The Cold War was a time of enormous tension between two of the worlds’ strongest superpowers that were ideologically opposed to one another: the communist Soviet Union, and the capitalist United States of America. When the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Cold War came to an end, it sparked a debate that continues to exist today and will go on for some time. Why did the Soviet Union collapse? Who, or what, was responsible? According to Margaret Thatcher: “Ronald Reagan won the cold war without firing a shot.” This echoes a widely held opinion in the West, especially in America, that it was Reagan who was directly responsible for ending the cold war. Alternative views of history reject this assessment, claiming that the Soviet Union collapsed because of its own problems at home.
The following paper examines both sides of the argument and comes to the conclusion that the impact of Reagan is often overstated in the West, as evidence suggests that he was not directly responsible for ending the Cold War. That is not to say, however, that he did not have any impact at all. The evidence suggests that Reagan’s foreign policy increased pressure on the Soviet Union, speeding up the collapse. Though this collapse was inevitable due to the internal problems facing the U.S.S.R. To make the case, this paper will be structured as follows: First, Reagan’s approach to foreign policy is outlined, followed by the arguments in favour of Reagan being responsible for winning the Cold War. Counter-arguments are then provided, showing how it was the internal problems of the Soviet Union that predominantly led to its collapse.
The Reagan Doctrine
Prior to the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the White House was occupied by Democrat leader Jimmy Carter. Disillusionment was still high within the American public due to Watergate and Vietnam, and so Carter was elected in 1976 to convey a more liberal approach to foreign policy, which emphasised working with others, foreign aid and diplomatic solutions. Conversely, critics argue that this was neither a viable, nor a politically acceptable foreign policy, as it overlooked the imperialist ambitions of the Soviet Union (Layne, 1988, p.96). Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first secretary of state, epitomised this sentiment by claiming that: “the Soviet Union had been seduced by the weakness of the American will and extended itself far beyond the natural limits of its own apparent interests and influence.” Moreover, the failure of the Jimmy Carter administration to resist “this audacious assault upon American interests” further exacerbated the problem (McMahon, 1995, p.371). There is strong evidence showing that during the 1970s, the Soviet Union expanded its military and conventional arsenals, consuming more than one-quarter of its GDP (Kaufman, 2011). For the first time, the Soviet’s military spending grew larger than the U.S’s, which had been descending. As Soviet interventionism expanded into Afghanistan, calls for the U.S. to rebuild its military grew, especially among neoconservatives who had already began shaping the Reagan administration’s foreign policy (Layne, 1988, p.97). Therefore, there is evidence that the 1980 Reagan campaign, which proposed a substantial increase in defence spending, reflected the mood of the American electorate, and so he was elected into office.
The Reagan Doctrine is the name given to the strategy of the Reagan administration to diminish the global influence of the Soviet Union. The plan was to build-up the military, reject arms controls, squeeze the U.S.S.R. economically and support anti-communist “freedom fighters” around the world. Layne (1988, p.98) provides a detailed definition of the Reagan Doctrine, in which he states:
The Reagan Doctrine has never been authoritatively defined, but its content can be inferred from various statements made by President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz and the writings of such neoconservative foreign policy theorists as Charles Krauthammer, Irving Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz. As commonly understood, the Reagan Doctrine committed the United States to resisting Soviet and Soviet-supported aggression wherever it arose, to building U.S.-style democracies in Third World countries, and to rolling back communism by aiding anti-communist insurgencies. The Reagan Doctrine sought to create an ideologically congenial world and assumed that U.S. security required nothing less. In some quarters, moreover, the doctrine’s objectives were framed more expansively to include bringing about the Soviet empire’s breakup and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet state itself by inflicting a series of what Kristol called “small defeats” on Moscow in the Third World (presumably undermining the Soviet regime’s domestic legitimacy), engaging the Kremlin in a high-tech arms race, and pressuring the Soviet Union economically.
This plan was quickly put into practice. Within his first five years the military budget had doubled, increasing from $142.6 billion to $286.6 billion (Korb, 1988, p.84). Reagan had purchased nearly 3,000 combat aircraft, 3,700 strategic missiles, 200 ships, and approximately 10,000 tanks in the first six years of his administration (ibid, p.86). By the middle of the decade, U.S. military expenditures surpassed the Soviet Union’s for the first time since the late 1960’s (ibid, p.84). In addition to which, the CIA began arming and financing the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan (Operation Cyclone), and the indigenous anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua – known as the Contras. In response to Martial Law in Poland (1981-1983), the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on the U.S.S.R, banning the exportation of equipment needed to build a pipeline between Russia and Western Europe.
It has been argued that it is mainly these policies that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kaufman (2011) argues that the doubling in the size of the defence budget, had the consequence of modernising the American military, which in turn, wiped out the Soviet’s military advantage that it had gained in the 1970s, and badly strained the Soviet economy. He argues that Reagan understood more clearly than others the “evil essence” of the Soviet Union and communism, and how to defeat it, and that the Soviet system was vulnerable to “sustained economic, military, moral, and political pressure.” Christopher Layne (1988, p.108), who by no means was a supporter of Ronald Reagan, conceded that the Reagan administration had restored national pride and self-confidence to the U.S. that had been badly damaged by Vietnam and the Iran hostage crisis (1979-1980). Supporters of Reagan’s foreign policy, also claim that his plans of developing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) posed a great technological threat to the Soviets which they simply could not compete with. SDI, or as critics called “Star Wars”, was a program that was intended to develop a sophisticated, space-based, anti-ballistic missile system which would prevent attacks from other countries, and, according to Reagan, “render nuclear weapons obsolete” (Brown, 2007, p.6). There is evidence that suggests that the Soviets were concerned about these plans. According to Busch (1997, pp.455-456) SDI became an “obsession” for the Soviet leadership, and they were “thrown into a state of despair”. At the Geneva summit in 1985, they proposed for the U.S. to abandon the program in return for a sharp reduction in Soviet nuclear arsenals, however, Reagan refused. The argument is that SDI had placed a strategic, technological and economic burden upon the Soviet Union which contributed as much as any other single factor to the end of the Cold War (ibid).
On the other hand, there is an evident problem with this line of thinking. The argument that the Reagan Doctrine was directly responsible for bringing about the end of the Cold War, fails to take into account the shift in Reagan’s approach towards foreign policy during his second term in The White House. In his second term, there is a strong indication that Reagan switched to a more pragmatic and conciliatory position, which encouraged dialogue, cooperation and understanding with the Soviet Union, and placed a greater emphasis on arms reduction (Fischer, 1997, pp.488-496). As in his first term, it was expected that the surge in defence spending would continue into his second administration. However, this was not the case. On the contrary, the budget began to decrease. Congress slashed the 1986 request by 10 percent, and the defence budget dropped in nominal terms (Korb, 1988, p.86). In addition, the two superpowers began communicating with each other, notably at the Geneva summit in 1985, at Reykjavik Iceland in 1986, and at Moscow in 1988. It appears that Reagan’s attitude towards the Soviet Union had changed. No longer were they the “evil empire” which he had called them previously. By 1988, he was referring to Gorbachev as “my friend”. As Ravenal (1988, p.125) points out, the administration had gone from “accusations of lying and cheating and committing “any crime” to the warm handshakes of three summits and the tangible accomplishments of the double-zero, intermediate-range arms reduction agreement and the foundation of a substantial cut in strategic nuclear arms.” Ironically, a portion of the neoconservative Republicans had began to complain that Reagan had become too soft and friendly towards the Soviets at the end.
The reason why Reagan changed his policy is up for debate. One reason could be attributed to the growing national deficit. In his first term in office, Reagan had succeeded in doubling the size of the defence budget, but also in doubling the size of the national deficit (Korb, 1988, p.90). For someone who was supposed to be a “fiscal conservative”, this does not seem very economically responsible. Another reason could have been in response to the events of Able Archer in 1983. Able Archer was a ten-day NATO exercise that provoked the Soviet Union to ready their nuclear forces for attack, due to the realistic nature of the exercise. This event had almost caused nuclear war, which may have led Reagan to believe that dialog would be the best approach, as not long after, he gave a speech in which he stated that: “Reducing the risk of war-and especially nuclear war is priority number one” (Fischer, 1997, p.487). Other reasons could be because of the growing public dissatisfaction with the Reagan Doctrine and scepticism about U.S. involvement overseas (Layne, 1988, p.101); or because of the rise of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership, who was a more democratic and cooperative leader. Regardless, the point remains that the Soviet Union did not collapse during Reagan’s first term, when he had taken a firm attitude towards the Soviet Union and focused on military build-up. On the contrary, the Soviet Union collapsed after Reagan’s shift in attitude and policy, and when the relationship between the two superpowers had improved. This seems to contradict the argument that the Reagan Doctrine brought about the collapse.
Internal problems
In some ways, supporters of communism are happy to place the blame on Reagan for the fall of the Soviet Union, as it takes away responsibility from the inherent flaws and inefficiencies of an authoritarian, centrally controlled economic system. In the late 1970s the Soviet Union was immersed in a mass of problems which it would not recover from, not least because its economy was stagnating. Price controls and collectivisation were having devastating effects on its agriculture sector, factories and technology were backwards and outdated, and consumers were faced with widespread shortages and low-quality products (Stoner-Weiss, 2009, pp.4-5). Moreover, prices had tripled, taxes had increased and living conditions were deteriorating (Crouch, 1989, pp.26-27). The absence of natural market forces such as supply and demand, and the lack of economic incentives meant that workers were unproductive and lacked a work ethic. “We pretend to work, while you pretend to pay us” was a common joke that circulated within its factories (Stoner-Weiss, 2009, p.45). These inefficiencies were predicted in the 1920s by economist Ludwig von Mises who argued that the Soviet system was unsustainable and would ultimately collapse because of the problems with state ownership of the means of production. A system that does not have private ownership of the means of production and capital markets does not have a functioning price and profit mechanism, therefore does not have information available about desirability and abundance of a good, and as a consequence there is no way of rationally allocating resources. Hence why the Soviet economy was so unproductive, wasteful and plagued with scarcities (Von Mises, 1990).
The vulnerability of the Soviet economy was not helped by the prioritisation of military build-up and its costly interventions abroad. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which turned out to be an almost ten year long war, involving approximately one million Soviet troops, tens of thousands of which either died or were injured (Reuveny and Prakash, 1999, p.696). Often labelled as “Russia’s Vietnam” by Western media, there is a strong case that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was one of the contributing factors that led to its collapse, not least because of the economic burden that it placed on the Soviet economy. The war discredited the perceived military strength of the Soviet army. Furthermore, the corruption, looting, plundering and other atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers destroyed its moral legitimacy, which consequently had profound implications for the survivability of the Soviet Union (ibid, p.698).
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he recognised that something needed to change. Unproductivity, corruption, cover-ups, and mismanagement had built-up in the Soviet system over many years, and reorganisation was not just needed, it was necessary. Not many would predict the scale of the reforms that Gorbachev brought in, however, as his plans were quite radical. His strategy was to reorganise the political and economic system, encourage transparency in its institutions, and rethink the interventionist approach to foreign policy. “Glasnost” meaning “openness” was one of the policies which Gorbachev introduced, and its effects were momentous. Gorbachev wanted to win the trust of the public by increasing dialogue between the government and its citizens, starting off by literally going out on the streets of Russia to talk to the people – something which had seemed impossible a few years before. The policy entailed greater freedom of speech for the citizens and the media, reducing censorship and controls, and opening up political debate. Brown (2007, pp.6-7) argues that these measures of political reform and democratisation were the most radical of Gorbachev’s reforms as they introduced a whole range of freedoms, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which were ultimately significant in ending the Cold War. Gorbachev’s glasnost policy had devastating consequences for the Soviet system, which we can assume was no part of his intention. The result was for the crimes and atrocities that had been carried out by the Soviet government to be exposed to the general public, and for them to learn about the higher standard of living that exists in the United States and in the West. A snowballing effect occurred which proved that revealing just a small amount of truth was almost impossible; “as soon as the iron-fist of the regime eased its grip, facts more and more damaging to the Soviet government were rapidly exposed” (Zilper, 1991, p.46). The evidence strongly suggests that Glasnost was a major contributing factor to the end of the Cold War.
Similarly, “Perestroika,” meaning “restructuring,” was another policy which Gorbachev introduced, that attempted to revive the Soviet economy. As the problems with central planning came to fruition, it became apparent that the command economy needed reforming. Gorbachev’s plan was to introduce various market-like reforms with the goal of making socialism work more efficiently. He attempted to increase competition between businesses by passing anti-monopoly legislation, and allowing some semi-private industries to form. In addition, he encouraged productivity and responsibility by removing the guarantee of bailouts for failing companies and introducing performance-related bonuses for workers and managers (Nuti, 1988, pp.377-380). The reforms did not go far enough, however, as price controls were kept in place, along with the inconvertibility of the currency and government controls over the means of production. Ultimately, Perestroika failed to provide the stimulation to the Soviet economy that it desperately needed, and eventually the Soviet Union collapsed on 25th December 1991. In reflection, Gorbachev (2013, p.40) claimed that “Perestroika’s greatest achievement was to awaken and liberate the mind. People were freed to think without the constraint of fear.” However, he does admit that mistakes were made, for example he regrets that he did not “decentralise[ ] more quickly.” (ibid).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the foreign policy of the Reagan administration was known as the Reagan Doctrine, and it planned to weaken the global influence of the Soviet Union by the combination of building up the military, rejecting arms controls and supporting anti-communist “freedom fighters” around the world. The evidence shows that the strategy did increase external pressures on the Soviet Union, in particular with the SDI programme, however, the degree to which is often overstated by Reagan’s supporters, who fail to take into account Reagan’s shift in policy towards the Soviet Union during his second term in office.
The evidence more strongly suggests that it was the internal problems of the Soviet Union that predominantly led to its collapse. The inherent flaws of a largely authoritarian and centrally planned economy had come to fruition. Factories and mines were dilapidated, corruption was rife, and consumers were faced with widespread shortages and low-quality products. Gorbachev’s well-intentioned reforms, including glasnost and perestroika, failed to revive the Soviet economy that it so desperately needed. As a result, by giving the public a small amount of freedom, Gorbachev sealed the fate of the Soviet Union, as the crimes and failures of communism came to the surface. Ultimately, freedom and national sovereignty became much more appealing to the people than totalitarian collectivism, and so the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end.
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