences in intellectual ability are constructed entirely by culture. Disparities in mental capacities are generally caused by existing social structures that have historically treated certain genders, races or classes subordinately. This is the view of Dorling (2013: online), who cites 1920’s psychiatrist Abraham Myerson, who once said: ‘We often hear of hereditary talents, hereditary vices, and hereditary virtues, but whoever will critically examine the evidence will find that we have no proof of their existence.’ The nurture side often criticises the nature side of reductionism and genetic determinism. The idea that a child’s characteristics are hard-wired by the genes of its parents, with no account taken of environmental and cultural influences, is completely opposed (Rose and Rose, 2000). It is also argued that the human nature argument has been used to justify existing hierarchical social structures, for example the role of women in society (ibid). Marxists argue that emphasis on nature and heritability has been used to oppose social change, as evolution and adaptation validates the way things are; and against social justice reform, for example the argument that the rich are only rich because they’ve inherited greater abilities, so programmes intended to raise the standards of the poor are doomed to fail (Lewontin, Rose and Kamin, 1984).

However, modern scientists largely reject the extreme nurture view of the complete blank slate, especially since the development of the human genome project (Dawkins, 2006; Pinker, 2002; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; Wade, 2014). Yet, the blank slate view is still popular among the social sciences and humanities. Steven Pinker (2002) claims that those who hold the blank slate view deny the existence of the very heart of our being – human nature. ‘A surprising number of intellectuals, particularly on the left, do deny that there is a such thing as inborn talent, especially intelligence.’ (ibid, p.149). Furthermore, he states:

There is now ample evidence that intelligence is a stable property of an individual, that it can be linked to features of the brain (including overall size, amount of gray matter in the frontal lobes, speed of neural conduction, and metabolism of cerebral glucose), that it is partly heritable among individuals, and that it predicts some of the variation in life outcomes such as income and social status. (ibid, p.150)

Of course, the extreme nature view that everything is hereditary is equally incorrect and rejected largely by modern science. Evidence shows that the environment and culture plays a significant part in the shaping of human behaviours and traits, however Pinker (ibid) criticises those who deny that heritability is a contributor at all to intellectual capacity. Pinker accepts that there are other contributing factors, such as: ‘sheer luck, inherited wealth, race and class prejudice, unequal opportunity (such as in schooling and connections), and cultural capital; habits and values that promote economic success.’ Yet, he claims that: ‘Acknowledging that talent matters does not mean that prejudice and unequal opportunity do not matter.’

Dorling’s claim that: ‘when it comes to our mental abilities, we are not made up of classes or races or genders’ also seems incorrect, according to research. There is evidence of differences in mental abilities between classes, races and genders, however, it is very difficult to know the extent to which it is the environment or genes that account for these differences. Yet, as the theory of evolution is vastly accepted to explain the development, adaptations and biological differences of human bodies between different races and genders, in respect to skin colour, bone size, muscle size, and so on; it seems irrational to say that evolution has had no effect on the physical human brain. Evidence shows that social class greatly effects the IQ of children, however, it seems more plausible that this is environmental (Nisbett et al, 2012: 136). IQ scores also differ between the ethnicities, with Asians displaying on average higher IQ’s than whites, and whites displaying higher than blacks, but the gap is narrowing. There is an argument for a genetic basis for this difference, however, culture is obviously significant too. (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994:269-270). In addition, research shows that there are differences in mental ability between the sexes. Although most tests show little or no difference in general intelligence, there are, however, certain aspects in which males excel over females, and females excel over males. For example, females tend to have an advantage in verbal abilities, such as fluency and memory abilities, performing slightly better in vocabulary and reading comprehension, and significantly higher in speech production and essay writing. Meanwhile, males have an advantage in visuospatial abilities, performing better at spatial visualisation, spatial perception, and mental rotation. (Nisbett et al, 2012: 144-146). These variances may explain why women tend to favour the arts and humanities, while men tend to favour the sciences and engineering.

The consequence of this, in regards to education policy, is that standardised testing, selection by ability and increased school choice is a valid education system and should not be completely rejected. There is evidence that we are born with certain innate characteristics and talents, moreover, the notion that we are born with a complete blank slate is vastly rejected. The comprehensive education system assumes that everyone is equal in terms of potential intellectual ability and skillset; that any talents or proficiencies exist because of the environment and how the child is brought up, and that inheritance plays no part. This is contrary to the evidence, however, which suggests that genes do play a part, and that variations exist between the social classes, races and genders. Every individual human being is born unique, not only in fingerprint, but also in abilities, needs and interests, and a one-size-fits-all education policy undermines this basic fact. Therefore, greater parental choice and school specialisation makes sense to account for these differences. For example, a parent with a child that shows proficiency and interest in sports, ought to send their child to a school that specialises in sport, and a parent with a child that shows proficiency and interest in technology, ought to send their child to a school that specialises in technology. Similarly, a child which displays academic talent should attend a school that has an academic focus, a child that displays technical talent should attend a school that has a technical focus, and a child that displays vocational talent should attend a school that has a vocational focus, and so on. Testing is an evident way to exhibit proficiencies that a child may have.

Conclusion

To conclude, British education policy previously consisted of a tripartite system, in which students took the eleven-plus exam that determined the type of secondary school they would attend. The more academic students attended grammar schools, which had an academic focus; the more technical students attended technical schools, and the more practical students attended secondary modern schools, which had a vocational focus. The theoretical basis for this education system was that every student has different needs and abilities, and so the school they attend and curricula they learn should accommodate for these differences. The system aimed to increase social mobility, providing the chance for students from poorer backgrounds to have the same opportunities as students from well-off backgrounds. Selection by ability accepts the idea genetics does play a role in determining the mental capacities of students, which Dorling rejects.

The tripartite system, however, faced logistical difficulties in the developing of technical schools, which undermined the whole system. In practice, the system was a two tier system, with those who passed the eleven-plus exam going to grammar schools, and those failed going to secondary modern schools. Critics accused the system of being unfair, and preserving class structures, rather than improving social mobility that was the original intention.

As a result, the comprehensive education system was established, which did not allow schools to select on the basis of ability. Comprehensive secondary schools taught a wide-ranging curriculum rather than a specific focus, endorsing the idea of mixed-ability classes and egalitarianism. The view was that students are born equal in potential, and the environment shapes the talents and abilities of students, with genetics playing little or no part. This view became popular with the writings of John Locke, who introduced the tabula rasa – the idea that humans are born with a blank slate of knowledge. That there are no innate psychological capacities. This view is largely discredited by modern science, however, as it ignores the influence of biology, evolution and human nature.

By the mid-1970’s and early 1980’s, the consensus was that the education system was failing, therefore, a number of market mechanisms have been introduced into the system over the last 30 years, including school choice, league tables and specialist schooling, in an effort to improve the standards and accountability of schools. Dorling rejects these reforms on the basis that it undermines comprehensive education, and is based upon ‘a nasty little theory’ that children vary greatly in what they might be able to achieve. Dorling claims that ‘when it comes to our mental abilities, we are not made up of classes or races or genders,’ however, on the contrary, evidence shows that there are differences in mental abilities between classes, races and genders. Therefore, there is valid justification for school choice and selection by ability.

 

References

Carvel, J. (1999) ‘Grammar schools ‘no escape route for poorer children’. The Guardian. [Online] 29th May. [Accessed on 10th March 2016] http://www.theguardian.com/education/1999/may/29/grammarschools.secondaryschools

Chitty, C. (2009) Education Policy in Britain. 2nd ed., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dawkins, R. (2006) The Selfish Gene: 30th Anniversary Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dorling, D. (2013) ‘English education policy is based on a nasty little theory’. The Guardian. [Online] 22nd July. [Accessed on 10th February 2016] http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/jul/22/education-policy-childrens-potential

Espinoza, J. (2016) ‘’One size fits all’ secondary education is failing youngsters, warns Ofsted head’. The Telegraph. [Online] 18th January. [Accessed on 15th March 2016] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/12105026/One-size-fits-all-secondary-education-is-failing-youngsters-warns-Ofsted-head.html

Fletcher, R. and Hattie, J. (2011) Intelligence and Intelligence Testing.

Herrnstein, R. and Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve. New York: The Free Press.

Lewontin, R. Rose, S. and Kamin, L. (1984) Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature. New York: Pantheon Books.

Machin, S. and Vignoles, A. (2006) Education Policy in the UK. Centre for the Economics of Education. London School of Economics. [Online] [Accessed on 7th March 2016] http://cee.lse.ac.uk/ceedps/ceedp57.pdf

Mason, R. (2014) ‘Nigel Farage lays out Ukip plans for schools and taxes’. The Guardian. [Online] 1st June. [Accessed 11th March 2016] http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/01/nigel-farage-ukip-schools-taxes

Nisbett, R., Aronson, J., Blair, C., Dickens, W., Flynn, J., Halpern, D. and Turkheimer, E. (2012) ‘Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments.’ American Psychologist, 67(2), pp.130-159.

Pinker, S. (2002) The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Penguin Books.

Rose, H. and Rose, S. (2000) Alas, poor Darwin: Arguments against Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Harmony Books.

Sesardic, N. (2005) Making Sense of Heritability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stone, J. (2015) ‘David Cameron says he will turn every school into an academy’. The Independent. [Online] 7th October. [Accessed 10th March 2016] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-says-he-will-turn-every-school-into-an-academy-a6684616.html

Sukhnandan, L. and Lee, B. (1998) Streaming, Setting and Grouping by Ability: a review of the literature. Berkshire: National Foundation for Educational Research. [Online] [Accessed 10th March 2016] https://www.nfer.ac.uk/publications/SSG01/SSG01.pdf

Wade, N. (2014) A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History. New York: Penguin Books.

Ward, S. and Eden, C. (2009) Key Issues in Education Policy. Sage Publications Ltd.

Was the Reagan administration responsible for ending the Cold War?

The Cold War was a time of enormous tension between two of the worlds’ strongest superpowers that were ideologically opposed to one another: the communist Soviet Union, and the capitalist United States of America. When the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Cold War came to an end, it sparked a debate that continues to exist today and will go on for some time. Why did the Soviet Union collapse? Who, or what, was responsible? According to Margaret Thatcher: “Ronald Reagan won the cold war without firing a shot.” This echoes a widely held opinion in the West, especially in America, that it was Reagan who was directly responsible for ending the cold war. Alternative views of history reject this assessment, claiming that the Soviet Union collapsed because of its own problems at home.

The following paper examines both sides of the argument and comes to the conclusion that the impact of Reagan is often overstated in the West, as evidence suggests that he was not directly responsible for ending the Cold War. That is not to say, however, that he did not have any impact at all. The evidence suggests that Reagan’s foreign policy increased pressure on the Soviet Union, speeding up the collapse. Though this collapse was inevitable due to the internal problems facing the U.S.S.R. To make the case, this paper will be structured as follows: First, Reagan’s approach to foreign policy is outlined, followed by the arguments in favour of Reagan being responsible for winning the Cold War. Counter-arguments are then provided, showing how it was the internal problems of the Soviet Union that predominantly led to its collapse.

The Reagan Doctrine

Prior to the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the White House was occupied by Democrat leader Jimmy Carter. Disillusionment was still high within the American public due to Watergate and Vietnam, and so Carter was elected in 1976 to convey a more liberal approach to foreign policy, which emphasised working with others, foreign aid and diplomatic solutions. Conversely, critics argue that this was neither a viable, nor a politically acceptable foreign policy, as it overlooked the imperialist ambitions of the Soviet Union (Layne, 1988, p.96). Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first secretary of state, epitomised this sentiment by claiming that: “the Soviet Union had been seduced by the weakness of the American will and extended itself far beyond the natural limits of its own apparent interests and influence.” Moreover, the failure of the Jimmy Carter administration to resist “this audacious assault upon American interests” further exacerbated the problem (McMahon, 1995, p.371). There is strong evidence showing that during the 1970s, the Soviet Union expanded its military and conventional arsenals, consuming more than one-quarter of its GDP (Kaufman, 2011). For the first time, the Soviet’s military spending grew larger than the U.S’s, which had been descending. As Soviet interventionism expanded into Afghanistan, calls for the U.S. to rebuild its military grew, especially among neoconservatives who had already began shaping the Reagan administration’s foreign policy (Layne, 1988, p.97). Therefore, there is evidence that the 1980 Reagan campaign, which proposed a substantial increase in defence spending, reflected the mood of the American electorate, and so he was elected into office.

The Reagan Doctrine is the name given to the strategy of the Reagan administration to diminish the global influence of the Soviet Union. The plan was to build-up the military, reject arms controls, squeeze the U.S.S.R. economically and support anti-communist “freedom fighters” around the world. Layne (1988, p.98) provides a detailed definition of the Reagan Doctrine, in which he states:

The Reagan Doctrine has never been authoritatively defined, but its content can be inferred from various statements made by President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz and the writings of such neoconservative foreign policy theorists as Charles Krauthammer, Irving Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz. As commonly understood, the Reagan Doctrine committed the United States to resisting Soviet and Soviet-supported aggression wherever it arose, to building U.S.-style democracies in Third World countries, and to rolling back communism by aiding anti-communist insurgencies. The Reagan Doctrine sought to create an ideologically congenial world and assumed that U.S. security required nothing less. In some quarters, moreover, the doctrine’s objectives were framed more expansively to include bringing about the Soviet empire’s breakup and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet state itself by inflicting a series of what Kristol called “small defeats” on Moscow in the Third World (presumably undermining the Soviet regime’s domestic legitimacy), engaging the Kremlin in a high-tech arms race, and pressuring the Soviet Union economically.

This plan was quickly put into practice. Within his first five years the military budget had doubled, increasing from $142.6 billion to $286.6 billion (Korb, 1988, p.84). Reagan had purchased nearly 3,000 combat aircraft, 3,700 strategic missiles, 200 ships, and approximately 10,000 tanks in the first six years of his administration (ibid, p.86). By the middle of the decade, U.S. military expenditures surpassed the Soviet Union’s for the first time since the late 1960’s (ibid, p.84). In addition to which, the CIA began arming and financing the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan (Operation Cyclone), and the indigenous anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua – known as the Contras. In response to Martial Law in Poland (1981-1983), the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on the U.S.S.R, banning the exportation of equipment needed to build a pipeline between Russia and Western Europe.

It has been argued that it is mainly these policies that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kaufman (2011) argues that the doubling in the size of the defence budget, had the consequence of modernising the American military, which in turn, wiped out the Soviet’s military advantage that it had gained in the 1970s, and badly strained the Soviet economy. He argues that Reagan understood more clearly than others the “evil essence” of the Soviet Union and communism, and how to defeat it, and that the Soviet system was vulnerable to “sustained economic, military, moral, and political pressure.” Christopher Layne (1988, p.108), who by no means was a supporter of Ronald Reagan, conceded that the Reagan administration had restored national pride and self-confidence to the U.S. that had been badly damaged by Vietnam and the Iran hostage crisis (1979-1980). Supporters of Reagan’s foreign policy, also claim that his plans of developing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) posed a great technological threat to the Soviets which they simply could not compete with. SDI, or as critics called “Star Wars”, was a program that was intended to develop a sophisticated, space-based, anti-ballistic missile system which would prevent attacks from other countries, and, according to Reagan, “render nuclear weapons obsolete” (Brown, 2007, p.6). There is evidence that suggests that the Soviets were concerned about these plans. According to Busch (1997, pp.455-456) SDI became an “obsession” for the Soviet leadership, and they were “thrown into a state of despair”. At the Geneva summit in 1985, they proposed for the U.S. to abandon the program in return for a sharp reduction in Soviet nuclear arsenals, however, Reagan refused. The argument is that SDI had placed a strategic, technological and economic burden upon the Soviet Union which contributed as much as any other single factor to the end of the Cold War (ibid).

On the other hand, there is an evident problem with this line of thinking. The argument that the Reagan Doctrine was directly responsible for bringing about the end of the Cold War, fails to take into account the shift in Reagan’s approach towards foreign policy during his second term in The White House. In his second term, there is a strong indication that Reagan switched to a more pragmatic and conciliatory position, which encouraged dialogue, cooperation and understanding with the Soviet Union, and placed a greater emphasis on arms reduction (Fischer, 1997, pp.488-496).  As in his first term, it was expected that the surge in defence spending would continue into his second administration. However, this was not the case. On the contrary, the budget began to decrease. Congress slashed the 1986 request by 10 percent, and the defence budget dropped in nominal terms (Korb, 1988, p.86). In addition, the two superpowers began communicating with each other, notably at the Geneva summit in 1985, at Reykjavik Iceland in 1986, and at Moscow in 1988. It appears that Reagan’s attitude towards the Soviet Union had changed. No longer were they the “evil empire” which he had called them previously. By 1988, he was referring to Gorbachev as “my friend”. As Ravenal (1988, p.125) points out, the administration had gone from “accusations of lying and cheating and committing “any crime” to the warm handshakes of three summits and the tangible accomplishments of the double-zero, intermediate-range arms reduction agreement and the foundation of a substantial cut in strategic nuclear arms.” Ironically, a portion of the neoconservative Republicans had began to complain that Reagan had become too soft and friendly towards the Soviets at the end.

The reason why Reagan changed his policy is up for debate. One reason could be attributed to the growing national deficit. In his first term in office, Reagan had succeeded in doubling the size of the defence budget, but also in doubling the size of the national deficit (Korb, 1988, p.90). For someone who was supposed to be a “fiscal conservative”, this does not seem very economically responsible. Another reason could have been in response to the events of Able Archer in 1983. Able Archer was a ten-day NATO exercise that provoked the Soviet Union to ready their nuclear forces for attack, due to the realistic nature of the exercise. This event had almost caused nuclear war, which may have led Reagan to believe that dialog would be the best approach, as not long after, he gave a speech in which he stated that: “Reducing the risk of war-and especially nuclear war is priority number one” (Fischer, 1997, p.487). Other reasons could be because of the growing public dissatisfaction with the Reagan Doctrine and scepticism about U.S. involvement overseas (Layne, 1988, p.101); or because of the rise of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership, who was a more democratic and cooperative leader. Regardless, the point remains that the Soviet Union did not collapse during Reagan’s first term, when he had taken a firm attitude towards the Soviet Union and focused on military build-up. On the contrary, the Soviet Union collapsed after Reagan’s shift in attitude and policy, and when the relationship between the two superpowers had improved. This seems to contradict the argument that the Reagan Doctrine brought about the collapse.

Internal problems

In some ways, supporters of communism are happy to place the blame on Reagan for the fall of the Soviet Union, as it takes away responsibility from the inherent flaws and inefficiencies of an authoritarian, centrally controlled economic system. In the late 1970s the Soviet Union was immersed in a mass of problems which it would not recover from, not least because its economy was stagnating. Price controls and collectivisation were having devastating effects on its agriculture sector, factories and technology were backwards and outdated, and consumers were faced with widespread shortages and low-quality products (Stoner-Weiss, 2009, pp.4-5). Moreover, prices had tripled, taxes had increased and living conditions were deteriorating (Crouch, 1989, pp.26-27). The absence of natural market forces such as supply and demand, and the lack of economic incentives meant that workers were unproductive and lacked a work ethic. “We pretend to work, while you pretend to pay us” was a common joke that circulated within its factories (Stoner-Weiss, 2009, p.45). These inefficiencies were predicted in the 1920s by economist Ludwig von Mises who argued that the Soviet system was unsustainable and would ultimately collapse because of the problems with state ownership of the means of production. A system that does not have private ownership of the means of production and capital markets does not have a functioning price and profit mechanism, therefore does not have information available about desirability and abundance of a good, and as a consequence there is no way of rationally allocating resources. Hence why the Soviet economy was so unproductive, wasteful and plagued with scarcities (Von Mises, 1990).

The vulnerability of the Soviet economy was not helped by the prioritisation of military build-up and its costly interventions abroad. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which turned out to be an almost ten year long war, involving approximately one million Soviet troops, tens of thousands of which either died or were injured (Reuveny and Prakash, 1999, p.696). Often labelled as “Russia’s Vietnam” by Western media, there is a strong case that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was one of the contributing factors that led to its collapse, not least because of the economic burden that it placed on the Soviet economy. The war discredited the perceived military strength of the Soviet army. Furthermore, the corruption, looting, plundering and other atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers destroyed its moral legitimacy, which consequently had profound implications for the survivability of the Soviet Union (ibid, p.698).

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he recognised that something needed to change. Unproductivity, corruption, cover-ups, and mismanagement had built-up in the Soviet system over many years, and reorganisation was not just needed, it was necessary. Not many would predict the scale of the reforms that Gorbachev brought in, however, as his plans were quite radical. His strategy was to reorganise the political and economic system, encourage transparency in its institutions, and rethink the interventionist approach to foreign policy. “Glasnost” meaning “openness” was one of the policies which Gorbachev introduced, and its effects were momentous. Gorbachev wanted to win the trust of the public by increasing dialogue between the government and its citizens, starting off by literally going out on the streets of Russia to talk to the people – something which had seemed impossible a few years before. The policy entailed greater freedom of speech for the citizens and the media, reducing censorship and controls, and opening up political debate. Brown (2007, pp.6-7) argues that these measures of political reform and democratisation were the most radical of Gorbachev’s reforms as they introduced a whole range of freedoms, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which were ultimately significant in ending the Cold War. Gorbachev’s glasnost policy had devastating consequences for the Soviet system, which we can assume was no part of his intention. The result was for the crimes and atrocities that had been carried out by the Soviet government to be exposed to the general public, and for them to learn about the higher standard of living that exists in the United States and in the West. A snowballing effect occurred which proved that revealing just a small amount of truth was almost impossible; “as soon as the iron-fist of the regime eased its grip, facts more and more damaging to the Soviet government were rapidly exposed” (Zilper, 1991, p.46). The evidence strongly suggests that Glasnost was a major contributing factor to the end of the Cold War.

Similarly, “Perestroika,” meaning “restructuring,” was another policy which Gorbachev introduced, that attempted to revive the Soviet economy. As the problems with central planning came to fruition, it became apparent that the command economy needed reforming. Gorbachev’s plan was to introduce various market-like reforms with the goal of making socialism work more efficiently. He attempted to increase competition between businesses by passing anti-monopoly legislation, and allowing some semi-private industries to form. In addition, he encouraged productivity and responsibility by removing the guarantee of bailouts for failing companies and introducing performance-related bonuses for workers and managers (Nuti, 1988, pp.377-380). The reforms did not go far enough, however, as price controls were kept in place, along with the inconvertibility of the currency and government controls over the means of production. Ultimately, Perestroika failed to provide the stimulation to the Soviet economy that it desperately needed, and eventually the Soviet Union collapsed on 25^th December 1991. In reflection, Gorbachev (2013, p.40) claimed that “Perestroika’s greatest achievement was to awaken and liberate the mind. People were freed to think without the constraint of fear.” However, he does admit that mistakes were made, for example he regrets that he did not “decentralise[ ] more quickly.” (ibid).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the foreign policy of the Reagan administration was known as the Reagan Doctrine, and it planned to weaken the global influence of the Soviet Union by the combination of building up the military, rejecting arms controls and supporting anti-communist “freedom fighters” around the world. The evidence shows that the strategy did increase external pressures on the Soviet Union, in particular with the SDI programme, however, the degree to which is often overstated by Reagan’s supporters, who fail to take into account Reagan’s shift in policy towards the Soviet Union during his second term in office.

The evidence more strongly suggests that it was the internal problems of the Soviet Union that predominantly led to its collapse. The inherent flaws of a largely authoritarian and centrally planned economy had come to fruition. Factories and mines were dilapidated, corruption was rife, and consumers were faced with widespread shortages and low-quality products. Gorbachev’s well-intentioned reforms, including glasnost and perestroika, failed to revive the Soviet economy that it so desperately needed. As a result, by giving the public a small amount of freedom, Gorbachev sealed the fate of the Soviet Union, as the crimes and failures of communism came to the surface. Ultimately, freedom and national sovereignty became much more appealing to the people than totalitarian collectivism, and so the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end.

 

Bibliography

Brown, A. (1996). The Gorbachev factor. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Brown, A. (2007). Perestroika and the End of the Cold War. Cold War History, 7(1), pp.1-17.

Busch, A. (1997). Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 27(3), pp.451-466.

Crouch, M. (1989). Revolution and Evolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Politics. London: Philip Allan.

Fischer, B. (1997). Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War. Political Science Quarterly, 112(3), pp.477-496.

Gorbachev, M. (2013). Perestroika 20 Years Later. New Perspectives Quarterly, 30(4), pp.40-44.

Kaufman, R. (2011). The First Principles of Ronald Reagan’s Foreign Policy. The Heritage Foundation.

Korb, L. (1988). The Reagan Defense Budget and Program: The Buildup That Collapsed. In: D. Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, pp.83-94.

Layne, C. (1988). Requiem for the Reagan Doctrine. In: D. Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, pp.95-112.

McMahon, R. (1995). Making Sense of American Foreign Policy during the Reagan Years. Diplomatic History, 19(2), pp.367-384.

Nuti, D. (1988). Perestroika: transition from central planning to market socialism. Economic Policy, 3(2), pp.353-389.

Ravenal, E. (1988). Reagan’s Failed Restoration: Superpower Relations in the 1980s. In: D. Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, pp.125-141.

Reuveny, R. and Prakash, A. (1999). The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union. Review of International Studies, 25(4), pp.693-708.

Stoner-Weiss, K. (2009). Domestic and International Influences on the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and Russia’s Initial Transition to Democracy (1993). CDDRL Working Papers.

Tucker, R. (1981). The Purpose of American Power. Foreign Affairs, 59(2), p.265.

Von Mises, L. (1990). Economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig Von Mises Institute, Auburn University.

Zilper, N. (1991). The Consequences of Glasnost. Library Journal, 116(9), pp.44-49.

 

Campaign Finance Reform

Introduction

The issue of campaign finance is one that has been debated among academics for many years, and has gained greater public attention in recent years due to the enormous, and constantly increasing money spent on political campaigns. It has been estimated that $7 billion were spent at the 2012 American election, the most expensive in U.S. history, which comprised of 3,514 candidates running for 475 seats. Much of that money was spent communicating to the public on the merits of candidates and their views on public issues (Weintraub and Tausanovitch 2013). Numerous books, journals and articles have been written on the topic of Campaign finance, with opinion split between those who claim that campaign finance is a problem, thus reform is necessary, and those who see reform as unnecessary and an infringement upon First Amendment rights. In studying the literature on the topic, it was noticeable that there were different approaches or techniques used by the authors to make their argument and to come to particular conclusions. Some favoured a more conceptual and ideological approach, outlining their philosophy and how campaign finance reform fits or doesn’t fit with it (Barrone 1986; Levine 1997; Sullivan 1998; Boaz 2009; Taylor Jr. 2009; Rubin 2010; Smith 2012). With this approach, it was permissible to use older literature due to its timeless nature. Whereas, others favoured a more empirical approach that included numerical data, tables and graphs in order to make their point (McSweeney 2005; Stratmann 2006; Gulati 2012; Johnstone 2013; Pastine and Pastine 2013). With this approach, only recent literature could be used because numerical data quickly becomes outdated and therefore irrelevant. It was also noticeable that there tended to be three schools of thought on the subject: those in favour of campaign finance reform; those against campaign finance reform; and those that preferred to portray both sides of the argument in an unbiased and balanced way. Books and articles from all sides of the argument are reviewed to gain a broad knowledge of the different schools of thought on the subject of campaign finance reform.

The Problem of Campaign Finance

Campaign Finance refers to the funding of electoral campaigns at federal, state and local levels. This involves public and/or private money being donated to a candidate that is used to pay for the financial expenditures that a political campaign entails. Typically, this covers costs of travel, hotels, catering, grassroots fundraising, management and research, communication and advertisements i.e. billboards, lawn signs and leaflets. The biggest expense of campaigning in modern times is television advertising (Gulati 2012), which includes positive advertising and, more controversially, negative advertising. Attack ads, push polls and smear campaigns are all contentious techniques used most frequently in U.S. campaigns, due to the lack of restrictions on campaign finance.

Political Action Committees (PACs) and Super PACs are the organisations that raise the money to influence elections and legislation. Super PACs can raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, associations and individuals and then spend unlimited amounts of money on things like TV advertisements (Gulati 2012). In the 2012 election, Super PACs spent an estimated $1.3 billion, the vast majority of which came from a small set of “ultra-wealthy mega-donors” (Pursley 2014). A criticism of Super PACs is that because they are capable of funding entire campaigns on their own, they circumvent parties and eliminate the need to cultivate small donors (Pursley 2014). Super PACs have been described as “ethics-deprived organisations” that “lack redeeming social value” but instead “spread fear, distort issues, squelch opportunity for meaningful debate, and are spoiling politics with irresponsible and dishonest political advertisements.” (Gulati 2012). A common argument against campaign finance is that when an individual, PAC or Super PAC makes a contribution to a candidate they are likely to expect something in return, a quid pro quo. A system that involves quid pro quo campaign contributions is more than likely to worsen the chance of politics to become a process of accommodating particular groups with particular selfish interests, instead of an effort to reach the best decisions for society as a whole (Strauss 1994).

The most frequently expressed concern about Campaign Finance within the literature is the risk of corruption that an unregulated system would be unable to prevent (Strauss 1994; Grant 2004; Gulati 2012; Johnstone 2013; Pursley 2014). It is very possible in the current system that politicians have the potential to be bribed by certain special interest groups, thus creating the problem of politicians serving the needs of the campaign donor rather the public, and because politicians are more likely to serve the needs of his/her donor rather than the needs of the public or the constituency, it causes a “swamping” of that constituency’s influence in general, thus undermining federalism (Pursley 2014). A common argument is that unlimited and unregulated campaign finance creates substantial implications for democracy (Yang 2000; Taylor Jr 2009; Pastine and Pastine 2013; Pursley 2014). Democratic participation is threatened and one reason articulated is because of the growing perception that wealthy interests either control or at the very least have too much influence over government, causing the public to lose confidence in the political process, with acknowledgement to numerous questionable fundraising methods and vast amounts of money being collected and spent on the campaign process (Yang 2000; Pursely 2014). The fact is that it is virtually impossible to get into office without raising and spending large amounts of money, and this need or obligation weakens the connection between politicians’ policy preferences and their actual actions, thus undermining and distorting the fundamental premise of a representative democracy (Taylor Jr 2009; Pastine and Pastine 2013).

The solutions to Campaign Finance

Attempts to curtail the problems associated with Campaign Finance date back as early as 1867, yet most efforts were largely ineffective and hardly ever enforced. It was not until the 1970s that the US Government made serious attempts to address the problem. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was successfully passed in 1971, which required wide disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures. The act was amended in 1974, following the public reaction to the Watergate Scandal, introducing limits on contributions to and spending by congressional candidates, a taxpayer-financed system of funding presidential elections along with contribution and spending limits for presidential campaigns, and a new federal agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), to enforce the law. However, a challenge to the constitutionality of the new rules as violations of freedom of speech, led to the Supreme Court striking down parts of the legislation while upholding other provisions in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) (Grant 2004). The most recent major reform to campaign finance is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, also known as the McCain-Feingold law. This legislation prohibited unlimited and unregulated contributions, known as “soft money”; and defined political issue ads paid for by corporations or unions as “electioneering communications”, banning the broadcast of such ads within 30 days of a primary or within 60 days of a general election (Campaign-Finance Reform: History and Timeline | Infoplease.com).

It is a commonly held view on both sides of the argument that the reforms that have been made have not been successful and the system is still broken. It is within the proposed solutions to the problem that the debate begins, with some saying that the reforms don’t go far enough and more restrictions and regulations are needed; and others saying that the regulations are the problem as they are counter-productive causing unintended consequences.  Probably the least controversial solution proposed is disclosure of where campaign contributions come from. It is the most adopted form of campaign finance regulation in democracies around the world (Briffault 2010), perhaps because the lack of transparency over where money has come from, causes the public to hold trepidations. It is argued that disclosure requirements provide a valid means of deterring corruption and strengthening democracy, providing voters with valuable accountability regarding where campaign participants money has come from and how it is spent; thus, enabling the public to make more informed decisions on who ought to be, or ought not to be, elected (Yang 2000; Briffault 2010).  A further argument is that disclosure plays an important role in educating the public about how the electoral system works, how government decision making occurs, and the relationship of campaign finance and government action (Briffault 2010). Disclosure is generally accepted from the public, and academics from both sides of the debate. Campaign finance disclosure frequently displays very high levels of public support in opinion polls. Among academics, both campaign finance reformers and campaign finance sceptics have endorsed support for disclosure. This can be put down to the universally held belief that government transparency is essential for public accountability (Briffault 2010).

Another commonly proposed solution to the problem of campaign finance is that there ought to be limits on campaign contributions (Hill 2006; Stratmann 2006; Hunker 2013). The argument is that limiting the amount of money an individual, group or corporation can give to a candidate is an effective way of reducing the influence of money in politics, thus strengthening representative democracy. There are currently just six states in the U.S that place no limitations of campaign donations – Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Utah and Virginia; and another six states that have very minimal contribution limits – Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Supporters of contribution limits also tend to support limiting the amount a candidate can spend in their campaign, and the arguments for both contribution limits and expenditure limits are very similar. Stratmann in his paper Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending empirically analyses the data and comes to the conclusion that campaign expenditures by incumbents and challengers are more productive when candidates run in states with campaign contribution limits, as opposed to in states without limits. He argues that campaign advertising is more productive when spending ability is curtailed by contribution limits (Stratmann 2006). However, this study was done in 2006, and so could possibly be outdated now.

A final proposed reform to campaign finance is public financing of campaigns. Small-scale public financing of campaigns already exists in numerous states, but many academics would like to see the program extended. Perhaps one of the most radical and controversial kinds of reforms proposed is the idea of “Clean Elections” which uses public funds to finance a candidate’s entire campaign (Gartner 2013). The argument is that public financing helps to level the playing field by giving all candidates sufficient resources to pay for campaign expenditures, with evidence for this in New York City and Los Angeles which uses public financing for mayor, city council and other races (Hill 2006). Supporters of Public financing claim that public financing helps to minimise money’s role in politics and opens up American democracy to new voices and ideas by “opening up the system”, allowing lesser-funded candidates to challenge better-funded candidates, whilst providing a broader and livelier debate (Hill 2006). Public financing helps challengers to overcome potential financial barriers to entering campaigns, providing a more competitive election (Gartner 2013). Critics of this reform say that tax-payer financing of elections is merely “welfare for politicians,” and concerns are raised over the expense of public financed elections, especially at a time of continuing budget deficits (Smith 1999; Boaz 2009).

Arguments against Campaign Finance Reform

On the other side of the debate is those who are against campaign finance reform. The main argument against reform that is regularly expressed throughout the literature is that any restrictions and regulations on campaign finance is a violation of the First amendment of the constitution – a violation a freedom of speech (Sullivan 1998; Smith 2001; Samples 2006; Boaz 2009; Rubin 2010; Smith 2012). In the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that: “A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.” This ruling caused certain amounts of ridicule within the pro campaign finance reform community, who perceived the ruling as meaning “money equals speech.” However, those against campaign finance reform are quick to note that the court did not say “money equals speech,” the ruling said that political speech requires spending money, and so restricting money translates to restricting speech (Boaz 2009; Smith 2012). Opponents of campaign finance reform point out that it is obvious and little more than common sense that limiting money means limiting speech. Consider a law saying that “the retail price of a political book may not exceed twenty dollars.” It is true that such a law is just about the money, and not about the book, nevertheless the law limits the amount and effectiveness of political speech as it affects the incentives to write and publish such books (Sullivan 1998). Money is related to speech because money buys the means of communicating with voters and freedom of speech means government places no restrictions on what can be said in response to fundamental political questions (Samples 2006).

Adversaries of Campaign Finance Reform not only argue that campaign finance restrictions are an attack of freedom of speech, but also that there are a number of unintended consequences associated with the reforms. One of these unintended consequences is that campaign finance restrictions causes, or at least plays a part in, the lack of competition that incumbents have in elections (Boaz 2009). In fact, incumbent members of Congress nearly always win re-election when they run; since 1998 they have been re-elected more than 98 percent of the time (Samples 2006). This figure could now be outdated though. It is undoubtedly true that incumbents have a significant advantage over challengers in campaign spending and one reason for this is because restrictions on campaign finance actually chokes out political competition. From the very beginning of races, incumbents enjoy a number of inherent advantages over challengers including money for staff and high name and issue recognition among voters. In order for challengers to overcome these advantages and build a recognition for themselves among voters, they are obliged to spend huge amounts of money, but they are limited by campaign spending limits. For this reason, spending limits harm challengers more than incumbents, thus, by undermining the competitiveness of elections, campaign finance laws undermine democracy (Sullivan 1998; Samples 2006; Smith 2012). An additional unintended consequence of campaign finance restrictions raised in the literature is that limiting campaign spending causes a reduction in public knowledge, attention and involvement in elections. John J. Coleman of the University of Wisconsin did a study which concluded that campaign spending increases public knowledge of candidates across the population, therefore if we are to believe that voters should be informed and participate in the democratic process, we ought to be encouraging campaign spending, not restricting it (Boaz 2009).

One of the most significant philosophical differences between academics on either side of the debate is associated with trust in government. For people who advocate campaign finance reform, government is a trustworthy institution whose power can be used to bring about what is best for society; hence why reforms and laws are made in an attempt to eliminate evils from the system, such as corruption, and promote democratic and egalitarian ideals. Alternatively, academics who are opposed to such laws and reforms, view the government as the founders did, as an inherently untrustworthy institution, especially when it comes to regulating political speech, which is the reason why the First Amendment exists (Smith 2012). Campaign finance reform opponents have a grievance with the ubiquitousness of government, which promotes corruption due to the vast powers it has over virtually every aspect of life (Boaz 2009). It is the incumbent legislators and elected officials that writes the rules and regulations, and then employs the referees (Congress created and oversees the Federal Election Commission), therefore it is no coincidence that campaign finance laws have a tendency to advance the interests of incumbents and public officials (Samples 2006).

Conclusion

In closing, there are thousands of pieces of academic literature on the topic of Campaign Finance Reform, all with various different viewpoints and arguments for and against reform. Typical arguments for reform are that campaign finance causes corruption because it is a form of legalised bribery, consequently democracy and equality is threatened and/or affected. Three kinds of solutions are often proposed to remedy the problem, including: disclosure over where funds have come from and how it is spent; limits on campaign contributions and spending; and public financing of campaigns. Typical arguments on the opposite side are that restrictions on money are a desecration of freedom of speech, as money is required to get the message out there into the public sphere, and also that campaign finance laws favour incumbents and limit competition.

As with various other issues and aspects of the U.S. political system, the topic of campaign finance reform is complex as it comes into contest with the Constitution, which attempts to limit the size and scope of government, and uphold the inalienable rights of the individual. This highlights a philosophical difference between conservatives and libertarians – who are sceptical of government; and liberals and progressives – who believe in government.

Although the subject of campaign finance reform is well debated amongst academics, it is not debated widely within the general public, so change is unlikely. This hinders both advocates and sceptics of reform, because, what is clear from the literature is that neither side is happy with the current system.

 

Bibliography

Barone, M. (1986). Campaign Finance: The System We Have. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 486(1), pp.158-162.

Boaz, D. (2009). Cato Handbook for Policymakers. 7th ed. Lanham: Cato Institute, pp.99-106.

Briffault, R. (2010). Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0. Election Law Journal, 9(4), p.273.

Fellay, S. (2013). Future of Campaign Finance: The Multi-Billion Dollar Enterprise. Harvard International Review, 34(4), p.45.

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Grant, A. (2004). Reforming American Election Campaign Finance. Political Quarterly, 75(2), p.132.

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The Liberal Government’s introduction of welfare reforms between 1906 and 1914

Historians see the years 1906 to 1914 as one of the biggest periods of reform in British history. During this period, with the Liberal Party in government, Britain saw the introduction of major social reform, known as ‘Liberal welfare reforms’, and a growth in state intervention, despite going against traditional liberal ideology.  With the establishment of various forms of legislation including health insurance, unemployment insurance, and pensions for elderly workers, and the shift away from classical, laissez faire type liberalism; the Liberal Party laid the foundations for the modern welfare state that we see today. The question of why this happened has been a subject of debate among historians for years, there are a number of theories, explanations and aspects to take into account in order to understand the subject.

Origins

The Liberal Party of the 19^th century was originally based on the ideology of classical liberalism, which emphasised freedom of the individual by limiting the size and power of the state. Early roots to classical liberalism can be seen in the works of Adam Smith, who wrote the historic economics book Wealth of Nations; and English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) whose philosophy underpinned the promotion of liberty, individualism, and property rights. His beliefs can be summed up in the quote: “The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule.”[1] One of the most successful and influential Liberal Party leaders, William Gladstone, was a strong believer in these ideas, and exemplified policies of low taxation and limited government, whilst stressing the importance of a balanced budget and free trade.

After the historic landslide victory in the 1906 general election, the Liberal Party, led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman and later Herbert Asquith, began to move away from the classical liberalism towards new, social liberalism, which involved a more positive view towards collectivism, taxation and the state. It incorporated the belief that the state can enable individual liberty by protecting people against social evils such as poverty, by providing healthcare, welfare and education. This kind of liberalism was first developed by British philosopher Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882). Influenced by the writings of German philosopher Hegel, Green rejected the idea that humans were solely driven by self-interest and believed that political institutions could enhance individual liberty. He stressed that the individual was part of an “organic” society and had obligations towards the community.[2] He also made a distinction between negative liberty i.e. freedom from restraint, and positive liberty i.e. freedom to do things; which justified state intervention and promoted the idea that the state should set a moral tone which all should aspire to.

T. H. Green’s ideas went on to influence other thinkers, such as L. T. Hobhouse and J. A. Hobson. Hobhouse, a sociologist, advocated that a liberal society involves a democratic state, rather than a minimal state, which provides basic social welfare[3]. He argued that “freedom was devoid of meaning to the victim of uncontrolled free enterprise, and urged collective action for mutual advantage.”[4] Hobson, an economist, was even more radical; he was highly critical of industrial capitalism and believed that “the state should maintain a minimum standard of life for all its citizens and operate certain economic functions for the community as a whole”.[5] He later went on to join the Labour Party in 1919.

The philosophy of ‘new liberalism’ was gaining in popularity among a younger generation in the late 19^th– early 20^th centuries, which coincided with an emergence of ‘new liberal’ politicians who were in positions of power to turn these ideas into practice. An example being David Lloyd George, who served as  President of the Board of Trade in 1905-1908, and Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908-1915[6]; Winston Churchill, who served as President of the Board of Trade in 1908-1910, Home Secretary in 1910-1911 and First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911-1915[7]; and H. H. Asquith, who was tutored by T. H. Green at Oxford, and went on to be Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1905-1908, and Prime Minister in 1908-1916[8].

Yet, we need to ask the question of why the ‘new liberal’ ideology was getting so popular. Why was this drastic change in ideology so unanimously accepted among Liberal Party supporters and politicians? Of course, there were a few exceptions that remained classical liberals, and opposed welfare reforms, including Liberal MP Harold Cox, who claimed the reforms were “eroding freedom” and “undermining individual responsibility”[9]; also journalist and editor of The Economist F. W. Hurst, who said that Liberal politicians had sacrificed the core of liberalism in a “miserable hunt for offices and titles”, “in order to please their Protectionist colleagues and remain in office”.[10] Clearly there must have been certain factors and events that contributed to bringing about the change.

During the 19^th century, strong evidence shows that conditions on the most part in Britain were vastly improving. Living standards where on the increase, prices were relatively stable and price of food was actually going down [11]; furthermore, birth and death rates were falling, average life expectancy rising and average number of children per family were on the decrease. The dependency ratio, which compares those that are dependant (i.e. children and elderly) with those at working age, fell from 0.67 to 0.56.[12] The late 19^th century also saw a huge shift in geographical distribution of the population from rural to urban; in 1851 there were just 8 towns with a population of 100,000 people, by 1901 there were 28.[13] There was also a shift in occupational distribution of the population from agriculture to manufacturing and service industries; this caused a reduction in the price of agricultural goods leading to an increase in living standards of urban wage earners. Also note that the cost of living between 1873 and 1896 fell by more than 23%.[14]

Despite this, there was a growing awareness and understanding of poverty due to a number of reports, investigations and novels written which expressed themes of the working class circumstance. At the time, it was reasonably difficult to gain a precise picture of the extent of poverty, until 1886 when a philanthropist called Charles Booth carried out an extensive investigation into the incomes of families and households containing school children in London. His report found that 8.4% of the population were living ‘in want’, and 22.7% were living in poverty, which he defined as ‘having no surplus’.  In an effort to realise the causes of poverty he observed that out of the 4076 families living in poverty in East London, just 1.5% were ‘loafers’; 62.5% were employment related (e.g. low pay, small profits); 13.6% were questions of habit (e.g. drunkenness, lack of thrift); and 22.5% were by circumstance (e.g. illness, infirmity).[15]

Then in 1899, Seebohm Rowntree, inspired by Booth’s work, carried out an investigation into the extent of poverty in York, which was a more realistic representation of provincial towns in Britain. Rowntree estimated that 27.84% of the total population of York were living below the poverty line. He classified those living below the poverty line into two groups: 9.91% lived in what he called ‘primary poverty’, meaning not enough income to provide basic needs of life; and 17.93% were living in ‘secondary poverty’, meaning high enough income to provide basic needs but this was spent on things other than the necessities of life.[16] At that point in time, the public perception of poverty was changing, and the findings of Booth and Rowntree helped to shed light on the issue. In fact, liberal politicians Lloyd George and Winston Churchill were not shy about the influence that Rowntree’s book had on them. Lloyd George said that Rowntree was: “one of the foremost successful pioneers in the development of improved conditions.”[17] And Winston Churchill once said to an audience in Blackpool in 1902:

I have been reading a book which has fairly made my hair stand on end, written by a Mr Rowntree who deals with poverty in the town of York. It is found that the poverty of the people of that city extends to nearly one-fifth of the population; nearly one-fifth had something between one and a half and three-fourths as much food to eat as the paupers in the York Union. That I call a terrible and shocking thing, people who have only the workhouse or prison as the only avenues to change from their present situation.[18]

It should be pointed out that Britain was not alone in undergoing change. “Societies as diverse as Germany, the United States of America, Tsarist and later Soviet Russia, Australia and Uruguay were embarking on social legislation, which contained many similar elements to the Liberal reforms, at roughly the same time.”[19] It is possible that some individuals, pressure groups and Liberal politicians were influenced by these countries. In 1908, David Lloyd George famously visited Germany to observe the workings of National Insurance. In fact, Germany is often identified as the country that created the welfare state, with welfare programmes introduced as early as the 1840s, and with Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s introduction of old age pensions, accident insurance and medical care during his time in office in the period of 1871-1890. Also, the Old Age Pensions Act of 1898 in New Zealand was an inspiration to the National Committee of Organised Labour on Old Age Pensions.[20]

The Boer War (1899-1902) was another major event that took place that can be seen as a factor responsible for Liberal welfare reforms. Peacock and Wiseman argued that wars in general cause an increased agenda for state action, and they produced a hypothesis about the effects of war on government expenditure. They concluded that, during peacetime, proposals to increase government spending on social services are rejected because the people object to increases in taxation necessary to pay for it. On the other hand, during war, the public’s perception of the tolerable level of taxation is disturbed; meaning that governments can now increase taxes on the population and embark upon welfare and other schemes. [21] The Boer war, specifically, was a disastrous war for Britain; with 40% of men volunteering turned away for being physically unfit to serve, the difficulty in defeating a small number of Boer farmers, and the growing fears of war with Britain’s industrial competitor Germany, there was an increased urgency to discuss poverty, especially regarding the health of school children. [22]

There was also a growing fear of the threat to Britain’s ‘national efficiency’. In the late 19^th century, a movement was developed which sought to identify and abolish waste in the economy and society, and implement solutions which would help Britain compete with the rest of the world (Germany in particular); this movement became known as the ‘National efficiency’ movement. The idea of national efficiency eventually “became part of the political language at the time”, and “helped to give social reform the status of a respectable political issue.”[23] It is also important to consider the political pressure from the left, that being from the emerging Labour party, which was increasing in strength, after a successful 1906 general election.  Their demands for radical socialist policies such as: abolition of Poor Law, free education for all, full employment and better pay, some see as having a significant effect on the Liberals.

Legislation

Although the Liberal party didn’t offer any social reform policies before coming into government; when in power, they embarked upon a series of social welfare legislation, initially concerning the well-being of children. This included: The Education (Provision of Meals) Act 1906 – which permitted, rather than forced, local authorities to provide free meals to deprived children; The Education (Administrative Provisions) Act 1907 – which set up school medical inspections; The Children Act 1908 – which prevented the committal of children to prison and penalised parents guilty of neglect; and the Education (Choice of Employment) Act 1910 – which set up vocational guidance in an attempt to prevent young people going into dead-end jobs. Next, after it became apparent that many elderly people were living in considerable deprivation, the Old-Age Pensions Act 1908 was passed, which provided a non-contributory old age pension for those over the age of 70.

The Liberals then turned their attention to the employed and unemployed. Legislation included: The Trade Dispute Act 1906 – which stated that unions could not be sued for damages sustained during a strike; The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906 – which granted compensation for personal injury at work; The Coal Mines Regulation Act 1908 – which limited the hours of mine workers to 8 hours per day; The Labour Exchanges Act 1909 – which saw the creation of employment agencies to help the unemployed find work; The Trade Boards Act 1909 – which established a fixed minimum wage in non-unionised ‘sweated’ industries; The Shops Act 1911 – which allowed a weekly half holiday for shop staff; and Part 2 of the historic National Insurance Act 1911 – which provided insurance cover against recurring unemployment in particular industries. Part 1 of the National Insurance Act regarded Health. The bill made it compulsory for health insurance to be provided to workers earning less than £160 per year, including maternity care and sanatorium treatment.

Perhaps the most prominent legislation introduced by the Liberal Party was the Finance Bill, known as the “People’s Budget”, which was presented in 1909, and finally passed in 1911, after a long conflict with the House of Lords. It has been described as a “revolutionary concept”[24] as it was the first budget that attempted to redistribute wealth from the rich to working citizens by means of high taxation. It included advanced moves towards a graduated income tax; a “super tax” on high incomes; taxes on certain goods such as tobacco, whisky and petrol; high taxes on the land of wealthy landowners; higher death duties and heavy taxes on the profits made from the sale and ownership of property.[25]

Conclusion

To conclude, there were a number of reasons why the Liberal party introduced welfare reforms. To say that one factor was solely responsible would be unwise. Rather, it was the combination of various events in history which coincided that led to the passing of certain legislation. Certain events are more obviously intertwined with particular legislation than others; for example, the child-oriented legislation was the result of military pressure after the failure of the Boer War. Whilst, with other legislation, e.g.  The “People’s budget”, we must take into account a number of direct or indirect causes, e.g. the increasing awareness of poverty, the pressure from the Labour Party, and the influence from overseas etc. In any case, the impact of the Liberal welfare reforms should not be understated; it undeniably led to the growth in government, and laid the building blocks for the modern welfare state.

 

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